我國注冊會計師審計獨立性問題治理對策研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-15 19:25
【摘要】：獨立性是獨立審計理論與實務(wù)中的一個基本問題，也是審計行業(yè)遇到的一個國際性難題。自美國證券法頒布以來，審計獨立性一直是會計職業(yè)界、學(xué)術(shù)界和證券市場監(jiān)管界普遍關(guān)注的熱點問題。近年來，，隨著會計市場競爭日益激烈和會計咨詢業(yè)務(wù)的迅猛發(fā)展，審計獨立性問題再度成為國際會計職業(yè)界和監(jiān)管界的熱點問題。審計獨立性是一個復(fù)雜的問題，而要找到有效的解決方法絕非易事(Sutton，1997)。 誠然，我國的注冊會計師行業(yè)已經(jīng)取得了很大的發(fā)展，但我國注冊會計師審計制度是在政府推動下發(fā)展起來的，發(fā)展至今整個行業(yè)的法制化、規(guī)范化仍相當(dāng)落后，審計質(zhì)量遠(yuǎn)不能適應(yīng)市場經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的需要，離社會公眾期望相差甚遠(yuǎn)。審計質(zhì)量不高的主要表現(xiàn)就是出現(xiàn)了許多的虛假審計報告。 本文正是基于以上考慮，試圖構(gòu)建一個研究審計獨立性問題的模型和理論框架，將影響審計獨立性的各種因素抽象為模型中的經(jīng)濟變量，基于委托代理理論，運用經(jīng)濟數(shù)學(xué)的分析方法，對各個經(jīng)濟變量和相關(guān)制度安排進行解析，分析各制度安排、政策變量和契約結(jié)構(gòu)等因素對審計獨立性的影響方式，進而尋找提高審計獨立性的對策。 第一章為導(dǎo)論，為審計獨立性問題的研究奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。首先介紹了論文選題的研究思路，再對幾個重要的概念和相關(guān)理論進行了闡述。 第二章為模型分析及理論檢驗，是本文的重點內(nèi)容。該章第一節(jié)闡述了模型的假設(shè)條件、模型的建立過程及模型變量分析和分析結(jié)論，并結(jié)合變量的現(xiàn)實意義對分析結(jié)論進行了解讀；第二節(jié)對模型的假設(shè)條件及分析結(jié)論進行了理論檢驗和自我評價。 第三章為現(xiàn)狀分析，圍繞審計獨立性問題，結(jié)合我國的現(xiàn)狀，對各制度安排中的缺陷和喪失獨立性的原因進行了剖析。 第四章為對策與建議，在前面幾章研究的基礎(chǔ)上，提出了治理審計獨立性問題的思路和一些政策性建議。
[Abstract]:Independence is not only a basic problem in the theory and practice of independent audit, but also an international problem encountered by audit industry. Since the promulgation of American securities law, audit independence has always been a hot issue in accounting profession, academia and securities market supervision. In recent years, with the increasingly fierce competition in the accounting market and the rapid development of accounting consulting business, the issue of audit independence has once again become a hot issue in the international accounting profession and the regulatory community. Audit independence is a complex issue, and finding an effective solution is no easy task (Suttonton 1997). It is true that the CPA industry in our country has made great progress, but the auditing system of CPA in our country has been developed under the impetus of the government, the legalization and standardization of the whole industry are still quite backward. Audit quality can not meet the needs of the development of market economy, far from the public expectations. The main manifestation of low audit quality is the appearance of many false audit reports. Based on the above considerations, this paper attempts to construct a model and a theoretical framework to study audit independence, abstracting various factors that affect audit independence into economic variables in the model, based on principal-agent theory. By using the method of economic mathematics, this paper analyzes various economic variables and related institutional arrangements, and analyzes the influence of various institutional arrangements, policy variables and contract structure on audit independence. And then to find ways to improve the independence of audit. The first chapter is the introduction, which lays a theoretical foundation for the study of audit independence. This paper first introduces the research ideas of the selected topic, and then expounds several important concepts and related theories. The second chapter is the model analysis and theoretical test, which is the focus of this paper. In the first section of this chapter, the hypothetical conditions of the model, the process of establishing the model, the analysis of the model variables and the conclusion of the analysis are described, and the analysis conclusions are interpreted in the light of the practical significance of the variables. In the second section, the hypothesis and conclusion of the model are tested theoretically and self-evaluated. The third chapter is the analysis of the current situation, focusing on the issue of audit independence, combined with the current situation in China, to analyze the defects and loss of independence in the institutional arrangements. The fourth chapter is the countermeasures and suggestions, on the basis of the previous chapters, it puts forward the ideas and some policy suggestions on the governance of audit independence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：F239.4
本文編號：2185180
[Abstract]:Independence is not only a basic problem in the theory and practice of independent audit, but also an international problem encountered by audit industry. Since the promulgation of American securities law, audit independence has always been a hot issue in accounting profession, academia and securities market supervision. In recent years, with the increasingly fierce competition in the accounting market and the rapid development of accounting consulting business, the issue of audit independence has once again become a hot issue in the international accounting profession and the regulatory community. Audit independence is a complex issue, and finding an effective solution is no easy task (Suttonton 1997). It is true that the CPA industry in our country has made great progress, but the auditing system of CPA in our country has been developed under the impetus of the government, the legalization and standardization of the whole industry are still quite backward. Audit quality can not meet the needs of the development of market economy, far from the public expectations. The main manifestation of low audit quality is the appearance of many false audit reports. Based on the above considerations, this paper attempts to construct a model and a theoretical framework to study audit independence, abstracting various factors that affect audit independence into economic variables in the model, based on principal-agent theory. By using the method of economic mathematics, this paper analyzes various economic variables and related institutional arrangements, and analyzes the influence of various institutional arrangements, policy variables and contract structure on audit independence. And then to find ways to improve the independence of audit. The first chapter is the introduction, which lays a theoretical foundation for the study of audit independence. This paper first introduces the research ideas of the selected topic, and then expounds several important concepts and related theories. The second chapter is the model analysis and theoretical test, which is the focus of this paper. In the first section of this chapter, the hypothetical conditions of the model, the process of establishing the model, the analysis of the model variables and the conclusion of the analysis are described, and the analysis conclusions are interpreted in the light of the practical significance of the variables. In the second section, the hypothesis and conclusion of the model are tested theoretically and self-evaluated. The third chapter is the analysis of the current situation, focusing on the issue of audit independence, combined with the current situation in China, to analyze the defects and loss of independence in the institutional arrangements. The fourth chapter is the countermeasures and suggestions, on the basis of the previous chapters, it puts forward the ideas and some policy suggestions on the governance of audit independence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：F239.4
【引證文獻】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條
1 李晴晴;基于委托模式的審計獨立性研究[D];天津財經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年
2 劉鳳蓮;基于三方博弈的我國民間審計獨立性缺失問題研究[D];哈爾濱工程大學(xué);2008年
本文編號：2185180
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