創(chuàng)業(yè)投資中聯(lián)合投資策略的演化博弈分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-17 15:39
【摘要】：十七大以后，我國加速產業(yè)結構升級，把自主創(chuàng)新放在了國家發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的核心位置，而創(chuàng)業(yè)投資作為提高創(chuàng)新能力的加速器，在產業(yè)升級過程中起到了至關重要的作用，近幾年創(chuàng)業(yè)投資高速發(fā)展，但由于創(chuàng)業(yè)投資具有高風險與收益不確定的特點，為了盡量降低風險，增加投資收益，許多創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構都采用聯(lián)合投資模式。 由于我國的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資起步較晚，，資本市場不規(guī)范，市場機制不成熟，法制不完善，配套設施不健全，所以，創(chuàng)業(yè)投資公司在運用聯(lián)合投資策略時存在許多問題亟待改善。鑒于此，本文主要研究了聯(lián)合投資的三個問題：創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構在進行創(chuàng)業(yè)投資時是否會選擇聯(lián)合投資模式進行投資；當創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構形成聯(lián)合投資后，內部會存在哪些管理問題，如何采取措施解決這些問題從而來提高聯(lián)合投資效率；創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構在退出聯(lián)合投資時會考慮何種資本退出方式。 本文通過構造演化博弈模型，分析兩類創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構動態(tài)演化的過程，尋找出在不同條件下創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構的演化穩(wěn)定策略，結果表明：創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構間是否能形成聯(lián)合投資，很大程度上取決于尋求聯(lián)合伙伴而可能產生的成本費用以及聯(lián)合效應的大小，當成本越小，聯(lián)合效應越大時，越易形成聯(lián)合投資模式；創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構的“搭便車”行為是由于即期博弈中收益與成本的對比關系引致的，管理成本以及在投資中所占的比例即股權份額直接影響了聯(lián)合投資參與者是否會出現(xiàn)道德風險；無論是在IPO條件還是非IPO條件下，違約費用的大小都會直接影響創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構選擇資本退出的方式，如果違約費用過高，創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構則會傾向于選擇股份回購策略，但如果違約費用低或者根本不存在違約費用的話，創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構會更愿意采取IPO上市策略和并購策略。 本文通過演化博弈分析聯(lián)合投資中存在的問題，并通過控制參數(shù)和優(yōu)化條件提出解決問題的一些建議，希望能為聯(lián)合投資的良性發(fā)展提供參考依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:After the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China accelerated the upgrading of industrial structure and put independent innovation at the core of the national development strategy. Venture capital, as an accelerator to improve the ability of innovation, played a vital role in the process of industrial upgrading. In recent years, venture capital has developed rapidly, but because venture capital has the characteristics of high risk and uncertain income, in order to minimize risk and increase investment income, many venture capital institutions adopt the mode of joint investment. Due to the late start of venture capital in our country, the capital market is not standardized, the market mechanism is not mature, the legal system is not perfect, and the supporting facilities are not perfect, there are many problems that need to be improved when the venture capital companies use the joint investment strategy. In view of this, this paper mainly studies the three problems of joint investment: whether the venture capital institutions will choose the joint investment mode to invest in the venture capital; When venture capital institutions form joint investment, what management problems will exist inside, and how to take measures to solve these problems in order to improve the efficiency of joint investment; By constructing evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the process of dynamic evolution of two kinds of venture capital institutions, and finds out the evolutionary stability strategy of venture capital institutions under different conditions. The results show that: can venture capital institutions form joint investment? Much depends on the possible cost of seeking a joint partner and the magnitude of the joint effect. When the cost is smaller, the greater the joint effect, the easier it is to form a joint investment model; The "free-rider" behavior of venture capital institutions is caused by the comparative relationship between income and cost in spot game. The management cost and the proportion in the investment, that is, the share of equity, have a direct impact on the moral hazard of the joint investment participants. Whether under the IPO condition or the non-IPO condition, the default cost will directly affect the venture capital investment institutions to choose the way to withdraw capital. If the default cost is too high, the venture capital institutions will tend to choose the stock repurchase strategy. But if the default fee is low or there is no default fee, venture capitalists will be more willing to adopt the IPO listing strategy and mergers and acquisitions strategy. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the joint investment by evolutionary game theory, and puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem by controlling the parameters and optimizing the conditions, hoping to provide a reference for the benign development of the joint investment.
【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.48;F224.32
本文編號：2384400
[Abstract]:After the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China accelerated the upgrading of industrial structure and put independent innovation at the core of the national development strategy. Venture capital, as an accelerator to improve the ability of innovation, played a vital role in the process of industrial upgrading. In recent years, venture capital has developed rapidly, but because venture capital has the characteristics of high risk and uncertain income, in order to minimize risk and increase investment income, many venture capital institutions adopt the mode of joint investment. Due to the late start of venture capital in our country, the capital market is not standardized, the market mechanism is not mature, the legal system is not perfect, and the supporting facilities are not perfect, there are many problems that need to be improved when the venture capital companies use the joint investment strategy. In view of this, this paper mainly studies the three problems of joint investment: whether the venture capital institutions will choose the joint investment mode to invest in the venture capital; When venture capital institutions form joint investment, what management problems will exist inside, and how to take measures to solve these problems in order to improve the efficiency of joint investment; By constructing evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the process of dynamic evolution of two kinds of venture capital institutions, and finds out the evolutionary stability strategy of venture capital institutions under different conditions. The results show that: can venture capital institutions form joint investment? Much depends on the possible cost of seeking a joint partner and the magnitude of the joint effect. When the cost is smaller, the greater the joint effect, the easier it is to form a joint investment model; The "free-rider" behavior of venture capital institutions is caused by the comparative relationship between income and cost in spot game. The management cost and the proportion in the investment, that is, the share of equity, have a direct impact on the moral hazard of the joint investment participants. Whether under the IPO condition or the non-IPO condition, the default cost will directly affect the venture capital investment institutions to choose the way to withdraw capital. If the default cost is too high, the venture capital institutions will tend to choose the stock repurchase strategy. But if the default fee is low or there is no default fee, venture capitalists will be more willing to adopt the IPO listing strategy and mergers and acquisitions strategy. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the joint investment by evolutionary game theory, and puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem by controlling the parameters and optimizing the conditions, hoping to provide a reference for the benign development of the joint investment.
【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.48;F224.32
【引證文獻】
相關碩士學位論文 前1條
1 徐鋼;創(chuàng)投機構特征、IPO后減持套現(xiàn)行為與超額收益研究[D];重慶大學;2014年
本文編號：2384400
本文鏈接：http://www.sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/huobilw/2384400.html
