建筑市場中尋租行為的制度分析
發(fā)布時間:2018-07-14 08:21
【摘要】:改革開放以來,我國建筑業(yè)經(jīng)過長期高速發(fā)展取得了長足的進步,成為國民經(jīng)濟的重要支柱。然而由于我國建筑市場尚不完善和市場轉(zhuǎn)軌過程中的價格雙軌制運行,使得建設(shè)領(lǐng)域成為尋租活動發(fā)生的重災(zāi)區(qū),尤其在當(dāng)前工程投資規(guī)模大、建設(shè)項目多、建設(shè)速度快的背景下,建筑市場中尋租問題更加突出。 論文采用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)的尋租理論對我國建筑市場中的尋租活動進行了分析,界定了尋租的內(nèi)涵并對尋租與尋利、尋租與腐敗進行了區(qū)分,認(rèn)為尋租行為產(chǎn)生的根源在于制度缺陷,而不能簡單歸結(jié)為市場失靈和政府失靈。論文對建筑市場中的規(guī)劃設(shè)計、招投標(biāo)、監(jiān)理及驗收等環(huán)節(jié)中尋租活動的表現(xiàn)進行了闡述,并從經(jīng)濟學(xué)原理上闡明了尋租行為造成的嚴(yán)重危害。建筑市場中的尋租活動不僅導(dǎo)致社會財富損失和社會資源的極大浪費,市場機制運作效率低下,還會毒化社會風(fēng)氣,瓦解社會規(guī)范,嚴(yán)重?fù)p害政府威信并導(dǎo)致信任危機。 在對我國建筑市場中的尋租現(xiàn)象進行深入剖析的基礎(chǔ)上,從制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)的角度闡述了建筑市場中尋租行為產(chǎn)生的制度根源,在新制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)的視角下深入分析我國建筑市場中尋租行為的成因,指出正式制度的缺陷和非正式制度的弱化以及路徑依賴是導(dǎo)致建筑市場中尋租行為泛濫的根本原因。運用制度創(chuàng)新理論,通過建立租金消散機制、完善建筑市場體制、培育建筑行業(yè)中介組織和強化反尋租的內(nèi)在約束機制,,構(gòu)建反尋租的制度體系,從而減少和杜絕建筑市場中尋租活動的發(fā)生。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the construction industry of our country has made great progress after a long period of rapid development, and has become an important pillar of the national economy. However, due to the imperfect construction market in our country and the double-track price operation in the course of market transition, the construction field has become a major disaster area for rent-seeking activities, especially in the current large scale of project investment and construction projects. Under the background of fast construction, the problem of rent-seeking in the construction market is more prominent. This paper analyzes the rent-seeking activities in the construction market of our country by using the rent-seeking theory of modern economics, defines the connotation of rent-seeking, and distinguishes between rent-seeking and profit-seeking, rent-seeking and corruption. The author thinks that the root of rent-seeking behavior lies in the system defect, which can not be simply attributed to market failure and government failure. This paper expounds the performance of the rent-seeking activities in the construction market, such as planning and design, bidding, supervision and acceptance, and expounds the serious harm caused by the rent-seeking behavior from the economic principle. The rent-seeking activities in the construction market not only lead to the loss of social wealth and great waste of social resources, but also to the inefficient operation of the market mechanism, but also poison the social atmosphere, disintegrate the social norms, seriously damage the authority of the government and lead to the crisis of trust. On the basis of deeply analyzing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in the construction market of our country, this paper expounds the institutional origin of the rent-seeking behavior in the construction market from the angle of institutional economics. From the perspective of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the causes of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market of our country, and points out that the defects of formal institution, the weakening of informal institution and the path dependence are the fundamental reasons for the proliferation of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market. By establishing the mechanism of rent dissipation, perfecting the construction market system, cultivating the intermediary organization of the construction industry and strengthening the internal restraint mechanism of anti-rent-seeking, the system of anti-rent-seeking is constructed by using the theory of institutional innovation. In order to reduce and eliminate the building market rent-seeking activities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:F426.92
本文編號:2121046
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the construction industry of our country has made great progress after a long period of rapid development, and has become an important pillar of the national economy. However, due to the imperfect construction market in our country and the double-track price operation in the course of market transition, the construction field has become a major disaster area for rent-seeking activities, especially in the current large scale of project investment and construction projects. Under the background of fast construction, the problem of rent-seeking in the construction market is more prominent. This paper analyzes the rent-seeking activities in the construction market of our country by using the rent-seeking theory of modern economics, defines the connotation of rent-seeking, and distinguishes between rent-seeking and profit-seeking, rent-seeking and corruption. The author thinks that the root of rent-seeking behavior lies in the system defect, which can not be simply attributed to market failure and government failure. This paper expounds the performance of the rent-seeking activities in the construction market, such as planning and design, bidding, supervision and acceptance, and expounds the serious harm caused by the rent-seeking behavior from the economic principle. The rent-seeking activities in the construction market not only lead to the loss of social wealth and great waste of social resources, but also to the inefficient operation of the market mechanism, but also poison the social atmosphere, disintegrate the social norms, seriously damage the authority of the government and lead to the crisis of trust. On the basis of deeply analyzing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in the construction market of our country, this paper expounds the institutional origin of the rent-seeking behavior in the construction market from the angle of institutional economics. From the perspective of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the causes of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market of our country, and points out that the defects of formal institution, the weakening of informal institution and the path dependence are the fundamental reasons for the proliferation of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market. By establishing the mechanism of rent dissipation, perfecting the construction market system, cultivating the intermediary organization of the construction industry and strengthening the internal restraint mechanism of anti-rent-seeking, the system of anti-rent-seeking is constructed by using the theory of institutional innovation. In order to reduce and eliminate the building market rent-seeking activities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:F426.92
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 楊太華;鄭慶華;;建設(shè)工程中質(zhì)檢站、監(jiān)理機構(gòu)和承包商尋租行為的博弈分析[J];四川建筑科學(xué)研究;2009年05期
2 賈洪;;建筑業(yè)尋租行為的博弈分析[J];北京交通大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2008年03期
3 賀衛(wèi),王浣塵;試論產(chǎn)權(quán)與尋租[J];財經(jīng)研究;1999年08期
4 張向達(dá);政府尋租及尋租社會的改革[J];當(dāng)代財經(jīng);2002年12期
5 盧現(xiàn)祥;論尋租的成本問題[J];貴州財經(jīng)學(xué)院學(xué)報;1999年Z1期
6 任志濤,張世英;業(yè)主和承包商的尋租分析[J];河北建筑科技學(xué)院學(xué)報;2004年01期
7 鄧衛(wèi)寧;建筑業(yè)內(nèi)尋租活動分析及其對策[J];建筑管理現(xiàn)代化;2005年04期
8 A·克魯格,劉麗明;尋租社會的政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)[J];經(jīng)濟社會體制比較;1988年05期
9 王海鴻;李田;;基于政企關(guān)系視角的房地產(chǎn)市場中政府尋租問題研究[J];經(jīng)濟體制改革;2010年02期
10 朱學(xué)紅;基于我國建筑市場政府尋租的分析[J];技術(shù)經(jīng)濟;2004年07期
本文編號:2121046
本文鏈接:http://www.sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/shengchanguanlilunwen/2121046.html
最近更新
教材專著