【摘要】：在供應(yīng)鏈中，各成員企業(yè)因為職責(zé)和利益各不相同，每個企業(yè)都以自身利益最大化為目標(biāo)制定策略，容易導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)效率低下，并造成巨大的浪費。因此，需要一種系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)機制將供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)集成起來。 信息不對稱是供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)中普遍存在的問題，為了降低信息不對稱給供應(yīng)鏈運作帶來的負面影響，現(xiàn)代企業(yè)傾向于建立“戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟”來達到使聯(lián)盟中的企業(yè)共享信息的目的。而處于戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟中的企業(yè)在相互間的合同中經(jīng)常會包含“收益共享”的條款。收益共享的一個必備條件是，在買家有審計權(quán)利的條件下雙方進行開放式的定價談判，，因為要是沒有完整、可信的成本信息，雙方基本不可能就分配比例達成一致。為了使買家能夠有效地行使其檢查的權(quán)利，審計是行之有效地方法。供應(yīng)商審計可以作為一個企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的一部分，保證供應(yīng)商提供的產(chǎn)品在成本和質(zhì)量方面都達到要求。 本文在委托 代理理論和信號博弈理論的基礎(chǔ)上，建立并分析了基于審計的供需雙方純策略以及混合策略的博弈模型。首先建立了基于審計的供需雙方信號博弈模型，得出了在審計懲罰大到一定程度時，將達到最高效率的均衡狀態(tài)；其次建立了包含利潤分配和隨機審計的供需雙方混合策略博弈模型，證明了在均衡情況下審計懲罰的增加或?qū)徲嫵杀镜慕档投伎梢蕴岣吖⿷?yīng)商選擇誠實的可能性；最后通過與完全信息下的均衡的比較，進一步闡述了前述審計懲罰和審計成本的變動可以使買方得益接近于完全信息下的情形。
[Abstract]:In the supply chain, each member enterprise has different responsibilities and interests, each enterprise makes the strategy with the goal of maximizing its own interests, which easily leads to the inefficiency of the supply chain system and causes a huge waste. Therefore, a systematic coordination mechanism is needed to integrate supply chain enterprises. Information asymmetry is a common problem in supply chain coordination. In order to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on supply chain operation, modern enterprises tend to establish "strategic alliance" to achieve the purpose of sharing information among enterprises in the alliance. Companies in strategic alliances often include "profit sharing" clauses in their contracts with each other. An essential condition for revenue-sharing is open pricing negotiations between the two parties under conditions where the buyer has the right to audit, because without complete and credible cost information, it is virtually impossible for both sides to agree on the distribution ratio. In order to enable buyers to effectively exercise their inspection rights, auditing is an effective method. Supplier audit can be used as part of the internal control of an enterprise to ensure the cost and quality of the products provided by the supplier. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal game theory, this paper establishes and analyzes the game model of pure strategy and mixed strategy between supply and demand parties based on audit. Firstly, the signal game model of supply and demand based on audit is established, and the equilibrium state of maximum efficiency is obtained when the audit penalty is high to a certain extent. Secondly, the mixed strategy game model of supplier and supplier is established, which includes profit distribution and random audit, which proves that the increase of audit penalty or the decrease of audit cost can improve the possibility of supplier choosing honesty under equilibrium condition. Finally, by comparing with the equilibrium under complete information, the author further explains that the above audit penalty and the change of audit cost can make the buyer benefit from the situation of complete information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F239.2;F224.32

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本文編號：2205121