混合所有制企業(yè)的股東利益沖突、股權(quán)混合模式與公司績(jī)效
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-01-14 13:35
【摘要】：一直以來,股東利益沖突問題都是公司治理研究中一個(gè)經(jīng)久不衰的課題,從股東與管理層間的利益沖突,到大股東與中小股東間的利益沖突,再到大股東間的利益沖突。但是,目前來看相較其他兩種類型的利益沖突,對(duì)大股東間利益沖突的研究尚顯不足。而在公司治理實(shí)踐中,上市公司中的股權(quán)之爭(zhēng)屢見不鮮,使我們不得不重視對(duì)大股東間利益沖突的研究。大股東間的利益沖突可能源于持股數(shù)量的差異,但更可能的是源于股東身份屬性的不同,股東的異質(zhì)性會(huì)影響股東間的關(guān)系,進(jìn)而加劇股東間的利益沖突。因此,在國(guó)有大股東與非國(guó)有大股東并存的混合所有制企業(yè)中,所面臨的股東利益沖突問題較之單一性質(zhì)的企業(yè)將更為復(fù)雜。在混合所有制改革進(jìn)程不斷推進(jìn)的當(dāng)下,對(duì)由股東異質(zhì)性所引起的國(guó)有大股東與非國(guó)有大股東之間的利益沖突的研究是其中一項(xiàng)極具現(xiàn)實(shí)意義的研究課題。本文以2009-2015年滬市A股中的混合所有制企業(yè)為研究樣本,以持股近似度和持股關(guān)注度這兩個(gè)新指標(biāo)來衡量混合所有制企業(yè)中國(guó)有大股東與非國(guó)有大股東間的利益沖突,同時(shí)兼顧大股東與中小股東間的利益沖突,以股利支付率和資金凈占用率作為其代理變量,進(jìn)而研究混合所有制企業(yè)中的股東利益沖突、股權(quán)混合模式對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):①股東利益沖突會(huì)影響公司績(jī)效�？傮w上,無論是代表國(guó)有大股東與非國(guó)有大股東間利益沖突的變量持股近似度和持股關(guān)注度,還是代表大股東與中小股東間利益沖突的變量股利支付率和資金凈占用率,都與公司績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān),說明股東利益沖突對(duì)公司績(jī)效具有負(fù)面作用。特別是,國(guó)有大股東和非國(guó)有大股東的持股比例及其對(duì)公司的關(guān)注程度越接近,就越不利于公司績(jī)效的提高。②不同的股權(quán)混合模式對(duì)混合所有制企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響不同,并非所有的股權(quán)混合模式都能促進(jìn)公司績(jī)效的提升。國(guó)有大股東和非國(guó)有大股東持股比例差距適中的股權(quán)混合模式有利于提升公司績(jī)效;兩類股東持股比例差異過大或過小的股權(quán)混合模式均不利于提高公司績(jī)效。因此,在混合所有制改革過程中,不宜過分強(qiáng)調(diào)異質(zhì)性股東間的制衡作用,而應(yīng)通過合理設(shè)計(jì)股權(quán)混合模式,有效化解大股東利益沖突,更好地發(fā)揮國(guó)有資本和非國(guó)有資本各自的優(yōu)勢(shì)。
[Abstract]:All along, the conflict of interest of shareholders is an enduring problem in the study of corporate governance, from the conflict of interest between shareholders and management, to the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders, and then to the conflict of interests between large shareholders and large shareholders. However, compared with the other two types of conflicts of interest, the research on the conflicts of interest among major shareholders is still insufficient. However, in the practice of corporate governance, there is a lot of controversy about the ownership of listed companies, which makes us pay more attention to the study of the conflicts of interest among the major shareholders. The conflict of interest among large shareholders may be due to the difference in the number of shareholders, but it is more likely to be due to the different identity of shareholders, the heterogeneity of shareholders will affect the relationship between shareholders, and then aggravate the conflict of interest among shareholders. Therefore, in the mixed ownership enterprises with the coexistence of state-owned large shareholders and non-state-owned large shareholders, the conflict of interests of shareholders will be more complex than that of the enterprises with a single nature. As the process of mixed ownership reform continues to advance, the research on the conflict of interest between the large state-owned shareholders and the non-state-owned major shareholders caused by the heterogeneity of shareholders is one of the most significant research topics. This paper takes the mixed ownership enterprises in Shanghai Stock Exchange 2009-2015 as the research sample, and measures the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and the non-state-owned large shareholders of the mixed ownership enterprises in China by using the two new indexes of shareholding approximation and stock ownership concern. At the same time, taking into account the conflict of interest between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders, the paper takes the dividend payment rate and the net occupancy rate of funds as the proxy variables, and then studies the conflict of interest of the shareholders in the mixed ownership enterprises and the influence of the mixed equity mode on the performance of the company. The results show that: 1 shareholder conflict of interest will affect the performance of the company. On the whole, whether it is the degree of similarity and concern of shareholding on behalf of the conflict of interest between the major state-owned shareholder and the non-state-owned major shareholder, or the variable dividend payment rate and net occupancy rate of the capital, which represents the conflict of interest between the major shareholder and the minority shareholder. Both of them are negatively related to corporate performance, indicating that shareholders' conflict of interest has a negative effect on corporate performance. In particular, the more the proportion of large state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned major shareholders and the degree of concern to the company are close, the more unfavorable to the improvement of corporate performance. 2 different mixed stock ownership models have different effects on the performance of mixed ownership enterprises. Not all of the mixed equity models can promote corporate performance. The shareholding mixed mode with moderate difference between state-owned and non-state-owned major shareholders is beneficial to the improvement of corporate performance, while the two types of shareholding mixed mode with too large or too small shareholding ratio are not conducive to improving corporate performance. Therefore, in the process of mixed ownership reform, the checks and balances among heterogeneous shareholders should not be overemphasized, but the conflicts of interests of large shareholders should be effectively resolved by reasonably designing the mixed mode of equity ownership. Better give play to the respective advantages of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51
本文編號(hào)：2408744
[Abstract]:All along, the conflict of interest of shareholders is an enduring problem in the study of corporate governance, from the conflict of interest between shareholders and management, to the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders, and then to the conflict of interests between large shareholders and large shareholders. However, compared with the other two types of conflicts of interest, the research on the conflicts of interest among major shareholders is still insufficient. However, in the practice of corporate governance, there is a lot of controversy about the ownership of listed companies, which makes us pay more attention to the study of the conflicts of interest among the major shareholders. The conflict of interest among large shareholders may be due to the difference in the number of shareholders, but it is more likely to be due to the different identity of shareholders, the heterogeneity of shareholders will affect the relationship between shareholders, and then aggravate the conflict of interest among shareholders. Therefore, in the mixed ownership enterprises with the coexistence of state-owned large shareholders and non-state-owned large shareholders, the conflict of interests of shareholders will be more complex than that of the enterprises with a single nature. As the process of mixed ownership reform continues to advance, the research on the conflict of interest between the large state-owned shareholders and the non-state-owned major shareholders caused by the heterogeneity of shareholders is one of the most significant research topics. This paper takes the mixed ownership enterprises in Shanghai Stock Exchange 2009-2015 as the research sample, and measures the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and the non-state-owned large shareholders of the mixed ownership enterprises in China by using the two new indexes of shareholding approximation and stock ownership concern. At the same time, taking into account the conflict of interest between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders, the paper takes the dividend payment rate and the net occupancy rate of funds as the proxy variables, and then studies the conflict of interest of the shareholders in the mixed ownership enterprises and the influence of the mixed equity mode on the performance of the company. The results show that: 1 shareholder conflict of interest will affect the performance of the company. On the whole, whether it is the degree of similarity and concern of shareholding on behalf of the conflict of interest between the major state-owned shareholder and the non-state-owned major shareholder, or the variable dividend payment rate and net occupancy rate of the capital, which represents the conflict of interest between the major shareholder and the minority shareholder. Both of them are negatively related to corporate performance, indicating that shareholders' conflict of interest has a negative effect on corporate performance. In particular, the more the proportion of large state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned major shareholders and the degree of concern to the company are close, the more unfavorable to the improvement of corporate performance. 2 different mixed stock ownership models have different effects on the performance of mixed ownership enterprises. Not all of the mixed equity models can promote corporate performance. The shareholding mixed mode with moderate difference between state-owned and non-state-owned major shareholders is beneficial to the improvement of corporate performance, while the two types of shareholding mixed mode with too large or too small shareholding ratio are not conducive to improving corporate performance. Therefore, in the process of mixed ownership reform, the checks and balances among heterogeneous shareholders should not be overemphasized, but the conflicts of interests of large shareholders should be effectively resolved by reasonably designing the mixed mode of equity ownership. Better give play to the respective advantages of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51
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，本文編號(hào)：2408744
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