本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 企業(yè)投資 投資過度 投資不足　出處：《中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：最早研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)的學(xué)者是Taussig和Barke。1925年,他們對(duì)美國公司的高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)分析后,得出股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司發(fā)展和盈利影響程度較低的結(jié)論。隨著生產(chǎn)力的迅速發(fā)展,知識(shí)密集型企業(yè)的增多,股權(quán)激勵(lì)憑借其具有激勵(lì)與約束的雙重效用,其應(yīng)用范圍也隨之?dāng)U大,因此股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效用成為了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的關(guān)注熱點(diǎn)。目前國外普遍認(rèn)為股權(quán)激勵(lì)屬于一種長期的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,對(duì)公司業(yè)績的影響是科學(xué)有效的。在我國資本市場結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型之后,伴隨著一系列政策和辦法的頒布,我國推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)的企業(yè)變多,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國得到重要的發(fā)展。由于企業(yè)投資的有效程度決定著企業(yè)的盈利水平和發(fā)展,因此探究股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)投資的作用對(duì)于分析公司的經(jīng)營狀況和成長能力都有著重要的意義。自我國實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)以來,信息技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司數(shù)量在逐步增長,截至2015年12月31,滬深兩市共有114家預(yù)告實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。本文從股權(quán)激勵(lì)產(chǎn)生與發(fā)展的背景、股權(quán)激勵(lì)的理論基礎(chǔ)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施模式以及股權(quán)激勵(lì)在軟件與信息技術(shù)行業(yè)實(shí)施時(shí)對(duì)投資的影響等幾個(gè)方面進(jìn)行研究和陳述。通過整理和總結(jié)國外和國內(nèi)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)有關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)內(nèi)容,為實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的可行性和有效性提供了理論上的支持。本文的研究是通過以實(shí)證研究為主,規(guī)范研究為輔,通過兩種方法相結(jié)合的方式對(duì)2006——2015年間所研究行業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司的投資行為進(jìn)行了多元回歸分析。本文根據(jù)估計(jì)合理投資程度的殘差值的正負(fù)來反應(yīng)企業(yè)是否投資過度和投資不足程度。經(jīng)過定性和定量的分析結(jié)果表明,我國的軟件與信息技術(shù)行業(yè)的企業(yè)投資存在投資過度和投資不足,股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)投資不足和投資過度有顯著的抑制作用,總體上投資不足的企業(yè)比例高于投資過度的企業(yè),股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果受到公司的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和經(jīng)營狀況的影響。最后,在本文的研究基礎(chǔ)上提出了如何使得股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國的實(shí)踐更有效的相關(guān)建議,并總結(jié)了目前研究的不足以及未來研究的發(fā)展方向。
[Abstract]:The first scholars to study equity incentive are Taussig and Barke.1925. After analyzing the executive compensation and performance of American companies, they come to the conclusion that the impact of equity incentive on the development and profitability of the company is low, and with the rapid development of productivity, it is concluded that equity incentive has a low impact on the development and profitability of the company. With the increase of knowledge-intensive enterprises, equity incentive has the dual utility of incentive and constraint, and its application scope is also expanded. Therefore, the utility of equity incentive has become the focus of attention of scholars at home and abroad. At present, it is generally considered that equity incentive is a long-term incentive mechanism, and the impact on corporate performance is scientific and effective. After the structural transformation of capital market in China, With the promulgation of a series of policies and measures, more and more enterprises implement equity incentive in our country, and equity incentive gets important development in our country. Because the effective degree of enterprise investment determines the profit level and development of enterprise, Therefore, it is of great significance to explore the effect of equity incentive on enterprise investment. Since the implementation of equity incentive in China, the number of companies implementing equity incentive in information technology industry has gradually increased. As of December 2015, there are 114 stock incentive plans in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. The implementation mode of equity incentive and the impact of equity incentive on investment in software and information technology industry are studied and stated. The literature related to equity incentive is summarized and summarized by collating and summarizing the literature on equity incentive both at home and abroad. It provides theoretical support for the feasibility and effectiveness of equity incentive. By combining the two methods, the investment behavior of listed companies with equity incentive in the industries studied from 2006 to 2015 is analyzed by multiple regression analysis. This paper reflects the enterprises according to the positive and negative residual value of the reasonable investment degree. Whether the industry is overinvested and underinvested. Qualitative and quantitative analysis shows that, There is overinvestment and underinvestment in enterprises in software and information technology industry in China, and equity incentive has a significant restraining effect on underinvestment and overinvestment. On the whole, the proportion of underinvested enterprises is higher than that of overinvested enterprises. The implementation effect of equity incentive is influenced by the internal governance structure and management status of the company. Finally, based on the research of this paper, the author puts forward some relevant suggestions on how to make the equity incentive more effective in our country. And summarized the present research insufficiency as well as the future research development direction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F49

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