本文選題：私募股權基金　切入點：有限合伙制　出處：《華東政法大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：自2004年美國新橋投資以12.35億元收購深發(fā)展17.89%的相對控股權后，私募股權基金這個概念進入了國人的視線。在短短的幾年間，中國的私募股權投資基金從無到有，從初露端倪到蓬勃發(fā)展，涌現(xiàn)出不少成功的投資案例，成為我國金融市場上頗具生命力的重要組成部分。而有限合伙制憑借靈活、自治的內部治理結構和充分的激勵約束機制，將投資人的資金與基金管理人的豐富的專業(yè)管理經驗和廣闊的人際關系進行有效地結合，揚長避短，實現(xiàn)共同發(fā)展；成為私募股權基金的主流形式。 在有限合伙制私募股權基金中，存在著兩個利益主體：一是基金投資人，，一是基金管理人。隨著募集資金行為的產生，基金投資人和基金管理人之間建立了委托代理關系，又具有合伙關系；這種交錯的雙重法律關系使得基金投資人和基金管理人的利益既存在一致性，又不可避免地存在沖突。為了保護各主體的利益，實現(xiàn)交易效率和公平，有必要構建一套利益平衡機制，以期規(guī)范私募股權投資秩序，推動私募股權投資市場的持續(xù)發(fā)展。而在現(xiàn)行的法律、政策環(huán)境下，并沒有“私募”的概念，亦沒有專門規(guī)范私募股權基金的制度：《合伙企業(yè)法》為其提供了組織形式的依據，但短短的25條僅簡單地規(guī)定了各主體的權利義務；《創(chuàng)業(yè)投資企業(yè)暫行管理規(guī)定》等都側重對企業(yè)的組織形式、設立條件及外部監(jiān)管等的規(guī)范；有關基金投資人和基金管理人的權利義務只能參照“證券投資基金”的相關制度；對基金投資人和基金管理人之間可能存在的利益失衡缺乏有效的解決方式。 因此，本文從基金投資人和基金管理人的各自利益出發(fā)，指出其利益沖突之處并剖析產生利益沖突的原因。在對私募股權基金中的價值取向進行選擇的基礎上，借鑒美國有限合伙制私募股權基金立法政策支持和有限合伙基金完善治理結構的成功經驗，“內外兼修”，構建一套適合我國有限合伙制私募股權基金發(fā)展的利益平衡機制。 按照上述寫作思路，本文的內容除了引言和結語之外主要分為四個部分： 第一部分對有限合伙制私募股權基金的利益平衡機制進行概述：首先介紹了私募股權基金的概念、特點、發(fā)展歷程及有限合伙制基金中的利益相關主體；其次分析了利益平衡機制的理論基礎，即委托代理關系和合伙關系；最后，概括介紹了有限合伙制中利益平衡機制的應有內容。 第二部分重點分析了有限合伙制私募股權基金的利益平衡機制：包括法律主體分析、主體之間的利益沖突；并深入分析了各主體產生利益沖突的根源和直接原因；最后在對利益平衡機制的價值目標進行選擇的基礎上，詳細介紹了利益平衡機制的一整套制度安排。 第三部分是對美國利益平衡機制的比較借鑒：首先分析了美國立法和有限合伙人協(xié)議在利益平衡方面的制度設計；然后對我國現(xiàn)行利益平衡機制的制度安排予以介紹。 第四部分是完善有限合伙制私募股權基金的利益平衡機制：通過有限合伙基金的內部救濟和立法政策的外部支持兩方面予以完善，互相協(xié)調，實現(xiàn)基金投資人和管理人的利益平衡。
[Abstract]:Since 2004 the United States new investment to 1 billion 235 million yuan acquisition of Shenzhen Development 17.89% relative holding rights, the concept of private equity funds into people's sight. In just a few years, Chinese private equity investment fund from the horizon to flourish, the emergence of a lot of successful investment cases, become an important part of me in the financial market vitality. But the limited partnership with flexible internal governance structure, autonomy and adequate incentive and restraint mechanisms, investment funds and the rich professional management experience and broad interpersonal relationship were combined effectively, and avoid weaknesses, to achieve common development; become the mainstream form of private equity funds.
In the limited partnership private equity funds, there are two main benefits: one is a fund investors, fund managers. With the behavior of raising funds, establish the principal-agent relationship between fund investors and fund managers, and the partnership; thisstaggered dual legal relationship makes the fund investors and fund management the interests of both consistency and conflict inevitably. In order to protect the interests of all the main transaction efficiency and fairness, it is necessary to construct a mechanism of balance of interests, in order to regulate the private equity investment in order to promote the sustainable development of the private equity market. But in the current law, policy environment. And there is no concept of "private", there is no special system to regulate private equity funds: "Partnership Enterprise Law > provides a basis for the organization, but only a short period of 25. The single has stipulated the rights and obligations of each subject; "Interim Provisions on the administration of venture investment enterprises" etc. were focused on the organizational form of enterprise, the establishment of conditions and external regulatory norms; the fund investors and fund managers can only refer to the rights and obligations of the relevant system of securities investment fund "; the lack of effective ways to solve the problem of interest may exist between fund investors and fund managers of the imbalance.
Therefore, this article from the respective interests of fund investors and fund managers, points out the interests conflict and analyzes the reasons of conflicts of interest. Based on the selection of the value orientation of private equity funds in the United States, from the limited partnership private equity fund legislation and policy support and improve the successful experience of Limited partnership fund governance structure, "Neiwaijianxiu", construct a set of suitable for our limited partnership private equity fund development interests balance mechanism.
In addition to the foreword and conclusion, the contents of this paper are divided into four parts, in addition to the introduction and conclusion.
The first part of the Limited Partnership Private Equity Fund to balance the interests of the mechanism were summarized: firstly introduces the concept and characteristics of private equity funds, stakeholders and the development of limited partnership funds; secondly analyzes the theoretical basis of the mechanism of balance of interests, namely principal-agent relationship and partnership; finally, summarizes its the contents of the mechanism of balancing of interests in limited partnership.
The second part focuses on the analysis of the benefit balance mechanism of Limited Partnership Private Equity Fund, including the analysis of the legal subject, the conflict of interests between subjects; and in-depth analysis of root causes of the conflicts and direct reason; finally in the value of the benefits balance mechanism based on the selection of the subject, introduces a set of arrangement the system of interest balance mechanism.
The third part is the comparison of the American interest balance mechanism. First, it analyzes the system design of the interests balance in the US legislation and limited partnership agreement, then introduces the institutional arrangement of our current interest balance mechanism.
The fourth part is to improve the limited partnership private equity fund interest balance mechanism: through the limited partnership fund's internal relief and external support of legislative policy two aspects to improve and coordinate each other, so as to achieve the balance of interests between fund investors and managers.

【學位授予單位】：華東政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D922.28;F832.51

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