【摘要】：P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)是融合了P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)和內(nèi)容分發(fā)技術(shù)各自的優(yōu)點(diǎn)而產(chǎn)生的，是目前互聯(lián)網(wǎng)應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域研究的熱點(diǎn)之一。但是在實(shí)際的網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境中存在著大量的自私節(jié)點(diǎn)，它們占用大量的帶寬資源卻又不愿意為其他節(jié)點(diǎn)提供下載服務(wù)，導(dǎo)致“搭便車(chē)”和“公共地悲劇”現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生。這違背了P2P最初的設(shè)計(jì)理念，嚴(yán)重影響了系統(tǒng)的整體性能。本文針對(duì)這一現(xiàn)象，引入了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的合作博弈理論，利用合作博弈理論中的三種技術(shù)：Shapley值、NBS(Nash Bargaining Solution)和Repeated Game來(lái)解決P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中激勵(lì)節(jié)點(diǎn)合作實(shí)現(xiàn)資源共享的問(wèn)題。 本文首先對(duì)P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行了綜述，包括研究背景、研究現(xiàn)狀和研究意義，重點(diǎn)討論了目前已有的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。接著介紹了P2P技術(shù)、內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)(CDN)和博弈論等理論知識(shí)。最后針對(duì)目前激勵(lì)機(jī)制在P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中存在的問(wèn)題，提出了基于合作博弈的內(nèi)容分發(fā)技術(shù)的設(shè)計(jì)方案，目的在于抑制“搭便車(chē)”現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生和促進(jìn)節(jié)點(diǎn)合作，從而提高P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的整體性能。 本文基于合作博弈的P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)技術(shù)的設(shè)計(jì)和分析主要包括三個(gè)方面：首先，提出了基于Shapley值的P2P視頻點(diǎn)播系統(tǒng)的存儲(chǔ)管理機(jī)制。該機(jī)制通過(guò)采用Shapley值的方法實(shí)現(xiàn)了P2P視頻點(diǎn)播系統(tǒng)中合作收益的公平合理分配，從而激勵(lì)了節(jié)點(diǎn)參與合作，提高了隨機(jī)搜索操作的命中率；其次，提出了基于NBS的社會(huì)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)的內(nèi)容分發(fā)管理方案。在社會(huì)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)這種典型的P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中，由于節(jié)點(diǎn)都具有社會(huì)屬性，節(jié)點(diǎn)之間易形成合作聯(lián)盟從而實(shí)現(xiàn)帶寬共享，但是節(jié)點(diǎn)合作時(shí)的最優(yōu)策略選擇和節(jié)點(diǎn)的公平性等問(wèn)題亟需研究。因此我們通過(guò)建立討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈模型并求出了納什談判解，提高了節(jié)點(diǎn)的效率和公平性；最后，提出了社會(huì)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)中基于重復(fù)博弈的懲罰激勵(lì)機(jī)制。在社會(huì)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)中，由于節(jié)點(diǎn)都是自私的，我們不能保證在整個(gè)合作過(guò)程中所有節(jié)點(diǎn)一直都是誠(chéng)信的，針對(duì)怎樣防止節(jié)點(diǎn)欺詐行為發(fā)生的問(wèn)題，提出了懲罰激勵(lì)機(jī)制“Punishment-Forgiving-Restoring(PFR)”。該機(jī)制有效地抑制了節(jié)點(diǎn)欺詐行為的發(fā)生，促進(jìn)了節(jié)點(diǎn)的誠(chéng)信合作并且提高了系統(tǒng)的平均收益。 仿真結(jié)果表明，基于合作博弈的P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)技術(shù)能夠有效地抑制了“搭便車(chē)”行為，實(shí)現(xiàn)了P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源的合理分配，平衡了網(wǎng)絡(luò)的效率和公平性，提高了網(wǎng)絡(luò)的整體性能，，對(duì)推動(dòng)P2P內(nèi)容分發(fā)技術(shù)應(yīng)用的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展具有重要意義。
[Abstract]:P2P content distribution network, which combines the advantages of P2P network and content distribution technology, is one of the hotspots in the field of Internet application. However, there are a lot of selfish nodes in the actual network environment, they occupy a lot of bandwidth resources, but they are unwilling to provide download services for other nodes, which leads to the phenomenon of "hitchhiking" and "tragedy of common land". This violates the original design idea of P2P and seriously affects the overall performance of the system. Aiming at this phenomenon, this paper introduces the cooperative game theory in economics, and makes use of three techniques in the cooperative game theory: Shapley value, NBS (Nash Bargaining Solution) and Repeated Game are used to solve the problem of encouraging nodes to cooperate to share resources in P2P content distribution networks. Firstly, this paper summarizes P2P content distribution networks, including the research background, research status and significance, and focuses on the existing incentive mechanisms. Then it introduces P2P technology, content distribution network (CDN) and game theory. Finally, aiming at the existing problems of incentive mechanism in P2P content distribution network, this paper puts forward a design scheme of content distribution technology based on cooperative game, which aims at restraining the phenomenon of "hitchhiking" and promoting node cooperation. In order to improve the overall performance of P2P content distribution network. The design and analysis of P2P content distribution technology based on cooperative game includes three aspects: firstly, the storage management mechanism of P2P VOD system based on Shapley value is proposed. The mechanism realizes fair and reasonable distribution of cooperative income in P2P VOD system by using Shapley value method, thus motivating nodes to participate in cooperation and improving hit ratio of random search operation. Secondly, the content distribution management scheme of social P2P network based on NBS is proposed. In the typical P2P content distribution network of social P2P network, because the nodes all have the social attribute, it is easy to form the cooperation alliance among the nodes to realize the bandwidth sharing. However, the optimal policy selection and the fairness of nodes need to be studied. So we build a bargaining game model and find the Nash solution to improve the efficiency and fairness of the node. Finally we propose a penalty incentive mechanism based on repeated game in social P2P network. In the social P2P network, because the nodes are selfish, we can not guarantee that all the nodes in the whole cooperation process are always honest, aiming at how to prevent node fraud. The penalty incentive mechanism "Punishment-Forgiving-Restoring (PFR)" is put forward. This mechanism effectively inhibits the occurrence of node fraud, promotes the cooperative integrity of nodes and improves the average income of the system. The simulation results show that the P2P content distribution technology based on cooperative game can effectively restrain the "hitchhiking" behavior, realize the rational allocation of P2P content distribution network resources, and balance the efficiency and fairness of the network. It improves the overall performance of the network and plays an important role in promoting the application of P2P content distribution technology.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：TP393.02

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前6條

1 劉業(yè);楊鵬;;基于重復(fù)博弈的P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)信用管理機(jī)制的研究[J];計(jì)算機(jī)研究與發(fā)展;2006年04期

2 樂(lè)光學(xué);李仁發(fā);陳志;周旭;;P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)中搭便車(chē)行為分析與抑制機(jī)制建模[J];計(jì)算機(jī)研究與發(fā)展;2011年03期

3 劉浩;卿桐;張連明;;一種P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)的重復(fù)博弈激勵(lì)機(jī)制[J];計(jì)算機(jī)工程與應(yīng)用;2010年35期

4 劉瑜;朱光喜;尹浩;劉雪寧;;內(nèi)容分發(fā)網(wǎng)發(fā)展綜述[J];計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué);2009年02期

5 余一嬌;金海;;對(duì)等網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的搭便車(chē)行為分析與抑制機(jī)制綜述[J];計(jì)算機(jī)學(xué)報(bào);2008年01期

6 徐海湄;鄭相全;齊守青;聶曉文;;一種新的基于博弈論的P2P激勵(lì)機(jī)制[J];計(jì)算機(jī)應(yīng)用研究;2008年09期

本文編號(hào)：2382772