本文選題：首次公開發(fā)行 + 盈余管理��； 參考：《華中科技大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：首次公開發(fā)行市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)特殊的市場(chǎng)，發(fā)行雙方“契約磨擦”與“溝通阻礙”的存在導(dǎo)致IPO公司盈余管理是一個(gè)非常普遍的現(xiàn)象。綜觀相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)，國內(nèi)外對(duì)于IPO中盈余管理問題的研究主要集中于二個(gè)方面，一是IPO公司盈余管理動(dòng)因研究；二是IPO盈余管理治理機(jī)制研究。關(guān)于盈余管理動(dòng)因的屬性，會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)界有兩種不同的觀點(diǎn)：信號(hào)觀和機(jī)會(huì)主義觀。盈余管理究竟是有益的，還是有害的？還是一個(gè)有待回答的理論和實(shí)證問題。不論是機(jī)會(huì)主義觀還是信號(hào)觀，都會(huì)導(dǎo)致利益再分配效應(yīng)。盈余管理行為會(huì)引發(fā)契約關(guān)系人之間財(cái)富的重新分配，并且過分的盈余管理容易演變成會(huì)計(jì)欺詐和內(nèi)幕交易等非法行為，影響到資本配置效率，甚至導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)失敗。探討IPO公司盈余管理的動(dòng)因與治理，有利于促進(jìn)IPO市場(chǎng)的健康持續(xù)發(fā)展。 在文獻(xiàn)綜述的基礎(chǔ)上，本文運(yùn)用統(tǒng)計(jì)模擬的方法，首先比較各盈余管理應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)計(jì)量模型的檢驗(yàn)效果；然后運(yùn)用實(shí)證方法，探討IPO公司盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)；最后檢驗(yàn)證券監(jiān)管制度的變遷對(duì)IPO公司盈余管理的約束。本文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容有三個(gè)方面： 運(yùn)用統(tǒng)計(jì)模擬的方法，本文通過測(cè)試各模型產(chǎn)生第一類錯(cuò)誤和第二類錯(cuò)誤的頻率，比較基本瓊斯模型、修正瓊斯模型、無形資產(chǎn)瓊斯模型、前瞻性修正瓊斯模型、收益匹配瓊斯模型、現(xiàn)金流量瓊斯模型、非線性瓊斯模型等七種常用的截面操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)模型在中國資本市場(chǎng)的檢驗(yàn)效果。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在中國資本市場(chǎng)上，基本瓊斯模型、修正瓊斯模型和無形資產(chǎn)瓊斯模型相對(duì)較優(yōu)，它們所犯第一類錯(cuò)誤和第二類錯(cuò)誤的頻率較小，但在收入操縱檢測(cè)上，修正瓊斯模型檢驗(yàn)?zāi)芰Ω怀觯滑F(xiàn)金流量瓊斯模型、非線性瓊斯模型雖然檢驗(yàn)盈余管理的能力較強(qiáng)，但是存在較為嚴(yán)重的第一類錯(cuò)誤，易夸大中國上市公司盈余管理的程度。前瞻性修正瓊斯模型計(jì)算復(fù)雜，存在第一類錯(cuò)誤，而且檢驗(yàn)盈余管理的能力上比修正瓊斯模型沒有明顯的提高；收益匹配瓊斯模型對(duì)于費(fèi)用操縱的檢驗(yàn)?zāi)芰^差。綜合各項(xiàng)檢測(cè)結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)中國證券市場(chǎng)上，分年度分行業(yè)回歸的截面修正瓊斯模型在模型的設(shè)定和盈余管理的檢驗(yàn)?zāi)芰Ψ矫姹憩F(xiàn)更佳。 本文利用“承銷商聲譽(yù)”劃分好企業(yè)與差企業(yè)，分析企業(yè)類型、IPO公司盈余管理水平與IPO后股票異常業(yè)績(jī)之間的相關(guān)性。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)無論是高聲譽(yù)的承銷商所承銷的好企業(yè)，還是低聲譽(yù)的承銷商所承銷的差企業(yè)，其上市前一年盈余管理水平都顯著為正，且與企業(yè)類型沒有顯著相關(guān)性，表明IPO公司盈余管理是一種普遍策略。但通過IPO后股票異常業(yè)績(jī)與IPO公司盈余管理水平相關(guān)性的進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)，發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)于差企業(yè)，IPO后異常股票業(yè)績(jī)與IPO公司盈余管理水平之間有顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)性，而對(duì)于好企業(yè)，這種顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)性并不存在�？傮w的實(shí)證結(jié)果支持企業(yè)類型決定IPO公司盈余管理動(dòng)因?qū)傩缘睦碚摲治觥１砻鲗?duì)于好企業(yè)，盈余管理是傳遞企業(yè)未來業(yè)績(jī)的信號(hào)，而對(duì)于差企業(yè)，，盈余管理是一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)為盈余管理的機(jī)會(huì)主義觀與信號(hào)觀的爭(zhēng)議提供了一種可能的解釋，也在一定程度上，證明了中國IPO市場(chǎng)承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的有效性。 基于中國IPO公司管制誘發(fā)型盈余管理動(dòng)因的考慮，本文根據(jù)中國證券發(fā)行制度演變，運(yùn)用應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)模型和實(shí)質(zhì)盈余管理模型來計(jì)量IPO公司盈余管理水平，通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)和多元回歸方法，分析證券發(fā)行制度市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程對(duì)于中國IPO公司盈余管理程度和方式的動(dòng)態(tài)影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)隨著證券發(fā)行制度由審批準(zhǔn)轉(zhuǎn)向核準(zhǔn)制，通道制轉(zhuǎn)向保薦制，IPO公司盈余管理水平顯著下降。在盈余管理方式的研究上，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)在中國IPO市場(chǎng)上，應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和實(shí)質(zhì)盈余管理是顯著正相關(guān)，并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)，Cohen et al.(2008)等西方研究文獻(xiàn)所證明的隨著監(jiān)管制度的加強(qiáng)，應(yīng)計(jì)管理和實(shí)質(zhì)盈余管理方式相互替代，此消彼長(zhǎng)的趨勢(shì)�？傮w的實(shí)證結(jié)果表明核準(zhǔn)制的實(shí)施，可以約束IPO公司機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理的行為，系統(tǒng)提高中國上市公司質(zhì)量。 本文通過對(duì)IPO盈余管理常用計(jì)量模型的檢驗(yàn)?zāi)芰Φ姆治�，發(fā)現(xiàn)分年度分行業(yè)回歸的截面修正瓊斯模型在模型的設(shè)定和盈余管理的檢驗(yàn)?zāi)芰Ψ矫姹憩F(xiàn)更佳，為盈余管理研究的模型選擇提供了一種依據(jù)。另外對(duì)IPO公司盈余管理動(dòng)因的實(shí)證分析，為盈余管理的機(jī)會(huì)主義觀與信號(hào)觀的爭(zhēng)論提供了一種可能的解釋，也在一定程度上，證明了中國IPO市場(chǎng)承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的有效性。同時(shí)從制度變遷的角度，研究IPO公司盈余管理行為，驗(yàn)證了證券發(fā)行制度的市場(chǎng)化的完善能有效約束IPO公司機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理，為證券發(fā)行制度進(jìn)一步向注冊(cè)制發(fā)展提供了證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:The initial public issue market is a special market. The existence of "contract friction" and "communication barrier" between the two sides lead to the IPO company earnings management is a very common phenomenon. In a comprehensive view of the related literature, the research on the problem of earnings management in IPO is mainly focused on two aspects, one is the motivation research of the earnings management of IPO company. The two is the study on the management mechanism of IPO earnings management. There are two different views on the attribute of earnings management motivation: the concept of signal and opportunism. Is the earnings management beneficial or harmful? It is still a theoretical and empirical question to be answered. Whether it is opportunist or signal, it will lead to profit. Profit redistribution effect. Earnings management will lead to the redistribution of wealth between contracts, and excessive earnings management can easily evolve into illegal activities such as accounting fraud and insider trading, affecting the efficiency of capital allocation and even the failure of the market. The motivation and governance of the earnings management of IPO companies will be beneficial to the promotion of the IPO market. Health continues to develop.
On the basis of the literature review, this paper uses the method of statistical simulation to compare the test results of the earnings management accrued profit measurement model, and then uses the empirical method to explore the motivation of the earnings management of IPO company. Finally, it examines the constraints of the change of the securities regulatory system on the surplus management of IPO company. The main contents of this paper are the contents of this paper. Three aspects:
Using the method of statistical simulation, this paper compares the basic Jones model, the Jones model, the Jones model of intangible assets, the prospective modified Jones model, the revenue matching Jones model, the Jones model of the cash flow, the Jones model of the cash flow, the nonlinear Jones model and so on by comparing the basic Jones model, the Jones model, the invisible asset, the invisible assets, the Jones model of the cash flow, the Jones model of the cash flow, and the nonlinear Jones model. In the Chinese capital market, the basic Jones model, the revised Jones model and the Jones model of intangible assets are relatively superior in China's capital market, and the frequency of the first and the second types of errors is smaller, but the correction of the Jones model is more effective in the revenue manipulation detection. Prominent, cash flow Jones model, nonlinear Jones model, although the ability of checking earnings management is strong, but there is a more serious first type of error, easy to exaggerate the degree of earnings management of Chinese listed companies. Forward looking correction Jones model is complex, there is a first type of error, and the ability to test earnings management is more than the revised Joan. There is no obvious improvement in the model, and the income matching Jones model is less able to test the cost manipulation. The comprehensive testing results show that the cross sectional revision of the Jones model in the annual division of China's securities market has better performance in the model setting and the ability to check the earnings management.
This article uses the "underwriter reputation" to divide the enterprise and the poor enterprise, and analyzes the correlation between the type of enterprise, the earnings management level of IPO company and the abnormal performance of the stock after IPO. The result shows that the good enterprises which the underwriters have underwritten by the high reputation, or the poor underwriters underwrite the poor enterprises, have the earnings management water of the first year of the market. There is no significant correlation between leveling and enterprise type, which indicates that the earnings management of IPO company is a universal strategy. However, through the further test of the correlation between abnormal performance of stock and the level of earnings management of IPO company after IPO, it is found that there is a significant negative phase between the abnormal stock performance and the earnings management level of the IPO company after the IPO. The significant negative correlation does not exist for good enterprises. The overall empirical results support the theoretical analysis of the attribution of earnings management in IPO companies. It shows that for good enterprises, earnings management is a signal to transfer the future performance of the enterprise, while for the poor enterprises, earnings management is an opportunistic behavior. Now it provides a possible explanation for the opportunism view of earnings management and the dispute of the signal view, and to a certain extent, it proves the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism of the Chinese IPO market underwriter.
Based on the reasons for the management of the earnings management of the IPO company in China, this paper uses the accrued profit model and the real earnings management model to measure the earnings management level of IPO companies according to the evolution of China's securities issuance system. Through descriptive statistics and multiple regression methods, this paper analyzes the market process of the certificate issuing system for the Chinese IPO company. The study found that the earnings management level of IPO company decreased significantly with the transfer of securities issuing system from approval to approval system and channel system to sponsor system. In the study of earnings management, this paper found that the accrued earnings management and the real earnings management are significant positive correlation in the Chinese IPO market. It is not found that the Cohen et al. (2008) and other western research documents have proved that with the strengthening of the regulatory system, the accrued management and the substantial earnings management are replaced by each other, the trend of the trend. The overall empirical results show that the implementation of the approval system can restrict the behavior of the opportunistic earnings management of the IPO company and systematically improve the public market in China. Quality of the Department.
Through the analysis of the testing ability of the IPO earnings management model, this paper finds that the cross sectional revision of the Jones model is better in the model setting and the ability to check the earnings management. It provides a basis for the model selection of the earnings management research. In addition, the motivation of the earnings management of the IPO company is true. The evidence analysis provides a possible explanation for the opportunistic view of the earnings management and the view of the signal. To a certain extent, it proves the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism of the Chinese IPO market underwriters. At the same time, the study of the earnings management behavior of the IPO company from the perspective of institutional change proves that the market of the securities issuance system can be improved effectively. Restricting the opportunistic earnings management of IPO company provides evidence for the further development of the securities issuance system to the registration system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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