【摘要】：在公司治理過(guò)程中一直存在兩個(gè)悖論:國(guó)有企業(yè)高管作為職業(yè)經(jīng)理人,雖然薪酬相對(duì)較低,但是企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)卻在高速增長(zhǎng)�？v觀并購(gòu)大潮主并購(gòu)方樂(lè)于積極主動(dòng)的尋找目標(biāo)公司,花費(fèi)大量金錢、資本實(shí)施并購(gòu),但是往往績(jī)效很差,違背股東財(cái)富最大化的目標(biāo)。到底是什么樣動(dòng)機(jī)和原因影響了高管的選擇?與此同時(shí),研究表明國(guó)有企業(yè)資本保值增長(zhǎng)率并沒(méi)有對(duì)高管的升遷產(chǎn)生顯著正的影響,這表明目前國(guó)有企業(yè)的發(fā)展方式仍然是“規(guī)模導(dǎo)向型”;國(guó)有企業(yè)職位的高管薪酬沒(méi)有對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)高管的升遷產(chǎn)生顯著的影響,國(guó)有企業(yè)高管職業(yè)經(jīng)理人身份弱化,更像是政府官員而非職業(yè)經(jīng)理人�？v觀30多年的歷史,國(guó)有企業(yè)的發(fā)展功不可沒(méi),在面臨改革深水區(qū)時(shí),核心問(wèn)題就是解決國(guó)有企業(yè)公司治理問(wèn)題;高管的激勵(lì)機(jī)制成為改革的重中之重;由于國(guó)有企業(yè)高管身份特殊,具備“準(zhǔn)官員”身份,使得研究政治晉升問(wèn)題有著“標(biāo)新立意”的意義。以“錦標(biāo)賽晉升機(jī)制”作為視角,國(guó)資委作為委任國(guó)有企業(yè)高管的直接負(fù)責(zé)人,考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)單一;這使得國(guó)有企業(yè)高管謀求企業(yè)資本以及規(guī)模的擴(kuò)張,實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的發(fā)展能更好地實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)和個(gè)人的雙贏具備可能性。從另一方面說(shuō),國(guó)有企業(yè)由于背景特殊,與政府有著不可分割的依賴粘性,即使國(guó)有企高管具備的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人身份,其向政府“尋租”可以為企業(yè)的發(fā)展謀求更好的條件以及更多的便利。以上邏輯表明,國(guó)有企業(yè)高管追求政治晉升在現(xiàn)實(shí)中具備可行性和必要性。作為國(guó)有企業(yè)高管在面臨能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)政治晉升機(jī)會(huì)時(shí),探索能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)擴(kuò)張“規(guī)�！毙再|(zhì)的管理活動(dòng)可以解決委托-代理問(wèn)題的先天矛盾。并購(gòu)行為作為擴(kuò)張規(guī)模挖掘企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力的手段之一,國(guó)企高管如何應(yīng)用該手段?在以往相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,實(shí)證研究探討了高管政治晉升、并購(gòu)規(guī)模、并購(gòu)規(guī)模以及并購(gòu)績(jī)效。研究樣本選取的是2004至2013年間滬、深A(yù)股上市的國(guó)有控股上市公司,實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示:面對(duì)不同程度的政治晉升可能性,相比較其他方式,并購(gòu)是國(guó)有企業(yè)高管選擇的最普遍方式。多數(shù)發(fā)生政治晉升行為的高管都在發(fā)生變更前的1-2年進(jìn)行過(guò)并購(gòu)行為。存在高管政治晉升的主并購(gòu)方企業(yè)對(duì)于并購(gòu)規(guī)模的選擇正相關(guān)性,可能性越大的國(guó)企高管,并購(gòu)規(guī)模就越大。主并購(gòu)方企業(yè)一旦進(jìn)行并購(gòu)選擇,在就會(huì)在企業(yè)動(dòng)態(tài)的過(guò)程中,不斷增加資本投入量,值得注意的是并購(gòu)規(guī)模呈現(xiàn)“倒U型”曲線,到達(dá)了峰值臨界點(diǎn)之后,擴(kuò)張規(guī)�？赡苓m得其反,背離目標(biāo)。雖然國(guó)有企業(yè)高管出發(fā)點(diǎn)在于利用政府“扶持之手”實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的發(fā)展、個(gè)人的升遷。但不可否認(rèn)的是,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看并購(gòu)績(jī)效不容樂(lè)觀,發(fā)生政治晉升行為的國(guó)有企業(yè)其并購(gòu)績(jī)效相對(duì)較差。本文的研究意義在于強(qiáng)調(diào)了并購(gòu)行為的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),需要完善國(guó)有企業(yè)并購(gòu)項(xiàng)目的選擇;對(duì)于國(guó)企高管來(lái)說(shuō),“問(wèn)責(zé)制度”不夠明晰,多數(shù)高管只需要對(duì)擔(dān)任高管期間業(yè)績(jī)負(fù)責(zé),使得其僅僅將擔(dān)任職業(yè)經(jīng)理人作為升遷的跳板。不可否認(rèn)的是,管理者行為對(duì)于企業(yè)具有滯后性,類似主并購(gòu)方企業(yè)并購(gòu)行為的考察要延長(zhǎng)時(shí)間跨度,否則會(huì)造成國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的流失和浪費(fèi)。從理論來(lái)說(shuō),政治晉升是一種隱性激勵(lì),需要和顯性激勵(lì)發(fā)揮協(xié)同作用,通過(guò)聲譽(yù)、自我實(shí)現(xiàn)等改善公司治理質(zhì)量,國(guó)企高管為了實(shí)現(xiàn)“準(zhǔn)官員”的政治升遷,會(huì)在意“企業(yè)家”身份的未來(lái),有助于分析一些國(guó)有企業(yè)的行為。
[Abstract]:There are always two paradoxes in the process of corporate governance: state-owned enterprise executives as professional managers, although the salary is relatively low, but corporate performance is growing at a high speed. At the same time, the research shows that the growth rate of capital preservation in state-owned enterprises does not have a significant positive impact on the promotion of senior executives, which indicates that the development mode of state-owned enterprises is still "scale-oriented"; the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is not. State-owned enterprises have a significant impact on the promotion of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. The status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is weakened, more like government officials than professional managers. Incentive mechanism has become the top priority of the reform; because of the special status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises and the status of "quasi-official", the study of political promotion has the meaning of "innovative ideas". On the other hand, because of the special background, state-owned enterprises have an inseparable dependence on the government, even if state-owned enterprise executives have the status of professional managers, they "seek" the government. The above logic shows that the pursuit of political promotion by executives of state-owned enterprises is feasible and necessary in reality. As executives of state-owned enterprises, when faced with the opportunity to achieve political promotion, it is possible to explore management activities that can expand the "scale" nature. Solving the congenital contradiction of the principal-agent problem. As one of the means to expand the scale and tap the core competitiveness of enterprises, how do the executives of state-owned enterprises use this method? Based on the review of relevant literature, this paper empirically studies the political promotion of executives, the scale of mergers and acquisitions, the scale of mergers and acquisitions and the performance of mergers and acquisitions. From 2004 to 2013 in Shanghai, Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned listed companies, the empirical results show that: in the face of varying degrees of political promotion possibilities, compared with other ways, mergers and acquisitions are the most common choice of state-owned enterprise executives. The choice of M&A scale is positively correlated with the choice of M&A scale by the main merger and acquisition enterprises with political promotion. The larger the possibility of the executives of state-owned enterprises, the larger the scale of M&A. After the peak of the critical point, the expansion of the scale may be counterproductive, deviating from the goal. Although the starting point of state-owned enterprise executives is to use the government's "hands" to achieve the development of enterprises, personal promotion. But it is undeniable that in the long run, the performance of mergers and acquisitions is not optimistic. The significance of this study is to emphasize the risk of mergers and acquisitions, need to improve the choice of state-owned enterprise mergers and acquisitions projects; for state-owned enterprise executives, "accountability system" is not clear enough, most executives only need to be responsible for the performance of senior executives, so that they will only serve as professional managers as a springboard for promotion. In theory, political promotion is a kind of implicit incentive, which needs to cooperate with explicit incentive to improve corporate governance through reputation and self-realization. Quantity, in order to achieve the political promotion of "prospective officials", executives of state-owned enterprises will care about the future of "entrepreneurship", which helps to analyze the behavior of some state-owned enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F276.1;F271;F275;F272.91

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