本文選題：審計(jì)獨(dú)立性　切入點(diǎn)：審計(jì)行為　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2006年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 審計(jì)獨(dú)立性一直是人們重點(diǎn)關(guān)注的問題,尤其是近年來各種審計(jì)失敗與審計(jì)舞弊案件的爆發(fā),使得獨(dú)立性問題更加突出。為此,美國還通過了《2002年薩班斯——奧克斯利法案》,對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性做出了嚴(yán)格的規(guī)定,我國也為此出臺(tái)了一系列相關(guān)法規(guī)與政策。本文以我國的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)環(huán)境為背景,討論注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)獨(dú)立性問題,以求為我國的審計(jì)制度建設(shè)提供相關(guān)的理論與實(shí)證證據(jù)。本研究以注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的經(jīng)濟(jì)人屬性為出發(fā)點(diǎn),即注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師作為市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的參與者,其審計(jì)行為實(shí)質(zhì)上是一種經(jīng)濟(jì)行為,從而決定了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性特點(diǎn)。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師在追求自身利益的過程中,必然要考慮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與收益的權(quán)衡,從而產(chǎn)生了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師決定保持與不保持一定審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的行為。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師作為經(jīng)濟(jì)人,必然要考慮審計(jì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),在現(xiàn)代審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越來越大的情況下,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向?qū)徲?jì)模式下也隨之興起。面對(duì)新情況,審計(jì)師又如何面對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與收益,從而如何保持一定的獨(dú)立性也是本文要研究的問題。本文不僅較系統(tǒng)地研究了審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的本質(zhì)內(nèi)涵與注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)行為的內(nèi)在關(guān)系,以及與審計(jì)本質(zhì)的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,而且進(jìn)一步研究了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向?qū)徲?jì)模式下的審計(jì)獨(dú)立性問題,并在此基礎(chǔ)上,我們實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了在我國證券市場(chǎng)上影響我國注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性選擇的有關(guān)因素。通過以上的規(guī)范與實(shí)證研究,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師是趨利避害的經(jīng)濟(jì)人,規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn),追求利益,審計(jì)行為是一種經(jīng)濟(jì)行為。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的保持是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與收益權(quán)衡后的結(jié)果。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向?qū)徲?jì)模式的興起有利于審計(jì)師獨(dú)立性的保持,但前提是審計(jì)責(zé)任的過錯(cuò)責(zé)任原則要過渡到嚴(yán)格責(zé)任原則,審計(jì)在本質(zhì)上成為一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保障機(jī)制。因此,提高審計(jì)師獨(dú)立性的制度安排應(yīng)從審計(jì)師的經(jīng)濟(jì)人屬性入手,而不應(yīng)將審計(jì)師看成完美的代理人,追求委托人的利益最大化。
[Abstract]:Audit independence has always been the focus of attention, especially in recent years, a variety of audit failures and the outbreak of audit fraud cases, making independence more prominent. The United States also passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which makes strict regulations on the audit independence of certified public accountants, for which China has issued a series of relevant laws and policies. This paper discusses the audit independence of CPA in order to provide relevant theoretical and empirical evidence for the construction of audit system in China. That is, CPA, as a participant in market economy, is essentially an economic act, which determines the independence of CPA. It is necessary to consider the tradeoff between risk and income, which leads to the CPA's decision to maintain or not maintain the independence of audit. As an economic person, CPA must consider the risk of audit. With the increasing risk of modern audit, the risk-based audit mode also rises. In the face of the new situation, how do auditors face risks and benefits? Therefore, how to maintain a certain degree of independence is also a problem to be studied in this paper. This paper not only systematically studies the intrinsic relationship between the essence of audit independence and the audit behavior of CPA, but also the internal relationship with the essence of audit. Furthermore, the issue of audit independence under the risk-oriented audit mode is further studied, and on this basis, Through the above normative and empirical research, we find that CPA is an economic person seeking advantages and avoiding risks. In pursuit of interest, audit behavior is an economic behavior. The maintenance of audit independence of CPA is the result of balancing risk and income. The rise of risk-based audit mode is conducive to the maintenance of auditor independence. However, the premise is that the principle of fault liability of audit liability should be transferred to the principle of strict liability, and audit is essentially a kind of risk guarantee mechanism. Therefore, the institutional arrangement to improve the auditor's independence should start with the auditor's attributes as an economic person. Auditors should not be regarded as perfect agents to maximize the interests of clients.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2006
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 張萬千;;關(guān)于提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量的幾點(diǎn)看法[J];財(cái)經(jīng)界(學(xué)術(shù)版);2011年05期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 魏愛翔;審計(jì)服務(wù)與非審計(jì)服務(wù)并存對(duì)審計(jì)獨(dú)立性影響的實(shí)證研究[D];新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

2 王艷萍;公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與審計(jì)獨(dú)立性研究[D];南昌大學(xué);2011年

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本文編號(hào)：1615868