本文選題：農(nóng)商行　切入點(diǎn)：普惠客戶經(jīng)理　出處：《揚(yáng)州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著城鎮(zhèn)化進(jìn)程的加快,縣域金融市場(chǎng)的層次和內(nèi)涵都發(fā)生著深刻變化,農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)越來(lái)越激烈。農(nóng)商行立足于農(nóng)村,服務(wù)于小微企業(yè),普惠類業(yè)務(wù)是全行業(yè)務(wù)的重中之重。普惠客戶經(jīng)理是農(nóng)商行經(jīng)營(yíng)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的主體,近年來(lái)普惠客戶經(jīng)理的離職率卻在不斷提高。因此,為了能在激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中不斷發(fā)展,就需要建立一支穩(wěn)定的普惠客戶經(jīng)理隊(duì)伍,通過(guò)薪酬激勵(lì)充分調(diào)動(dòng)其積極性,充分發(fā)揮普惠客戶經(jīng)理的作用。因此探索普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì),完善普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬分配,這對(duì)留住人才,吸引人才至關(guān)重要。因而,以Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)其普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì)進(jìn)行深入研究,為Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì)的有效運(yùn)行提出針對(duì)性的優(yōu)化建議,具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義和管理價(jià)值。本文以薪酬激勵(lì)理論為基礎(chǔ),通過(guò)文獻(xiàn)研究法、問(wèn)卷調(diào)查法,深入分析了 Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀及激勵(lì)效果。研究結(jié)果表明,Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬構(gòu)成包括基本工資、績(jī)效工資、福利津貼和職務(wù)晉升。Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì)效果如下:首先,普惠客戶經(jīng)理普遍對(duì)薪酬水平的滿意度低。其次,對(duì)于薪酬的公平性問(wèn)題上,大部分普惠客戶經(jīng)理感到薪酬制度不夠公正和公平,影響薪酬分配的最主要的問(wèn)題依次是薪酬制度和考核不透明、薪酬政策的穩(wěn)定性和統(tǒng)一性信息、技術(shù)落后,數(shù)據(jù)采集失真。第三,普惠客戶經(jīng)理對(duì)目前福利滿意度不高。第四,普惠客戶經(jīng)理對(duì)績(jī)效考核體系滿意度較低,影響績(jī)效考核效果的最主要的問(wèn)題依次領(lǐng)導(dǎo)意志干擾較多、缺乏有效的監(jiān)督約束機(jī)制、績(jī)效考核系統(tǒng)尚不完善、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)不夠重視。最后,普惠客戶經(jīng)理對(duì)中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的滿意度不高,絕大多數(shù)普惠客戶經(jīng)理認(rèn)為職務(wù)的晉升對(duì)于提高薪酬的影響較大。在上述分析的基礎(chǔ)上,指出了Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì)存在的問(wèn)題及原因:第一,薪酬水平市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力較弱。第二,薪酬分配內(nèi)部公平性缺乏,包括:薪酬政策缺乏統(tǒng)一性、數(shù)據(jù)采集信息技術(shù)落后、薪酬制度及考核不透明。第三,福利設(shè)計(jì)針對(duì)性有待加強(qiáng)。第四,績(jī)效考核體系仍需要健全,包括:體制陋習(xí)未完全改變、績(jī)效考核系統(tǒng)效率低、監(jiān)督約束機(jī)制不健全。第五,薪酬激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)不合理,包括:基本工資受職務(wù)晉升影響較大、短期激勵(lì)和長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)失衡。針對(duì)上述問(wèn)題,對(duì)Y農(nóng)商行普惠客戶經(jīng)理薪酬激勵(lì)提出了相應(yīng)的優(yōu)化建議:第一,界定合理薪酬水平。第二,促進(jìn)薪酬分配公平,包括:統(tǒng)一薪酬分配政策、建立電子考核系統(tǒng)、建立有效溝通機(jī)制。第三,實(shí)施彈性福利政策。第四,完善績(jī)效考核體系,包括:存量客戶競(jìng)投標(biāo)制度、優(yōu)化績(jī)效考核指標(biāo)、建立薪酬考核委員會(huì)。第五,調(diào)整完善薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),包括完善員工管理體系機(jī)制、重視中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的作用。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of urbanization, the level and connotation of the county financial market have undergone profound changes, and the competition in the rural financial market is becoming more and more intense. The general business is the most important part of the whole bank business. The account manager is the main body of the agribusiness value creation, but the turnover rate of the customer manager is increasing in recent years. Therefore, in order to be able to develop continuously in the fierce competition, It is necessary to set up a stable team of account managers, mobilize their enthusiasm and give full play to the role of account managers. This is very important to retain talents and attract talents. It has important practical significance and management value to put forward targeted optimization suggestions for the effective operation of compensation incentive for the general customer manager of Yagang Company. Based on the theory of compensation incentive, this paper is based on the theory of compensation incentive, through the method of literature research, questionnaire survey, and so on. The paper deeply analyzes the current situation and incentive effect of the compensation of the general manager of the Yagang Company. The results show that the salary composition of the customer manager includes the basic salary, the performance salary, the performance salary, the basic salary, the performance salary and the performance salary. The benefits and job promotion. Y. the incentive effect of the general account manager is as follows: firstly, the general satisfaction of the customer manager with the salary level is low. Secondly, on the issue of the fairness of the salary, Most of the general account managers feel that the compensation system is not fair and equitable. The most important problems affecting the distribution of compensation are, in turn, the opaque pay system and appraisal, the information on the stability and unity of the salary policy, and the backward technology. Third, the customer manager's satisfaction with welfare is not high. Fourth, the customer manager's satisfaction with the performance appraisal system is low, and the most important problems affecting the performance appraisal result are more interference of leadership will. Lack of effective supervision and restraint mechanism, performance appraisal system is not perfect, the leadership is not enough attention. On the basis of the above analysis, the paper points out the problems and reasons of the compensation incentive of the general manager in the Yagang Company: first, Second, the lack of internal fairness of salary distribution, including: lack of uniformity of salary policy, backward data collection and information technology, pay system and assessment is not transparent. Fourth, the performance appraisal system still needs to be improved, including: the bad habits of the system have not completely changed, the efficiency of the performance appraisal system is low, the supervision and restraint mechanism is not perfect. Fifth, the design of salary incentive structure is unreasonable. It includes: the basic salary is influenced greatly by the promotion of the position, the short-term incentive and the long-term incentive structure are out of balance. In view of the above problems, the paper puts forward the corresponding optimization suggestions for the compensation incentive of the general manager of the Yagang Company: first, Second, to promote the fair distribution of compensation, including: unifying the salary distribution policy, establishing an electronic assessment system, establishing an effective communication mechanism. Third, implementing flexible welfare policies. Fourth, perfecting the performance appraisal system. It includes: stock customer competitive bidding system, optimize performance appraisal index, establish salary appraisal committee. Fifth, adjust and perfect salary structure, including perfect employee management system mechanism, attach importance to the role of medium and long term incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：揚(yáng)州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.35;F272.92

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