【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)股東是公司在IPO之前的先期投入者，是公司重要的資本金資源和人力資源，他們掌握著公司長期健康成長的關(guān)鍵要素，而上市公司的健康發(fā)展是證券市場穩(wěn)定的基石。尤其在公司成功上市以后，，創(chuàng)業(yè)股東除了能獲取高額創(chuàng)業(yè)利潤外，還可能利用信息優(yōu)勢及持股成本低的優(yōu)勢在市場上進(jìn)行套利，適當(dāng)?shù)奶桌欣谑袌龌貧w價值區(qū)間，但利用信息不對稱的過度套利無疑會對公司的成長和市場的穩(wěn)定造成很大危害。所以，創(chuàng)業(yè)股東的市場行為及其對公司成長性的影響應(yīng)受到廣泛關(guān)注，規(guī)范創(chuàng)業(yè)股東的市場行為不僅有利于維護(hù)市場的穩(wěn)定，還可以保持公司的長期成長。對股東市場行為的動因及市場影響研究較多，但針對創(chuàng)業(yè)股東的市場行為與公司成長性的關(guān)系研究較少，本文以2006年—2010年發(fā)生創(chuàng)業(yè)股東增減持股票的公司為樣本，根據(jù)創(chuàng)業(yè)股東增減持股份后公司成長性的實(shí)際變化，進(jìn)行了多方面的實(shí)證，其研究不僅具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，還具有一定的理論意義。 文章以委托代理理論為基礎(chǔ)分析了兩個層次“搭便車”問題，確立創(chuàng)業(yè)股東是公司成長的核心力量，從“利益協(xié)同效應(yīng)”和“壕溝防御效應(yīng)”視角探討了創(chuàng)業(yè)股東對經(jīng)營者的激勵；實(shí)證論證了創(chuàng)業(yè)股東增持股票強(qiáng)化了“利益協(xié)同效應(yīng)”，減持股票加重了“壕溝防御效應(yīng)”；而第一大股東持股比例越大，“壕溝防御效應(yīng)”越明顯，前十大股東持股比例越大，“利益趨同效應(yīng)”越顯著，這體現(xiàn)出股權(quán)制衡與股權(quán)控制的平衡關(guān)系。在分析創(chuàng)業(yè)利潤的基礎(chǔ)上，剖析了創(chuàng)業(yè)股東IPO套利動機(jī)和套利模式，得出創(chuàng)業(yè)股東存在著長期IPO套利的機(jī)會主義這一結(jié)論。最后根據(jù)以上結(jié)論提出了對創(chuàng)業(yè)股東減持股票的限制措施，使創(chuàng)業(yè)股東利潤最大化目標(biāo)由市場套利轉(zhuǎn)移到促進(jìn)公司長期成長上來。
[Abstract]:Venture shareholders are the investors before IPO, the important capital resources and human resources of the company. They hold the key elements of the long-term healthy growth of the company, and the healthy development of the listed companies is the cornerstone of the stability of the securities market. Especially after the successful listing of the company, the venture shareholders can not only obtain high venture profits, but also may arbitrage in the market by using the advantages of information advantage and low cost of holding shares. Appropriate arbitrage is conducive to the return of the market to the value range. But the use of asymmetric information arbitrage will undoubtedly cause great harm to the growth of companies and the stability of the market. Therefore, the market behavior of the venture shareholders and its influence on the growth of the company should be paid more attention to. Standardizing the market behavior of the venture shareholders is not only conducive to maintaining the stability of the market, but also can maintain the long-term growth of the company. There are many researches on the motivation and market influence of shareholders' market behavior, but there are few researches on the relationship between the market behavior of venture shareholders and the growth of the company. According to the actual changes of the growth of the company after the increase or decrease of the shares of the venture shareholders, this paper has carried out a variety of empirical studies, the research of which is not only of practical significance, but also of certain theoretical significance. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the problem of "hitchhiking" at two levels, and establishes that the entrepreneurial shareholders are the core force of the growth of the company. From the perspective of "benefit synergy effect" and "trench defense effect", this paper discusses the incentive of venture shareholders to operators; It is demonstrated that the increase of stock holding by venture shareholders strengthens the "benefit synergy effect", and the "trench defense effect" is aggravated by the reduction of stock holdings. However, the larger the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the more obvious the "trench defense effect", and the greater the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders, the more significant the "interest convergence effect", which reflects the balance between equity balance and equity control. Based on the analysis of entrepreneurial profits, this paper analyzes the IPO arbitrage motivation and arbitrage model of venture shareholders, and draws the conclusion that there is a long-term opportunism of IPO arbitrage among venture shareholders. Finally, according to the above conclusions, the paper puts forward the restriction measures to reduce the stock holdings of the venture shareholders, so that the goal of maximizing the profits of the venture shareholders is transferred from market arbitrage to promoting the long-term growth of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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