本文選題：盈余操縱　切入點(diǎn)：成因　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在我國(guó),隨著資本市場(chǎng)的日漸發(fā)展和上市公司的大量涌現(xiàn),上市公司的盈余操縱問(wèn)題逐漸凸現(xiàn),成為我國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)理論與實(shí)務(wù)界的新課題。盈余操縱使公司盈余信息背離公司實(shí)際,沒(méi)有真實(shí)的反映公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況與經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī),不利于廣大會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表使用者正確決策。盈余操縱在上市公司中泛濫,嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了廣大投資者的利益,極大地阻礙了我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的規(guī)范運(yùn)作,不利于國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)健康發(fā)展。要解決我國(guó)目前的會(huì)計(jì)信息失真并促進(jìn)資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,就必須對(duì)上市公司的盈余操縱行為進(jìn)行研究。有鑒于此,本文對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司盈余操縱的成因、手段進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)分析,并立足于獨(dú)立審計(jì),提出了相關(guān)對(duì)策。 全文共分四個(gè)部分: 第一部分,緒論。首先,提出研究背景和選題意義,并對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究成果進(jìn)行總結(jié);其次,指出本文的研究思路與可能的創(chuàng)意;最后,對(duì)盈余操縱這一基本概念進(jìn)行界定。 第二部分,分析我國(guó)盈余操縱產(chǎn)生的原因。首先,上市公司在相關(guān)利益的驅(qū)使下,具備盈余操縱的種種動(dòng)機(jī);其次,會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則本身的不完善為其提供可乘之機(jī);再者,公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的不健全,不能形成良好的內(nèi)部制約機(jī)制;最后,證券監(jiān)管的不完善更助長(zhǎng)了上市公司盈余操縱的氣焰。 第三部分,歸納總結(jié)上市公司盈余操縱的各種手段。包括利用會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇與變更、濫用會(huì)計(jì)估計(jì)、利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易、收入與費(fèi)用的確認(rèn)等手段。 第四部分,從獨(dú)立審計(jì)視角,提出盈余操縱的治理對(duì)策。首先,要提高獨(dú)立審計(jì)權(quán)威,保持注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師獨(dú)立性;其次,加強(qiáng)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)職業(yè)道德與執(zhí)業(yè)水平建設(shè);再次,明確審計(jì)法律責(zé)任,建立民事賠償機(jī)制;最后,指出審計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)中,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師識(shí)別盈余操縱的常用方法。 盈余操縱不僅是一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)問(wèn)題,而且是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的社會(huì)問(wèn)題,不能依靠注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)一方面的改進(jìn)來(lái)達(dá)到治理的目的,需要社會(huì)各個(gè)相關(guān)部門(mén)聯(lián)合起來(lái)綜合治理,才能從根本上抑制上市公司的盈余操縱行為,保證我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)和國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康有序發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In our country, with the development of the capital market and the emergence of a large number of listed companies, the problem of earnings manipulation of listed companies has gradually emerged, which has become a new topic in the field of accounting theory and practice in China. Earnings manipulation makes the earnings information of companies deviate from the actual situation of the company. The lack of a true reflection of the financial situation and operating performance of the company is not conducive to the correct decision of the majority of the users of the accounting statements. Earnings manipulation is rampant in the listed companies, which seriously damages the interests of the majority of investors. It greatly hinders the normal operation of China's securities market, and is not conducive to the sustained and healthy development of the national economy. It is necessary to solve the current distortion of accounting information in China and promote the development of the capital market. It is necessary to study the earnings manipulation behavior of listed companies. In view of this, this paper systematically analyzes the causes and means of earnings manipulation of listed companies in China, and puts forward relevant countermeasures based on independent audit. The full text is divided into four parts:. The first part is introduction. Firstly, the research background and the significance of the topic are put forward, and the research results at home and abroad are summarized. Secondly, the research ideas and possible ideas are pointed out. Finally, the basic concept of earnings manipulation is defined. The second part analyzes the reasons of earnings manipulation in China. Firstly, listed companies have a variety of motives for earnings manipulation driven by relevant interests; secondly, the imperfections of accounting standards provide opportunities for them to take advantage of. The imperfect corporate governance structure can not form a good internal restraint mechanism; finally, the imperfect securities supervision encourages the arrogance of earnings manipulation of listed companies. The third part summarizes the various methods of earnings manipulation of listed companies, including the use of accounting policy selection and change, misuse of accounting estimates, use of related party transactions, revenue and expense recognition and other means. The fourth part, from the perspective of independent audit, put forward the governance countermeasures of earnings manipulation. First, to improve the independent audit authority, to maintain the independence of certified public accountants; secondly, to strengthen the professional ethics and professional standards of certified public accountants; third, Finally, it points out the common methods for CPA to identify surplus manipulation in audit practice. Earnings manipulation is not only an accounting problem, but also a complex social problem. We cannot rely on the improvement of the CPA industry to achieve the goal of governance. In order to restrain the earnings manipulation of listed companies fundamentally and ensure the healthy and orderly development of China's securities market and national economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 張大翠;基于舞弊行為的審計(jì)策略與方法研究[D];蘇州大學(xué);2008年

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本文編號(hào)：1645504