【摘要】：審計(jì)合謀嚴(yán)重影響了審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性,具有嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。審計(jì)合謀在對(duì)資本市場產(chǎn)生深重危害的同時(shí),也對(duì)整個(gè)審計(jì)行業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展提出了嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)。因此,對(duì)防范審計(jì)合謀進(jìn)行研究十分必要。 本文以經(jīng)濟(jì)人假說、信息不對(duì)稱理論為基礎(chǔ),根據(jù)逆向選擇原理建立委托—代理模型,對(duì)審計(jì)合謀現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行邏輯推理和數(shù)理論證,分析獎(jiǎng)、懲審計(jì)師以防范審計(jì)合謀的有效性,并把研究的結(jié)論應(yīng)用于我國審計(jì)行業(yè)的具體監(jiān)管。 在委托——代理關(guān)系中,為防止代理人偷懶,委托人聘請(qǐng)審計(jì)師對(duì)代理人的工作進(jìn)行監(jiān)督和審查。由于代理人的偷懶行為具有隨機(jī)性,因此委托人理想的策略是實(shí)施隨機(jī)審計(jì)。為了自己的偷懶行為不被審計(jì)師報(bào)告給委托人,代理人采取賄賂審計(jì)師的辦法以達(dá)成合謀。針對(duì)代理人的策略,委托人對(duì)審計(jì)師進(jìn)行獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)以誘使其不參與合謀。然而,委托人獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)審計(jì)師的策略,會(huì)被有信息優(yōu)勢(shì)的代理人加以利用,代理人高額賄賂審計(jì)師,委托人給予審計(jì)師的獎(jiǎng)金將隨代理人的賄賂數(shù)值的增加而同益看漲,博弈均衡的結(jié)果是代理人的偷懶概率與委托人支付的獎(jiǎng)金不斷增加,使得獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)審計(jì)師不能有效防范審計(jì)合謀。為此,委托人轉(zhuǎn)而尋求懲罰措施,聘請(qǐng)監(jiān)管者對(duì)審計(jì)師進(jìn)行審查。由于代理人和審計(jì)師之間的合謀是隨機(jī)的,委托人的最優(yōu)策略是實(shí)施隨機(jī)監(jiān)管。面對(duì)合謀事發(fā)將遭受高額罰款,審計(jì)師參與合謀的可能性大大降低,因此,和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施相比,懲罰能有效地防范審計(jì)合謀。我國在對(duì)審計(jì)行業(yè)實(shí)施監(jiān)管政策時(shí),必須注意把懲罰的額度、監(jiān)管的力度和監(jiān)管的投入結(jié)合起來考慮。
[Abstract]:Audit collusion seriously affects the independence of audit and has serious economic consequences. Audit collusion not only does great harm to the capital market, but also poses a severe challenge to the survival and development of the whole audit industry. Therefore, it is necessary to study the prevention of audit collusion. Based on the hypothesis of economic man and the theory of information asymmetry, this paper establishes the principal-agent model according to the principle of adverse selection, makes logical reasoning and mathematical demonstration on the phenomenon of audit collusion, analyzes the award, and punishes auditors in order to prevent the effectiveness of audit collusion. And the conclusions of the study are applied to the specific supervision of the audit industry in China. In the principal-agent relationship, in order to prevent the agent from being lazy, the principal employs an auditor to supervise and examine the work of the agent. Because the lazy behavior of the agent is random, the ideal strategy of the principal is to carry out random audit. In order not to be reported to the principal by the auditor, the agent bribed the auditor to achieve collusion. In view of the agent's strategy, the principal rewards the auditor to induce him not to participate in collusion. However, the principal's strategy of reward auditors will be taken advantage of by agents who have the advantage of information. Agents bribe auditors in large quantities. The bonus given to auditors by the principal will be bullish with the increase of the bribe value of the agent. The result of game equilibrium is that the probability of laziness of the agent and the bonus paid by the principal are increasing, which makes the reward auditor unable to prevent the audit collusion effectively. To this end, clients instead seek penalties and hire regulators to review auditors. Because the collusion between agent and auditor is random, the optimal strategy of principal is to implement random supervision. In the face of high fines for collusion, auditors are greatly less likely to participate in collusion. Therefore, compared with incentives, punishment can effectively prevent audit collusion. When carrying out the supervision policy to the audit industry in our country, we must pay attention to the amount of punishment, the intensity of supervision and the investment of supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

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