本文選題：獨立董事經(jīng)理人 + 審計委員會��； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文

【摘要】：作為一篇規(guī)范性的論文,本文意在從美國審計委員會失效出發(fā),探究審計委員會失效的原因并提出改進的方案。通過分析,本文得出審計委員會的失效在于公眾對其組成成員即獨立董事的理解上出現(xiàn)了問題�；谖写砝碚摗⒔�(jīng)濟人假設(shè)和管理學(xué)的基本理論,本文得出獨立董事的身份應(yīng)該是經(jīng)理人。 本文認(rèn)為,將獨立董事視為經(jīng)理人身份為我們理解審計委員會提供了一個新的視野,這具體體現(xiàn)在它突破了以往對獨立董事形式化的認(rèn)識,徹底將獨立董事視為社會經(jīng)濟人,要求獨立董事實實在在對公司價值做出貢獻,而不僅僅充當(dāng)董事會“正名”的工具,成為花瓶或者裝飾品。獨立董事本身就是委托代理問題的一部分,要像其他經(jīng)理人一樣接受股東為主的利益相關(guān)者的選擇、激勵和監(jiān)督。同時本文認(rèn)為獨立董事的經(jīng)理人身份,不會導(dǎo)致獨立董事獨立性的削弱,反而會加強它。以往我們對獨立性的要求僅僅停留在準(zhǔn)入的門檻階段,現(xiàn)在將獨立董事像其他經(jīng)理人那樣加以激勵和監(jiān)督,可以將獨立性的維護推入一個過程,從而切實落實對獨立性的維護。本文進一步以獨立董事經(jīng)理人身份為基礎(chǔ),并結(jié)合審計委員會的工作特點,對審計委員會的選擇、激勵和約束機制進行設(shè)計。在選擇機制中,本文探討了審計委員會成員應(yīng)具備的素質(zhì)和選擇形式;在激勵機制中,本文認(rèn)為單純的聲譽激勵不能生效,需要與經(jīng)濟激勵相配合,并運用組合激勵模型做出了分析;在約束機制中,本文在自我約束、他方約束、機制約束上對審計委員會的約束進行了探討。文章最后,根據(jù)中國現(xiàn)階段的特征,分析了審計委員會在中國的發(fā)展,認(rèn)為要使審計委員會在中國生效,要漸進的方式協(xié)調(diào)好審計委員會與監(jiān)事會的關(guān)系,并且在規(guī)則的制定過程中要以規(guī)則為導(dǎo)向。
[Abstract]:As a normative paper, this paper aims to explore the causes of the audit committee's invalidation from the failure of the American audit committee and put forward the improvement scheme. Through analysis, this paper concludes that the failure of audit committee lies in the public understanding of its constituent members, that is, independent directors. Based on the principal-agent theory, the hypothesis of economic man and the basic theory of management, this paper concludes that the identity of independent director should be manager. This paper holds that treating independent directors as managers provides us with a new vision to understand the audit committee, which is embodied in the fact that it breaks through the previous understanding of the formalization of independent directors and completely regards independent directors as social economic persons. Require independent directors to actually contribute to the value of the company, not just as a board's "name" tool, as a vase or ornament. Independent director itself is a part of the principal-agent problem, like other managers, they should accept the choice, incentive and supervision of stakeholders. At the same time, this paper argues that the independent director's executive identity will not lead to the weakening of the independent director's independence, but will strengthen it. In the past, our demand for independence was only at the threshold of entry. Now we can encourage and supervise independent directors as other managers do, which can push the maintenance of independence into a process, so as to effectively implement the maintenance of independence. Based on the identity of independent director manager and the working characteristics of audit committee, this paper designs the selection, incentive and restraint mechanism of audit committee. In the selection mechanism, this paper discusses the quality and selection form of the members of the audit committee. In the incentive mechanism, the author thinks that the pure reputation incentive is not effective, and needs to be coordinated with the economic incentive. In the constraint mechanism, this paper discusses the constraints of the audit committee in terms of self-constraint, other constraints and mechanism constraints. Finally, according to the characteristics of China at the present stage, this paper analyzes the development of audit committee in China, and thinks that in order to make the audit committee effective in China, it is necessary to coordinate the relationship between audit committee and supervisory committee in a gradual manner. And in the process of making the rules, we should be guided by the rules.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號】：F239.4

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