本文關(guān)鍵詞：最終控制權(quán)對(duì)過(guò)度投資影響的實(shí)證研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：投資作為拉動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的“三駕馬車(chē)”之一,對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的促進(jìn)作用毋庸置疑,但投資是把雙刃劍,過(guò)熱的投資也引發(fā)了一系列問(wèn)題。企業(yè)是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要參與者,企業(yè)層面“過(guò)度投資”的行為是造成宏觀層面“投資過(guò)熱”的重要原因。從微觀層面看,我國(guó)上市公司中普遍存在過(guò)度投資行為,過(guò)度投資已經(jīng)成為阻礙上市公司價(jià)值提升的主要原因之一。大量過(guò)度投資行為的出現(xiàn),會(huì)使越來(lái)越多的社會(huì)資本扭曲配置,制約著我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。因此,科學(xué)合理的投資決策無(wú)論在微觀層面還是在宏觀層面都具有重要意義。 隨著公司治理問(wèn)題的深入研究,最終控制人與中小股東的代理沖突引起了學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注。最終控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離降低了最終控制人的侵占成本,過(guò)度投資就是其攫取控制權(quán)私人收益的具體表現(xiàn)之一。 本文在梳理了相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)與理論成果之上,基于委托代理理論構(gòu)建了最終控制人投資決策契約模型,用數(shù)學(xué)邏輯演繹了“兩權(quán)分離”導(dǎo)致企業(yè)過(guò)度投資的過(guò)程。在實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì)部分,本文對(duì)過(guò)度投資度量(判別)模型進(jìn)行評(píng)述與選擇,考慮行業(yè)特征,選取2007-2009年滬深兩市制造業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本,借鑒Richardson(2006)的殘差度量模型量化企業(yè)的非效率投資,接著選取殘差為正的樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行多元線性回歸,重點(diǎn)考察了最終控制權(quán)、現(xiàn)金流權(quán)以及兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)企業(yè)過(guò)度投資的影響以及過(guò)度投資的制約機(jī)制。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示：(1)樣本公司普遍存在正的自由現(xiàn)金流；(2)自由現(xiàn)金流與過(guò)度投資顯著正相關(guān)；(3)現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與過(guò)度投資負(fù)相關(guān),兩權(quán)分離度與過(guò)度投資正相關(guān),最終控制權(quán)對(duì)過(guò)度投資的影響因最終控制人性質(zhì)的不同而不同；(4)派發(fā)現(xiàn)金股利、獨(dú)立董事和股權(quán)制衡對(duì)過(guò)度投資具有抑制作用。最后,基于我國(guó)具體國(guó)情和研究結(jié)果,本文從法律法規(guī)建設(shè)、公司治理等角度提出改善過(guò)度投資現(xiàn)狀的相關(guān)建議。 本文研究的貢獻(xiàn)：(1)將最終控制權(quán)與企業(yè)過(guò)度投資相結(jié)合進(jìn)行研究：(2)構(gòu)建了最終控制人投資決策契約模型,用數(shù)學(xué)邏輯演繹了兩權(quán)分離后企業(yè)必然存在過(guò)度投資這一過(guò)程;(3)將控股股東的掏空行為納入過(guò)度投資研究的視角。 本文研究的不足：(1)沒(méi)有將樣本按照兩權(quán)分離度的大小進(jìn)行細(xì)分,因?yàn)橐延袑W(xué)者證明兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)自由現(xiàn)金流過(guò)度投資的影響呈現(xiàn)倒U型的關(guān)系,不是單純的正相關(guān)或是負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；(2)出于行業(yè)特征考慮,選取了制造業(yè)作為研究樣本,并剔除了發(fā)行B股和H股的公司,這樣對(duì)樣本的廣泛代表性略有影響；(3)本文選用了Richardson預(yù)測(cè)投資模型估計(jì)預(yù)期投資和非預(yù)期投資,根據(jù)以往研究經(jīng)驗(yàn),直接默認(rèn)了上市公司整體投資處于正常水平且不存在系統(tǒng)性誤差,缺乏理論證明過(guò)程。
[Abstract]:As one of the "troika" to stimulate economic growth, investment is undoubtedly promoting economic growth, but investment is a double-edged sword. Overheated investment also leads to a series of problems. Enterprises are important participants in the market economy, and the behavior of "overinvestment" at the enterprise level is an important cause of "overinvestment" at the macro level. Overinvestment has become one of the main reasons to hinder the promotion of listed companies' value. A large number of over-investment behavior appears. It will make more and more social capital distorted allocation and restrict the economic development of our country. Therefore, scientific and reasonable investment decision is of great significance both at the micro level and at the macro level. With the in-depth study of corporate governance, the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders has aroused widespread concern in the academic community. The separation of the final control and cash flow rights reduces the cost of the ultimate controller's encroachment. Overinvestment is one of the concrete manifestations of its acquisition of private gains from control. On the basis of combing the relevant literature and theoretical results, this paper constructs a contract model of the final controller's investment decision based on the principal-agent theory. This paper deduces the process of overinvestment caused by "separation of two rights" by mathematical logic. In the part of empirical research and design, this paper reviews and selects the model of overinvestment measurement (discrimination), considering the characteristics of the industry. From 2007 to 2009, the listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were selected as the research samples, and the residual measurement model of Richardson's 2006 was used to quantify the inefficient investment of enterprises. Then select the sample data with positive residuals to carry out multivariate linear regression, and focus on the final control. The influence of cash flow right and the degree of separation of two rights on overinvestment and the restriction mechanism of overinvestment. The empirical results show that the sample companies generally have positive free cash flow. (2) Free cash flow is positively correlated with overinvestment; (3) the cash flow right is negatively correlated with overinvestment, the separation degree of two rights is positively related to overinvestment, and the influence of final control right on overinvestment is different from the nature of ultimate controller. 4) the distribution of cash dividends, independent directors and equity checks and balances have a restraining effect on overinvestment. Finally, based on the specific conditions and research results of our country, this paper builds from the laws and regulations. Corporate governance and other angles to improve the status of overinvestment related recommendations. The contribution of this paper is: 1) the final control right is combined with the overinvestment of the firm. (2) the contract model of the final controller investment decision is constructed. The paper deduces the process of over-investment after the separation of two rights by mathematical logic. 3) integrating the hollowing behavior of controlling shareholders into the perspective of excessive investment research. The lack of this paper does not subdivide the samples according to the size of the two weights separation degree, because some scholars have proved that the influence of the two rights separation degree on the free cash flow overinvestment is inversely U-shaped. Not only positive correlation or negative correlation; (2) considering the characteristics of the industry, the manufacturing industry is selected as the research sample, and the companies that issue B shares and H shares are excluded, which has a slight influence on the wide representation of the samples; 3) this paper selects the Richardson forecast investment model to estimate the expected investment and the unexpected investment, according to the previous research experience. By default, the whole investment of listed companies is in the normal level and there is no systematic error.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F425;F832.51;F224

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