本文選題：D2D通信 + D2D內(nèi)容共享��； 參考：《北京交通大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著智能移動終端的普及和流行,移動數(shù)據(jù)流量正以前所未有的速率急劇增加。蜂窩網(wǎng)絡被迫從過去以連接為主的端到端通信向以內(nèi)容為中心的未來通信轉(zhuǎn)變,面臨著資源短缺,容量受限等諸多壓力和挑戰(zhàn)。因此,急需新的通信模式出現(xiàn)來解決移動用戶對流量和頻譜的巨大需求。D2D通信(Device-to-Device Communications,D2D)作為 5G(5th Generation Mobile Communication)的關鍵技術之一,被廣泛認為是可以解決未來移動通信的頻譜資源缺乏問題,卸載基站流量的重要手段之一,極具發(fā)展情景。D2D通信的優(yōu)勢源于其可以繞過蜂窩基礎架構(gòu)實現(xiàn)兩個距離相近的移動用戶的直接通信和內(nèi)容共享。未來網(wǎng)絡中經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)的場景可能是,基站將流行的請求內(nèi)容發(fā)送至某移動用戶,該移動用戶再通過D2D通信分享給附近需求的其他用戶。然而現(xiàn)有的D2D通信研究忽視了一個重要的問題,即怎樣去激勵用戶參與到D2D通信中,去分享這些內(nèi)容給有需求的用戶。如果移動用戶不愿意通過D2D通信分享內(nèi)容,那么基站仍然需使用蜂窩下行鏈路提供內(nèi)容,D2D的這些優(yōu)勢也就無從談起。本文致力于設計協(xié)作激勵機制激勵移動用戶使用D2D通信分享內(nèi)容,以緩解蜂窩網(wǎng)的資源和流量壓力。本文引入了信息經(jīng)濟學中的委托代理理論來構(gòu)建和規(guī)劃D2D通信中的協(xié)作激勵設計。在D2D內(nèi)容共享場景中,基站(Base Station,BS)作為委托人,內(nèi)容提供者扮演代理人通過D2D通信方式發(fā)送內(nèi)容給請求者。本文研究了 BS和內(nèi)容提供者之間的兩種信息不對稱情況,分別利用信號發(fā)送模型和績效模型設計了兩套協(xié)作激勵機制,SCSI(Signaling-based Content Sharing Scheme)機制和 PRCSI(Performance-Related Content Sharing Incentive)機制,去激勵內(nèi)容提供者參與到D2D內(nèi)容共享中來。在SCSI機制中,通過推導每個內(nèi)容提供者的最優(yōu)策略來最大化內(nèi)容提供者的效用收益,并保證基站的效益不為負值。在PRCSI中,代理人與委托人簽訂績效合同來促使代理人更加努力的工作,并解決隱藏行動帶來的道德風險問題。在SCSI和PRCSI兩個協(xié)作激勵機制中,代理人和委托人都選取了最優(yōu)行動來到達納什均衡狀態(tài)。仿真結(jié)果顯示,SCSI和PRCSI可以提高接收速率,增大代理人和委托人的效用,使內(nèi)容提供者得到激勵。如此,系統(tǒng)的頻譜效率和通信速率得到了極大的提升。且代理人的行動符合一個理性的市場人的選擇。
[Abstract]:With the popularity and popularity of intelligent mobile terminals, mobile data traffic is increasing rapidly at an unprecedented rate. Cellular network is forced to change from end-to-end communication to content-centric future communication, facing many pressures and challenges, such as shortage of resources, limited capacity and so on. Therefore, the emergence of new communication modes is urgently needed to solve the huge demand of mobile users for traffic and spectrum. As one of the key technologies of 5G(5th Generation Mobile Communication), D2D communication device / to-device communications / D2D) is widely considered to be able to solve the problem of lack of spectrum resources in future mobile communications. One of the most important ways to unload base station traffic is that the advantage of developing scenario. D2D communication is that it can bypass the cellular infrastructure to realize direct communication and content sharing between two mobile users with close distance. A common scenario in future networks may be that the base station sends popular request content to a mobile user, who in turn shares it with other nearby users via D2D communication. However, the existing research on D2D communication neglects an important problem, that is, how to encourage users to participate in D2D communication and share the content to users who need it. If mobile users are unwilling to share content over D2D communications, these advantages of using cellular downlinks to provide content for base stations will not be possible. This paper is devoted to designing collaborative incentive mechanism to encourage mobile users to share content using D2D communication, so as to alleviate the pressure of resources and traffic in cellular networks. This paper introduces the principal-agent theory in information economics to construct and plan collaborative incentive design in D2D communication. In the D2D content sharing scenario, the base station base station (BSs) acts as the principal, and the content provider acts as the agent to send the content to the requester through D2D communication. In this paper, two kinds of information asymmetry between BS and content provider are studied, and two sets of cooperative incentive mechanisms, SCSI signaling-based Content Sharing Scheme) and PRCSI(Performance-Related Content Sharing Incentive), are designed by using the signal sending model and the performance model, respectively. To motivate content providers to participate in D 2 D content sharing. In the SCSI mechanism, the optimal policy of each content provider is derived to maximize the utility benefit of the content provider and to ensure that the benefit of the base station is not negative. In PRCSI, the agent and the principal sign the performance contract to urge the agent to work harder and solve the moral hazard caused by the hidden action. In two cooperative incentive mechanisms, SCSI and PRCSI, agents and principals both select optimal actions to reach Nash equilibrium. The simulation results show that SCSI and PRCSI can improve the receiving rate, increase the utility of agent and client, and make the content provider receive incentive. In this way, the spectral efficiency and communication rate of the system are greatly improved. And the agent's action accords with the choice of a rational marketer.
【學位授予單位】：北京交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：TN929.5

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