本文選題：董事會治理　切入點：信息披露　出處：《鄭州大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：在證券市場上,外部投資者利用上市公司披露的信息進行投資決策,由于信息的不對稱,上市公司的管理層占據著信息優(yōu)勢,而外部股東處于信息劣勢,信息披露容易出現信息失真,財務舞弊,投機行為等弊端,這嚴重損害投資者利益,影響企業(yè)健康持久發(fā)展。所以人們迫切要求找到影響信息披露質量的因素,而完善的董事會治理是提高信息披露質量的關鍵因素,因此,如何加強董事會治理來提高信息披露質量是亟待解決的問題。 目前,國內外現有文獻多是研究公司治理與信息披露質量的關系,或者僅選取董事會特征中個別因素進行研究,而本文直接從董事會治理的角度出發(fā),依據有效市場理論、信息不對稱理論和委托代理理論,提出研究假設,實證檢驗董事會治理與信息披露質量之間的關系。 本文的核心內容是對董事會治理與信息披露質量的關系進行實證研究。首先,選取深圳證券交易所343家非金融類上市公司的數據,設定自變量：董事會會議次數、董事成員持股比例、獨立董事比例、兩職合一、董事會規(guī)模；控制變量：資產負債率、公司規(guī)模、凈資產收益率；對信息披露質量的衡量,采用深圳證券交易所對外公布的信息考評結果,設定考評結果為0和1,并對變量進行Pearson相關性檢驗,初步判斷變量之間不存在多重共線性。其次,建立實證模型,采用二項logistic回歸分析,檢驗董事會治理與信息披露質量的相關關系。最后,得出實證結果：董事成員持股比例與信息披露質量顯著正相關,董事會會議次數與信息披露質量顯著正相關,兩職合一與信息披露質量顯著負相關,而獨立董事在董事會治理中發(fā)揮的作用有限,對信息披露質量影響不顯著,董事會規(guī)模與信息披露之間無顯著關系。 在本文最后,根據實證研究的結果,提出以下改進措施：提高董事成員持股比例,加強對董事成員的股權激勵；董事會領導結構上堅持“二元領導”；完善獨立董事會制度,發(fā)揮獨立董事監(jiān)督作用；加強對信息披露工作的管理。
[Abstract]:In the stock market, investors use the information disclosure of listed companies to make investment decisions, because of the information asymmetry, the managers of listed companies dominate the information superiority, and the external shareholders in information disadvantage, information disclosure is prone to information distortion, financial fraud, speculation and other defects, which seriously damage the interests of investors, affect the enterprise lasting health development. There is an urgent requirement to find the factors affecting the quality of the information disclosure, and improve the governance of the board of directors is the key factor to improve the information disclosure quality, therefore, how to strengthen the governance of the board of directors to improve the quality of information disclosure is the problem to be solved.
At present, the domestic and foreign existing literature is to study the relationship between corporate governance and the quality of information disclosure, to study the characteristics of the board of directors or only selected individual factors, and this paper directly from the board governance perspective, based on the efficient market theory, information asymmetry theory and the principal-agent theory, put forward the research hypothesis, the empirical relationship between the board of directors governance and the quality of information disclosure.
The core content of this paper is on the board of directors and the quality of information disclosure of the relationship between empirical research. First, select the Shenzhen stock exchange 343 non-financial listed company data, set up the independent variable: the number of board meetings, the share ratio of directors, independent directors proportion, the two level one, the size of the board of directors; control variables asset liability ratio, company size, rate of return on net assets; on the quality of information disclosure measure, the information evaluation results of Shenzhen Stock Exchange announced, setting evaluation results for 0 and 1, and the Pearson correlation test of variables, preliminary judgment does not exist multicollinearity between variables. Secondly, establish an empirical model, using two logistic regression analysis, test related between board governance and the quality of information disclosure. Finally, the empirical results: Directors shareholding ratio and the quality of information disclosure. With a positive correlation, the board of directors is positively related to the number of meetings and the quality of information disclosure, the two level one and the quality of information disclosure is negatively related, and independent directors in the board of directors governance play a limited role, has no significant effect on the quality of information disclosure, the board of directors has no significant relation between scale and information disclosure.
At the end of this paper, according to the results of empirical research, put forward the following measures: to improve the share ratio of directors, strengthen the equity incentive for members of the board of directors; leadership structure adhere to the "two yuan leadership"; perfecting the independent system of board of directors, independent directors play a supervisory role; strengthen the management of information disclosure.

【學位授予單位】：鄭州大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F276.6;F233;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1684263