本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式選擇的影響因素研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股票期權(quán) 限制性股票 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 方式選擇 影響因素

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)高速發(fā)展，現(xiàn)代公司制度建立，企業(yè)所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離導(dǎo)致的代理問(wèn)題日益嚴(yán)重。起源于上世紀(jì)50年代的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度，歷經(jīng)幾十年的發(fā)展，證明能夠?qū)芾韺悠鸬介L(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)作用，，已成為激勵(lì)代理人的行為與委托人利益一致、調(diào)和委托人和代理人兩權(quán)分離矛盾的有效手段。在我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)日臻成熟的今天，已有越來(lái)越多的上市公司進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)，運(yùn)用最多的是股票期權(quán)和限制性股票這兩種激勵(lì)方式。 本文主要研究股票期權(quán)和限制性股票這兩種股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式，比較了股票期權(quán)和限制性股票的制度異同，選取2010年1月1日至2013年2月28日我國(guó)公布過(guò)股權(quán)激勵(lì)預(yù)案的上市公司為樣本，建立logistic模型，分析了各種公司特征變量對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)標(biāo)的選擇傾向變量的影響，發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性、企業(yè)盈利情況是影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式選擇的主要因素，高成長(zhǎng)性、盈利情況好的企業(yè)，分別以顯著性水平5%和10%傾向于選擇股票期權(quán)方式；企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)性、行業(yè)性質(zhì)、控股股東性質(zhì)、高管年齡與高管持股比例對(duì)企業(yè)選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式的影響不顯著；企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)性高、國(guó)有企業(yè)更傾向于選擇股票期權(quán)的激勵(lì)方式，但并不顯著。股權(quán)集中度、獨(dú)立董事比例、董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兼任與否這三個(gè)公司治理特征對(duì)企業(yè)選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式的影響不顯著。 因此，為充分發(fā)揮股權(quán)激勵(lì)的激勵(lì)作用，企業(yè)應(yīng)優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，加強(qiáng)獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的監(jiān)督制衡，并設(shè)置專(zhuān)門(mén)的薪酬委員會(huì)，結(jié)合實(shí)際，選擇恰當(dāng)?shù)墓蓹?quán)激勵(lì)方式，形成企業(yè)特有的激勵(lì)模式，并逐步擴(kuò)大企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的接受面。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of our economy, the establishment of modern company system, the agency problem caused by the separation of enterprise ownership and management rights is becoming more and more serious. The equity incentive system, which originated in -50s, has experienced decades of development. Proved to be able to play a long-term incentive role to the management, has become an incentive agent behavior consistent with the interests of the principal. The effective means of reconciling the contradiction between the principal and the agent. Nowadays, more and more listed companies have carried out equity incentive in the stock market of our country. Stock options and restricted stocks are the two most widely used incentive methods. This paper mainly studies the stock option and restricted stock, and compares the institutional similarities and differences between stock option and restricted stock. From January 1st 2010 to February 28th 2013, the listed companies with stock incentive plan were selected as samples, and the logistic model was established. This paper analyzes the influence of various company characteristic variables on the choice tendency variable of the stock right incentive target, and finds that the growth of the enterprise and the profit of the enterprise are the main factors affecting the choice of the equity incentive mode, and the high growth is the main factor. Enterprises with good profitability tend to choose stock options with significant levels of 5% and 10% respectively; The cash liquidity, industry nature, controlling shareholder nature, senior executive age and the proportion of executive stock ownership have no significant influence on the choice of equity incentive mode. Because of the high cash liquidity, state-owned enterprises prefer to choose the incentive mode of stock option, but it is not significant. The degree of equity concentration, the proportion of independent directors. The three corporate governance characteristics of chairman and general manager have no significant influence on the choice of equity incentive. Therefore, in order to give full play to the incentive role of equity incentive, enterprises should optimize the ownership structure, strengthen the independent director and board of supervisors of the supervision and balance of equity incentive, and set up a special compensation committee, combined with the reality. Choose the appropriate equity incentive mode, form a unique incentive model, and gradually expand the acceptance of corporate equity incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：1395732