本文選題：生物醫(yī)藥公司 + 研發(fā)投入��； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)中的管理層和股東的委托代理沖突一直以來備受學(xué)者關(guān)注,而在解決如何緩解代理沖突的過程中,管理層薪酬是一個行之有效的角度。近些年來,隨著管理層薪酬制度的逐步完善,對管理層實(shí)行長期的激勵的企業(yè)越來越普遍。而且大量研究都在表明,長期性的薪酬激勵將管理層和股東的利益緊密結(jié)合,不僅緩解了二者之間的委托代理沖突,而且還會影響著管理層的投資策略,突出表現(xiàn)在長期性和不穩(wěn)定的投資。本文另辟蹊徑,以委托代理理論和激勵理論作為基石,從董事會設(shè)計薪酬方案來引導(dǎo)對創(chuàng)新起關(guān)鍵作用的高管決策者的行為作為切入點(diǎn),讓高管認(rèn)識到提高研發(fā)投入是有利可圖的事情,從而增強(qiáng)公司自主創(chuàng)新能力,豐富了有效激勵高管注重公司競爭優(yōu)勢和長期利益的研究。 在知識經(jīng)濟(jì)時代,技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的作用不言而喻,政府、企業(yè)與學(xué)術(shù)界都在關(guān)注如何提高企業(yè)的核心競爭力—技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力。醫(yī)藥行業(yè)是一個具有戰(zhàn)略性的支柱行業(yè),其最主要的特征是新產(chǎn)品或新技術(shù)的出現(xiàn),從而帶動行業(yè)的發(fā)展。從某種程度上而言,醫(yī)藥公司的自主創(chuàng)新能力是公司成長和發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素。基于此,考慮到公司研發(fā)項(xiàng)目周期較長、不確定性較大等特點(diǎn),高管會降低對研發(fā)投入的積極性,但如果公司董事會設(shè)計的薪酬激勵方案側(cè)重于鼓勵長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展,從而讓高管意識到增大研發(fā)投入是一件有利可圖的事情,這樣就緩解高管規(guī)避研發(fā)投入的機(jī)會主義行為。本文就實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)一下生物醫(yī)藥行業(yè)的薪酬方案,通過對2009-2011年中國生物醫(yī)藥上市公司研發(fā)投入強(qiáng)度和高管薪酬激勵的實(shí)證考察,結(jié)果表明公司董事會通過薪酬方案鼓勵公司高管提高研發(fā)投入強(qiáng)度以增強(qiáng)公自主創(chuàng)新能力。而且,研究表明公司薪酬方案更傾向于獎勵提高研發(fā)投入強(qiáng)度的公司高管團(tuán)隊(duì),而不是公司CEO。 本文總共有六個部分。第一部分是緒論,構(gòu)建了論文的研究框架,闡述了文章的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。第二部分主要介紹了研究的理論依據(jù),界定了與論文主題相關(guān)的幾個基本概念,闡述了研發(fā)投入與高管薪酬激勵研究的相關(guān)理論,并梳理了國內(nèi)外的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)。第三部分重點(diǎn)介紹了研發(fā)投入的現(xiàn)狀。第四部分是研究設(shè)計,首先在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出相應(yīng)的研究假設(shè),接著開始介紹研究樣本的選取與數(shù)據(jù)來源,同時在相關(guān)參考文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,對被解釋變量、解釋變量和控制變量進(jìn)行了定義,提出了本文的研究模型。第五部分對實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行了分析同時對回歸結(jié)果進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。第六部分,闡述本文的研究結(jié)論,提出研究不足之處并對研究做了進(jìn)一步展望。 在國務(wù)院提出用15年時間進(jìn)入創(chuàng)新型國家行列的總體目標(biāo)的背景下,通過對生物醫(yī)藥行業(yè)研發(fā)投入與高管薪酬激勵的研究,對于其他行業(yè)如何加大研發(fā)投入力度、提高自主創(chuàng)新能力產(chǎn)生一定的指導(dǎo)意義,同時豐富了有效激勵高管注重公司競爭優(yōu)勢和長期利益這一重要的研究課題,期待未來這一研究領(lǐng)域有更多深入的研究出現(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:The management layer and the principal-agent conflict in the enterprise have always been paid attention to by the scholars. In the process of solving the agent conflict, the management salary is an effective angle. In recent years, with the gradual improvement of the management salary system, the enterprises that have long encouraged the management are becoming more and more common. A large number of studies have shown that long-term remuneration incentives combine the interests of management and shareholders closely, not only alleviates the conflict between the two parties, but also affects the investment strategy of the management, and highlights the long-term and unstable investment. Stone, from the design of the board of directors to guide the behavior of the executive decision-makers who play a key role in innovation as a breakthrough point, let the executives realize that improving R & D investment is a profitable thing, thus enhancing the company's independent innovation ability, and enriching the research that effectively motivate the executives to pay attention to the competitive advantage and long-term interests of the company.
In the era of knowledge economy, the role of technological innovation is self-evident. The government, the enterprise and the academia are concerned about how to improve the core competitiveness of the enterprises - the technological innovation ability. The pharmaceutical industry is a strategic pillar industry whose most important feature is the emergence of new products or new techniques, which will lead to the development of the industry. On the other hand, the independent innovation ability of the pharmaceutical company is the key factor for the growth and development of the company. Based on this, the executives will reduce the enthusiasm for R & D investment, considering that the company's R & D project cycle is long and the uncertainty is large, but if the salary incentive scheme designed by the board of directors focuses on encouraging long-term development, it will make the company high It is a profitable thing to realize the increase of R & D investment by the management. This will relieve the opportunist behavior of senior executives to avoid R & D investment. This paper empirically examines the salary scheme of the bio pharmaceutical industry, through an empirical study on the intensity of R & D investment and the incentive of executive compensation in the 2009-2011 year Chinese pharmaceutical listed companies. The board of directors of the company encouraged executives to increase their R & D input to enhance their capacity for public innovation through compensation schemes. Moreover, the research shows that the company's compensation scheme is more likely to reward the company's top management team, not the company CEO., to increase the intensity of R & D investment.
This article has six parts altogether. The first part is the introduction, which constructs the research framework of the paper and expounds the innovation point of the article. The second part mainly introduces the theoretical basis of the research, defines several basic concepts related to the topic of the paper, expounds the related theories of research and development input and executive compensation incentive, and combs the domestic and foreign countries. The third part focuses on the present situation of R & D input. The fourth part is the research design. First, it puts forward the corresponding research hypothesis on the basis of theoretical analysis, and then begins to introduce the selection and data sources of the research samples, and on the basis of the related references, the explanatory variables, the explanatory variables and the control variables are carried out. The fifth part analyses the results of the demonstration and tests the robustness of the regression results. The sixth part, expounds the conclusions of this paper, and puts forward the shortcomings of the research and makes a further prospect for the research.
Under the background of the State Council's overall goal of entering the ranks of innovative countries for 15 years, through the research on R & D investment and executive compensation incentive in the bio pharmaceutical industry, it has a certain guiding significance for other industries to increase R & D investment and improve the ability of independent innovation. At the same time, it enriches the effective incentives for executives to pay attention to it. The important research topic of the company's competitive advantages and long-term interests looks forward to more in-depth research in the future.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F426.72

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

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本文編號：1837969