本文選題：城市商業(yè)銀行 + 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)�。� 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：2012年,象山綠葉城市信用社改制為寧波東海銀行,標(biāo)志著我國最后一家城市信用社改制完成。時至今日,城商行已走過了十幾年的發(fā)展歷程。在成立之初,城商行背負著城市信用社的巨額不良貸款。為防止城商行無法償還儲戶存款,引發(fā)地方金融震蕩,監(jiān)管部門明確要求地方政府入股城商行。也正是由于這一歷史原因,城商行內(nèi)普遍存在地方政府“一股獨大”的現(xiàn)象。自2002年起,部分城商行逐漸意識到“一股獨大”問題的嚴重性,紛紛增資擴股,引入境內(nèi)外投資者,借助外力建立市場化運作機制,提高市場競爭力。增資擴股不僅增加了城商行的資本金,還改變了城商行的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),但什么樣的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有利于提升銀行業(yè)績?地方政府在城商行經(jīng)營管理中發(fā)揮著什么作用?這是本文所要研究的主要內(nèi)容。城商行的市場定位是為中小企業(yè)服務(wù),但中小企業(yè)生命周期短、管理成本高的特點導(dǎo)致一部分城商行偏離中小企業(yè),將資金投向大客戶、大項目。由于城商行信貸資金有限,主要在當(dāng)?shù)亻_展業(yè)務(wù),將大量信貸資金投向當(dāng)?shù)卮罂蛻艉笕菀仔纬少J款集中現(xiàn)象。結(jié)合社會普遍關(guān)注的城商行貸款集中問題,本文將對不同股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下貸款集中度對銀行業(yè)績的影響進行研究。首先,本文以一般公司治理理論和銀行業(yè)特殊性為基礎(chǔ),分析了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與銀行業(yè)績的關(guān)系。然后通過閱讀城商行相關(guān)資料后歸納了城商行發(fā)展歷程中的特征,并對城商行、股份制商業(yè)銀行和國有銀行的現(xiàn)狀進行了對比分析。在實證分析中,本文廣泛搜集了2005-2013年我國26個省份(含自治區(qū)、直轄市)66家城市商業(yè)銀行的年報數(shù)據(jù),用Eviews6.0建立靜態(tài)面板模型,先探討股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對銀行業(yè)績的影響,再引入股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與貸款集中度的交互項,探討不同股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對貸款集中度和銀行業(yè)績關(guān)系的影響。實證結(jié)果表明:第一大股東持股比例越高,前五大股東持股比例越集中,銀行業(yè)績越差;大股東之間的制衡關(guān)系越強,銀行業(yè)績越好;貸款集中度越高,城商行業(yè)績越差;加入股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與貸款集中度的交互項后發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡度不影響貸款集中與銀行業(yè)績的關(guān)系,而當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|為政府時會減弱貸款集中度對銀行業(yè)績的不利影響。最后,本文根據(jù)實證結(jié)果,結(jié)合我國城市商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營現(xiàn)狀,對城市商業(yè)銀行未來發(fā)展提出了以下政策建議:第一,降低股權(quán)集中度,建立股東制衡機制;第二,減少地方政府干預(yù),引入境內(nèi)境外戰(zhàn)略投資者;第三,在城商行間展開合作,降低貸款集中風(fēng)險,并利用各城商行在當(dāng)?shù)氐馁Y源優(yōu)勢和信息優(yōu)勢開展業(yè)務(wù);第四,城商行應(yīng)結(jié)合自身經(jīng)營狀況,準(zhǔn)確市場定位,充分發(fā)揮小銀行優(yōu)勢。
[Abstract]:In 2012, Xiangshan Green Leaf City Credit Cooperative was transformed into Ningbo Donghai Bank, marking the completion of the last urban credit cooperative reform in China. Today, the city business has gone through more than ten years of development. At the beginning of its establishment, city banks were saddled with a huge amount of bad loans from urban credit cooperatives. In order to prevent City Commercial Bank from failing to repay depositors' deposits and trigger local financial shocks, regulators explicitly require local governments to take a stake in City Commercial Bank. It is precisely because of this historical reason that the local government's dominance is widespread in the city commercial banks. Since 2002, some city commercial banks have gradually realized the seriousness of the problem of "one share alone". They have increased capital and expanded shares one after another, introduced domestic and foreign investors, set up market-oriented operation mechanism with the help of foreign forces, and improved market competitiveness. Increasing capital and expanding shares not only increase the capital of CCB, but also change the equity structure of CCB, but what kind of equity structure is conducive to the improvement of bank performance? What role does the local government play in the operation and management of city commercial banks? This is the main content of this paper. The market orientation of city commercial bank is to serve small and medium-sized enterprises, but the characteristics of short life cycle and high management cost of small and medium-sized enterprises cause some city commercial banks to deviate from small and medium-sized enterprises and invest funds into large clients and projects. Due to the limited credit capital of the city commercial bank, it is easy to form the phenomenon of credit concentration after investing a large amount of credit funds in the local major customers. Combined with the problem of city commercial bank loan centralization, this paper will study the influence of loan concentration on bank performance under different ownership structure. Firstly, based on the general corporate governance theory and banking particularity, this paper analyzes the relationship between equity structure and bank performance. Then it summarizes the characteristics of the development of city commercial banks by reading the relevant materials of city commercial banks, and makes a comparative analysis of the present situation of city commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and state-owned banks. In the empirical analysis, this paper collects the annual report data of 66 urban commercial banks in 26 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government) from 2005 to 2013, establishes the static panel model with Eviews6.0, and probes into the influence of equity structure on bank performance. Then the interaction between equity structure and loan concentration is introduced to explore the influence of different ownership structure on the relationship between loan concentration and bank performance. The empirical results show that the higher the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder, the more concentrated the first five shareholders are, and the worse the bank performance is, the stronger the checks and balances between the major shareholders are, the better the bank performance is, the higher the loan concentration is, the worse the performance of the city commercial bank is. After adding the interaction between equity structure and loan concentration, it is found that equity concentration and equity balance do not affect the relationship between loan concentration and bank performance, but when the largest shareholder is the government, the negative impact of loan concentration on bank performance will be weakened. Finally, according to the empirical results, combined with the current situation of urban commercial banks in China, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations for the future development of urban commercial banks: first, reduce the degree of equity concentration, establish a shareholder balance mechanism; second, Reduce local government intervention, introduce domestic and foreign strategic investors; third, develop cooperation among city commercial banks, reduce the risk of credit concentration, and take advantage of the local resources and information advantages of the local commercial banks to carry out business; fourth, City commercial banks should combine their own operating conditions, accurate market positioning, give full play to the advantages of small banks.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F832.33;F832.51

【相似文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉勇;論銀行業(yè)績評價機制[J];西南金融;2001年09期

2 ;銀行業(yè)績[J];中國外匯;2006年03期

3 張強;劉彥;武次冰;;利益相關(guān)者行為對商業(yè)銀行業(yè)績影響的實證分析[J];金融理論與實踐;2008年02期

4 熊娟;;資本充足率要求對商業(yè)銀行業(yè)績影響研究[J];上海金融學(xué)院學(xué)報;2010年02期

5 程群;;平衡計分卡在商業(yè)銀行業(yè)績評價中應(yīng)用的思考[J];審計月刊;2009年05期

6 賈雷,楊克磊;我國商業(yè)銀行業(yè)績評價[J];沈陽理工大學(xué)學(xué)報;2005年01期

7 李芹;湯，

本文編號：1781474