本文選題：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　切入點(diǎn)：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)制度體系尚未健全，公司投資都是在這不完善的環(huán)境下進(jìn)行的，基于嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱和代理問(wèn)題致使公司普遍存在無(wú)效率投資，即過(guò)度投資和投資不足。而會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量特征之一，它具有會(huì)計(jì)信息的治理功能，即能有效緩解信息不對(duì)稱和代理問(wèn)題，可改善公司非效率投資。一方面會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性要求及時(shí)反映損失，經(jīng)理人為維護(hù)自己的名譽(yù)而不會(huì)盲目選擇損失項(xiàng)目，有效抑制過(guò)度投資；另一方面穩(wěn)健性會(huì)計(jì)政策是充分及時(shí)披露會(huì)計(jì)信息，減少契約方間的信息不對(duì)稱，抑制逆向選擇問(wèn)題來(lái)緩解投資不足。近年來(lái)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者逐漸關(guān)注會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，面臨著普遍存在非效率投資的現(xiàn)象，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越能體現(xiàn)其是一種重要的治理機(jī)制。當(dāng)然我國(guó)的特殊制度和市場(chǎng)背景造成上市公司廣為詬病的一股獨(dú)大、所有者缺位的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，并且因代理問(wèn)題和信息不對(duì)稱致使企業(yè)投資行為普遍受到扭曲。很多學(xué)者認(rèn)為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司重要的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)，會(huì)影響著治理機(jī)制的發(fā)揮。 本文以委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、投資理論等作為理論支撐，借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的研究方法和結(jié)論，，從我國(guó)特有的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)入手，分析其在上市公司會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與資本投資效率關(guān)系中的影響，以期可以為我國(guó)建立功能完善的資本市場(chǎng)提供相應(yīng)的政策建議以及為投資者的投資決策提供參考。通過(guò)理論分析和實(shí)證研究，本文有如下發(fā)現(xiàn)： 1．提高會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性可以改善公司資本的投資效率，即在其他條件一定的情況下，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與公司資本投資的無(wú)效率水平負(fù)相關(guān)，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與過(guò)度投資（投資不足）負(fù)相關(guān)，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性在公司資本投資中具有治理價(jià)值； 2．在國(guó)有控股上市公司中，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性可有效抑制過(guò)度投資和緩解投資不足，而在非國(guó)有控股上市公司里會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)非效率投資的改善作用較弱些，尤其是對(duì)過(guò)度投資行為產(chǎn)生的作用很弱； 3．股權(quán)集中度高易導(dǎo)致企業(yè)非效率投資，股權(quán)集中度與投資的無(wú)效率水平，過(guò)度投資（投資不足）顯著正相關(guān)； 4．股權(quán)制衡度高說(shuō)明股東權(quán)力牽制力強(qiáng)，可有效改善企業(yè)非效率投資，即股權(quán)制衡度高與投資的無(wú)效率水平，過(guò)度投資（投資不足）顯著負(fù)相關(guān)； 5．股權(quán)集中程度對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與投資的無(wú)效率水平、過(guò)度投資（投資不足）之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系具有顯著的抑制作用； 6．股權(quán)制衡度對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與投資的無(wú)效率水平、過(guò)度投資（投資不足）之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系具有顯著的促進(jìn)作用； 7．股權(quán)集中度在國(guó)有控股上市公司和非國(guó)有控股上市公司中對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資的負(fù)相關(guān)中都起到了抑制的作用，尤其是對(duì)國(guó)有控股公司的過(guò)度投資和非國(guó)有控股公司的投資不足，股權(quán)集中度的這種阻礙作用更為顯著； 8．股權(quán)制衡度在國(guó)有控股上市公司和非國(guó)有控股上市公司中對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資的負(fù)相關(guān)中都起到了促進(jìn)作用，尤其是對(duì)國(guó)有控股公司的過(guò)度投資，股權(quán)制衡度的這種促進(jìn)作用更為顯著。
[Abstract]:The system of capital market system in China is not perfect, the investment company is not perfect in this environment, serious information asymmetry and agency problems based on common causes the company inefficient investment, namely excessive investment and insufficient investment. Accounting conservatism is one of the characteristics of accounting information quality, it has the function of accounting information governance. Which can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry and agency problems, improve the company's non efficiency investment. On the one hand the accounting conservatism requirements reflect the loss of managers to maintain their reputation will not blindly choose loss projects, effectively curb excessive investment; on the other hand, the robustness of the accounting policy is full and timely disclosure of accounting information, reduce the information asymmetry between the contracting parties to alleviate the adverse selection problem, inhibition of lack of investment. In recent years, domestic and foreign scholars gradually focus on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism, face The widespread phenomenon of inefficient investment, accounting conservatism can reflect its is an important governance mechanism. Of course, special system background and market of our country caused by listed companies widely criticized for the dominance of the ownership structure and the absence of owners, due to agency problems and information asymmetry caused widespread corporate investment behavior twist. Many scholars believe that the ownership structure is the internal governance structure of the company important, will affect the governance mechanism of the play.
Based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, investment theory as the theoretical support, drawing on relevant literature research methods and conclusions at home and abroad, starting from the ownership structure of China, analyzes its influence on the relationship between listed companies accounting conservatism and capital efficiency, in order for China to establish a perfect function of capital the market provides some policy suggestion and provide reference for the investment decisions of investors. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this study found the following:
1. improve the accounting conservatism can improve the efficiency of investment capital, which in certain conditions, the level of capital investment inefficiency is negatively related to accounting conservatism and the company's accounting conservatism and overinvestment (underinvestment) negative correlation, accounting conservatism has value in capital investment in company governance;
2., in state holding listed companies, accounting conservatism can effectively curb excessive investment and ease investment, while in non state holding listed companies, accounting conservatism has little effect on inefficient investment, especially for overinvestment.
3. the concentration of equity is highly likely to lead to the inefficiency of the investment, the concentration of equity and the inefficiency of investment, and the significant positive correlation between over investment (insufficient investment).
4., the high degree of checks and balances indicates that the power of shareholders is strong, and it can effectively improve the inefficient investment of enterprises, that is, the high degree of equity check and the level of inefficiency of investment, and the over investment (underinvestment) are significantly negatively correlated.
5., the degree of ownership concentration has a significant inhibitory effect on the negative correlation between accounting conservatism and investment inefficiency level and over investment (underinvestment).
6. the balance of equity has a significant effect on the negative correlation between the accounting conservatism and the inefficiency of investment, the overinvestment (underinvestment).
7. ownership concentration in state-owned listed companies and non state-owned holding listed companies investment on Accounting Conservatism and non efficiency of the negative correlation plays an inhibitory role, especially the lack of excessive investment in state-owned companies and non state-owned holding company equity investment, set moderate this blocking effect is more significant;
8. degree of equity balances in state-owned listed companies and non state-owned holding listed companies investment on Accounting Conservatism and negative correlation in non efficiency have played a catalytic role, especially the excessive investment in state-owned holding companies, equity balance degree of this effect is more significant.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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