本文關(guān)鍵詞：審計(jì)合謀的預(yù)警與防治對(duì)策的有效性研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2009年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：審計(jì)合謀嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了證券市場(chǎng)的基本秩序與聲譽(yù)。嚴(yán)懲合謀者雖然給受害者帶來心理安慰但補(bǔ)償效果甚微,投資者、債權(quán)人等利益相關(guān)者更加關(guān)注如何盡早發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)合謀并及時(shí)予以制止,并且希望有效懲治以防止類似事件的重復(fù)發(fā)生。審計(jì)合謀的預(yù)警和防治仍是重要的研究課題。 本文首先運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、管理學(xué)、法學(xué)、博弈論等多學(xué)科的基本理論工具分析審計(jì)合謀的形成機(jī)理,然后從上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)、審計(jì)師特征、審計(jì)收費(fèi)等視角獲取審計(jì)合謀的特征指標(biāo),再以這些特征指標(biāo)為變量采用多種方法構(gòu)建審計(jì)合謀預(yù)警模型。最后,對(duì)防治審計(jì)合謀的獎(jiǎng)懲對(duì)策的有效性進(jìn)行理論分析和實(shí)證測(cè)度。 本文共安排六章從三個(gè)大的方面研究審計(jì)合謀的預(yù)警與防治問題。第一,運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè)、信息不對(duì)稱理論、聲譽(yù)理論、博弈論等基本理論,規(guī)范研究制度安排缺陷、聲譽(yù)機(jī)制作用微弱情況下合謀者機(jī)會(huì)主義動(dòng)機(jī)如何向機(jī)會(huì)主義行為轉(zhuǎn)化,通過建立多方博弈模型研究合謀各方的行為特點(diǎn)和制度在防范審計(jì)合謀中的作用,為后續(xù)審計(jì)合謀預(yù)警與防治的數(shù)理論證、實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)提供理論基礎(chǔ);第二,采用實(shí)證的方法研究上市公司的異常財(cái)務(wù)狀況、特殊的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)、審計(jì)師特征、異常審計(jì)收費(fèi)等與審計(jì)合謀之間的關(guān)系,通過多元回歸分析獲取構(gòu)建審計(jì)合謀預(yù)警模型的特征變量。然后,在此基礎(chǔ)上,分別運(yùn)用單變量判定、主成分分析、線性概率回歸、LOGIT回歸和PROBIT回歸等方法建立了預(yù)警效果較好的審計(jì)合謀預(yù)警模型。經(jīng)驗(yàn)檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn),在預(yù)警效果上,多變量預(yù)警模型大大優(yōu)于單變量判定模型,且Logistic模型依次優(yōu)于PROBIT模型和LPM模型;第三,拓展Tirole(1986)、Kofman和Lawarree(1993)、Fahad(2006)等審計(jì)合謀研究模型,對(duì)獎(jiǎng)、懲審計(jì)師以防范審計(jì)合謀的有效性問題進(jìn)行博弈分析和數(shù)理論證。進(jìn)一步運(yùn)用實(shí)證方法從股票市場(chǎng)的異常反應(yīng)、上市公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值、審計(jì)師聲譽(yù)、審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)獨(dú)立性等方面測(cè)度懲罰機(jī)制對(duì)防治審計(jì)合謀的效果。研究結(jié)果表明上市公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所聲譽(yù)未受到實(shí)質(zhì)影響,但懲罰措施在一定程度上促進(jìn)了審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的提高。 論文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新在于:(1)從制度安排、治理結(jié)構(gòu)、法律責(zé)任壓力和聲譽(yù)機(jī)制等方面系統(tǒng)研究審計(jì)師合謀動(dòng)機(jī)向合謀行為轉(zhuǎn)化的作用機(jī)制,為審計(jì)合謀的研究提供理論基礎(chǔ)平臺(tái)。(2)在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊預(yù)警研究的基礎(chǔ)上,充分考慮審計(jì)合謀的特點(diǎn),從不同視角進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析獲取審計(jì)合謀的特征變量,構(gòu)建了效果較好的審計(jì)合謀預(yù)警模型,彌補(bǔ)了審計(jì)合謀預(yù)警缺乏實(shí)證模型的缺陷,為我國的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)預(yù)警審計(jì)合謀提供操作性更強(qiáng)的方法;(3)理論論證獎(jiǎng)懲措施對(duì)于防治審計(jì)合謀的效果問題,并采用實(shí)證的方法測(cè)度懲罰對(duì)策對(duì)于防治審計(jì)合謀的有效性,為較科學(xué)地評(píng)價(jià)和改進(jìn)現(xiàn)有防范審計(jì)合謀制度提供科學(xué)的理論支持和經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Audit collusion seriously damage the basic order of the securities market and reputation. Although severely conspire to bring psychological comfort to victims compensation but had little effect, investors, creditors and other stakeholders to pay more attention to how to detect early audit collusion and stop it timely, and hope the effective punishment to prevent similar incidents from recurring. The important research topic of early warning control and audit collusion is still.
Firstly, using economics, management, law, analysis of the basic theory of game theory and other disciplines of the formation mechanism of audit collusion. Then from the financial situation of listed companies, ownership structure and governance structure, auditor characteristics, characteristics of audit fees perspective for audit collusion, then these indicators as variables using a variety of methods the construction of audit collusion model. Finally, theoretical analysis and empirical validity measure incentive countermeasure against audit collusion.
This paper includes six chapters from the problem of early warning and prevention of three aspects of audit collusion. First, using the economic man hypothesis, information asymmetry theory, reputation theory, game theory, normative research system defects, how to transform the role of reputation mechanism under the condition of weak opportunism motivation to seek unity through opportunistic behavior. The behavior characteristics and establish a system of multi Game Research on Collusion model parties in the prevention of audit collusion in the role for demonstrating follow-up audit collusion and prevention, provide a theoretical basis for the empirical test; second, the abnormal financial status of empirical research methods of listed companies, ownership structure and governance structure, the special characteristics of auditor, audit the relationship between fees and audit collusion, through multiple regression analysis to obtain the feature construction of audit collusion model variables. Then, in On this basis, using single variable model, principal component analysis, linear regression, LOGIT regression and PROBIT regression method to establish the audit collusion effect of the early warning model better. Empirical research show that in the early warning effect, multi variable prediction model is superior to single variable decision model, and Logistic model are better than the PROBIT model and the LPM model; third, Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Fahad (2006) and other audit collusion model award, game analysis and demonstrating the effectiveness of punishing the auditor to prevent audit collusion. Further the use of empirical methods from the abnormal reaction of the stock market, the market value of listed companies the effect of auditor reputation, audit quality and audit independence measure of punishment mechanism for the prevention of audit collusion. The results show that the market value of listed companies and accounting firms The reputation has not been substantially affected, but the punishment measures have contributed to the improvement of audit quality and audit independence to a certain extent.
The main innovation of the thesis is: (1) from the institutional arrangements, governance structure, mechanism transformation of legal responsibility and reputation stress system of auditor collusion motivation to collusion behavior, and provide a theoretical basis for the research platform of audit collusion. (2) based on the study of financial reporting fraud warning, fully consider the characteristics of the audit collusion, empirical analysis of characteristic variables to obtain audit collusion from different perspectives, construct the audit collusion model better, to make up for the defects of audit collusion lack of empirical model, provides a method of operating more for the early warning of audit collusion China's regulatory agencies; (3) the effect of incentive measures for the prevention and treatment of theory audit collusion, and the effectiveness of the method to measure the punishment countermeasure for the prevention of audit collusion, to scientifically evaluate and improve the prevention of audit collusion The system provides scientific theoretical support and empirical evidence.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

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