發(fā)布時間：2018-05-20 18:27

  本文選題：高管薪酬 + 內(nèi)部控制��； 參考：《南京大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：伴隨著國民經(jīng)濟的持續(xù)穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,人們在充分享受豐富的物質(zhì)生活之余,對生活質(zhì)量、生存環(huán)境的改善提出了越來越高的要求,這越發(fā)突顯出企業(yè)承擔社會責任的重要性。企業(yè)承擔社會責任會增大成本支出,影響短期財務(wù)績效,出于自利的考慮,高管有動機減少企業(yè)社會責任活動。薪酬管理在人力資源管理中能夠發(fā)揮積極的激勵作用,能夠引導高管的行為和戰(zhàn)略決策。研究高管薪酬對企業(yè)履行社會責任的激勵是將高管激勵和企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略行為結(jié)合的新的研究方向�，F(xiàn)有文獻大多集中于高管薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)濟績效之間的關(guān)系,而僅從財務(wù)角度對薪酬管理進行考量易導致高管的短視和自利行為。將履行社會責任納入薪酬管理的范疇,有利于更好的制定合理有效的薪酬制度,有利于企業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展。高管薪酬除了包括短期貨幣薪酬外,還包括持股所帶來的長期收益。將高管薪酬分為短期貨幣薪酬和長期薪酬,有利于更好的分析高管薪酬激勵的作用機制。同時現(xiàn)有文獻在研究高管薪酬對企業(yè)社會責任的影響中,忽略了內(nèi)部控制在制度層面的重要監(jiān)督控制作用,本文將內(nèi)部控制納入研究框架,豐富了社會責任的研究。本研究選取A股上市公司的樣本數(shù)據(jù),對本文提出的假設(shè)進行回歸驗證,得出結(jié)論:高管短期貨幣薪酬與企業(yè)社會責任顯著正相關(guān);長期薪酬與企業(yè)社會責任顯著正相關(guān);內(nèi)部控制能促進高管短期貨幣薪酬、長期薪酬對企業(yè)社會責任的正向關(guān)系。結(jié)果表明高管的薪酬越高,不論是短期貨幣薪酬還是長期持股薪酬都能對企業(yè)履行社會責任產(chǎn)生積極的激勵效果,良好的內(nèi)部控制水平能夠促進激勵效果更好的發(fā)揮。并據(jù)此結(jié)論提出建議:完善薪酬激勵制度,短期貨幣薪酬與長期持股相協(xié)同;完善內(nèi)部控制制度,充分發(fā)揮內(nèi)部控制的監(jiān)督作用。
[Abstract]:With the sustained and stable development of the national economy, people in the full enjoyment of rich material life, to improve the quality of life, living environment has put forward higher and higher requirements, which more and more highlights the importance of corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility will increase costs and affect short-term financial performance. For self-interest, executives have the motivation to reduce corporate social responsibility activities. Compensation management can play an active role in human resource management, and can guide the executive's behavior and strategic decision. It is a new research direction to study the incentive of executive compensation to corporate social responsibility. Most of the existing literature focuses on the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise economic performance, but only from the financial point of view to pay management is easy to lead to short-sighted and self-interest behavior of executives. To bring social responsibility into the category of salary management is beneficial to the establishment of a reasonable and effective salary system and to the long-term development of enterprises. Executive compensation includes short-term monetary compensation as well as long-term gains from equity holdings. The classification of executive compensation into short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation is conducive to better analysis of executive compensation incentive mechanism. At the same time, in the study of the impact of executive compensation on corporate social responsibility, the existing literature ignores the important supervisory and control role of internal control at the institutional level. This paper brings the internal control into the research framework and enriches the research on social responsibility. Based on the sample data of A-share listed companies, this study verifies the hypotheses put forward in this paper, and concludes that the short-term monetary compensation of executives is significantly positively correlated with corporate social responsibility, long-term compensation is significantly positively correlated with corporate social responsibility, and long-term compensation is significantly positively correlated with corporate social responsibility. Internal controls promote a positive relationship between short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation for corporate social responsibility. The results show that the higher the executive compensation, both short-term monetary compensation and long-term shareholding compensation can produce positive incentive effect on corporate social responsibility, and good internal control level can promote the incentive effect better. Based on this conclusion, some suggestions are put forward: perfecting the salary incentive system, coordinating the short-term monetary compensation with the long-term stock holding, perfecting the internal control system and giving full play to the supervisory role of the internal control.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F270;F832.51;F275
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本文編號：1915757