本文選題：央地關(guān)系　切入點(diǎn)：制度墮距　出處：《山東社會科學(xué)》2017年05期

【摘要】：我國中央與地方之間的關(guān)系在行政體制和政黨制度的雙重規(guī)定下,具有鮮明的“單一制”和中央集權(quán)特征。近些年,隨著中央政府權(quán)力的不斷下放,特別是經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力的下放,地方政府有了更加明確的利益訴求,“地方主義”日益嚴(yán)重。地方政府出于自身利益考量,常常會對中央的部分政策選擇性執(zhí)行、表面執(zhí)行、扭曲執(zhí)行甚至拒絕執(zhí)行,中央與地方之間出現(xiàn)了明顯的制度墮距。為了維護(hù)國家整體利益,打破“地方主義”割裂局面,保證政策執(zhí)行暢通,中央政府不斷地對中央與地方之間的縱向權(quán)力配置進(jìn)行改革。然而,通過對改革的手段和方法進(jìn)行分析發(fā)現(xiàn),中央與地方關(guān)系的改革出現(xiàn)了內(nèi)卷化現(xiàn)象。只有走出內(nèi)卷化困境,才能真正解決中央與地方關(guān)系中所存在的問題。
[Abstract]:The relationship between the central and local governments in China is characterized by "single system" and centralization of power under the dual provisions of the administrative system and the political party system. In recent years, with the decentralization of central government power, especially the decentralization of economic power. Local governments have more explicit interest demands, and "localism" is becoming increasingly serious. For their own interests, local governments often selectively implement, superficially, distort or even refuse to implement some of the policies of the central government. In order to safeguard the overall interests of the country, break the fragmentation of "localism", and ensure the smooth implementation of policies, The central government constantly reforms the vertical distribution of power between the central and local governments. However, through the analysis of the means and methods of the reform, it is found that the reform of the relationship between the central and local governments has appeared the phenomenon of internal curl. Only then can we really solve the problems existing in the relations between the central and local governments.
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本文編號：1680860