發(fā)布時間：2018-06-07 06:07

  本文選題：物流金融 + 博弈論　； 參考：《浙江理工大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：目前，很多中小企業(yè)面臨資金鏈緊張、融資困難等問題。物流金融作為一種創(chuàng)新性的第三方物流服務(wù)金融產(chǎn)品，可為金融機構(gòu)、第三方物流企業(yè)以及融資企業(yè)之間創(chuàng)造緊密合作的商業(yè)機會，尤其可為解決中小企業(yè)的融資困難問題提供便利。 然而，由于物流金融服務(wù)還處在初步發(fā)展階段，因此存在很多不完善之處，特別是這種新型的業(yè)務(wù)模式給金融機構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)帶來不同于以往的風(fēng)險，其中道德風(fēng)險尤為明顯。因此，如何合理有效地管理道德風(fēng)險對于物流金融業(yè)務(wù)的順利開展非常重要。以往對風(fēng)險的研究比較注重對融資企業(yè)的客觀因素進行評估和度量，事實上，相對于客觀風(fēng)險，主觀道德風(fēng)險由于其主觀性反而更難控制，這種主觀道德風(fēng)險主要是由于參與主體之間信息不對稱而引起的。 本文首先對與研究內(nèi)容相關(guān)的物流金融、信息不對稱、委托代理、博弈論、博弈均衡以及道德風(fēng)險等概念和理論進行闡述，并在對物流金融參與主體之間的委托代理關(guān)系進行梳理的基礎(chǔ)上，對各參與主體的道德風(fēng)險來源進行分析，從而識別物流金融道德風(fēng)險如何產(chǎn)生。 然后，從博弈論及博弈均衡視角出發(fā)，分析傳統(tǒng)模式下融資企業(yè)與金融機構(gòu)的收益均衡模型以及物流金融模式下三方參與主體的收益均衡模型，通過模型的選取與求解，探析影響物流金融主體違約風(fēng)險大小的原因，挖掘?qū)θ谫Y企業(yè)與第三方物流企業(yè)的違約或者合謀概率有抑制作用的因素，從而分析金融機構(gòu)在作出不同行動情況下對道德風(fēng)險的影響，總結(jié)與風(fēng)險防范有關(guān)的結(jié)論，，并提出防范建議。 最后，以H銀行為背景，將模型與實例相結(jié)合，對博弈均衡模型下得出的結(jié)論進行驗證。本文將定性與定量方法相結(jié)合，對物流金融道德風(fēng)險道德產(chǎn)生根源及防范進行深入研究，具有一定的理論和實踐意義。
[Abstract]:At present, many small and medium-sized enterprises are faced with the shortage of capital chain, financing difficulties and other problems. As an innovative third party logistics service financial product, logistics finance can create business opportunities for close cooperation among financial institutions, third party logistics enterprises and financing enterprises. In particular, to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises to provide facilities. However, because the logistics financial service is still in the initial stage of development, there are many imperfections, especially this new business model brings different risks to financial institutions and logistics enterprises, especially the moral hazard. Therefore, how to manage moral hazard reasonably and effectively is very important for the smooth development of logistics financial business. In the past, the research on risk has paid more attention to the evaluation and measurement of the objective factors of the financing enterprises. In fact, compared with the objective risk, the subjective moral hazard is more difficult to control because of its subjectivity. This kind of subjective moral hazard is mainly caused by the asymmetry of information among the participants. In this paper, the concepts and theories of logistics finance, information asymmetry, principal-agent, game theory, game equilibrium and moral hazard are discussed. On the basis of combing the principal-agent relationship among the participants in the logistics finance, this paper analyzes the source of the moral hazard of the participants, so as to identify how to produce the moral hazard of the logistics finance. Then, from the perspective of game theory and game equilibrium, this paper analyzes the income equilibrium model of financing enterprises and financial institutions under the traditional model and the income equilibrium model of the three parties involved in the logistics finance model, through the selection and solution of the model. This paper analyzes the reasons that affect the default risk of logistics financial subjects, and excavates the factors that inhibit the probability of default or collusion between the financing enterprises and the third party logistics enterprises. This paper analyzes the influence of financial institutions on moral hazard in different situations, summarizes the conclusions related to risk prevention, and puts forward some preventive suggestions. Finally, taking H bank as the background, the conclusion under the game equilibrium model is verified by combining the model with an example. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper makes a deep study on the origin and prevention of moral hazard and morality in logistics finance, which has theoretical and practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F253;F832.4;F224.32

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本文編號：1990123