本文選題：中央集權 + 地方分權　； 參考：《社會》2017年03期

【摘要】：在中國歷史上,中央集權與地方分權的關系經(jīng)歷了一系列重大演變。這些演變給我們提出如下三類問題:第一,在地方政治體制上,為什么一部分王朝在開國初期采用了分封制,而當王朝穩(wěn)定下來之后,卻又謀求削藩?第二,在邊疆和西南少數(shù)民族地區(qū),為什么元代和明代采用"土司制",清代卻推行"改土歸流"?第三,在省級政區(qū)和省級政府的設置上,為什么漢人政權表現(xiàn)出興廢不定和周期性循環(huán),而游牧民族建立的中原王朝卻不存在這種循環(huán)?此外,清代之后建立的漢人政權為什么又打破了這種周期循環(huán),建立起穩(wěn)定的省級政區(qū)和統(tǒng)一的省級政府?本文論證了上述問題可以用"風險論"——即中央政府追求"統(tǒng)治風險最小化"的行為及其面臨的約束條件——來解釋,還同時比較了"風險論"與"帝國的治理邏輯"和"行政發(fā)包制模型"在解釋能力上的差別。
[Abstract]:In Chinese history, the relationship between centralization and decentralization has undergone a series of important changes. These evolution give us the following three questions: first, in the local political system, why some dynasties in the early days of the founding of the country, but when the dynasty stabilized, but also seek to cut the vassal? Second, why did the Yuan and Ming dynasties adopt the "Tusi system" in the border areas and the southwest minority areas, while the Qing Dynasty carried out "changing the land and returning to flow"? Third, in the setting up of provincial government and provincial government, why did the Han government show the cycle of prosperity and abolition, but the central Plains dynasty established by nomadic people did not exist such a cycle? In addition, why did the Han regime established after the Qing Dynasty break this cycle and set up stable provincial governments and unified provincial governments? This paper argues that the above problems can be explained by the "risk theory", that is, the behavior of the central government in pursuit of "ruling risk minimization" and the constraints it faces. At the same time, the paper compares the differences between the theory of risk and the logic of imperial governance and the model of administrative contract system.
【作者單位】： 浙江大學社會學系;浙江大學地方政府與社會治理研究中心;
【基金】：包兆龍包玉剛留學生基金會的資助
【分類號】：D630

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本文編號：1995563