發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-16 12:39

  本文選題：掏空　切入點(diǎn)：支持　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在當(dāng)前控股股東掏空上市公司是大股東與中小股東矛盾的主要表現(xiàn)。由于我國(guó)的特色，關(guān)聯(lián)交易作為大股東占用上市公司資金的一種方式，大股東通過(guò)關(guān)聯(lián)交易占用上市公司資金的問(wèn)題被學(xué)者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)廣泛關(guān)注。與此同時(shí)近年來(lái)我國(guó)投資規(guī)模的過(guò)大同樣引起學(xué)者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)廣泛關(guān)注。本文從關(guān)聯(lián)交易的角度，采用2007-2010年通過(guò)關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行資金占用的樣本數(shù)據(jù)，，對(duì)上市公司掏空、支持行為與資本投資的關(guān)系進(jìn)行重點(diǎn)研究，考察了上市公司控股股東掏空、支持行為對(duì)上市公司資本投資的影響，同時(shí)研究不同控股股東性質(zhì)下上市公司掏空、支持行為對(duì)資本投資的不同影響。 本文通過(guò)理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的方式對(duì)我國(guó)基于關(guān)聯(lián)交易的上市公司掏空、支持與資本投資的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究，通過(guò)相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的回顧，在對(duì)大小股東利益沖突的理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，分析掏空、支持與資本投資的作用機(jī)理，進(jìn)而提出研究假設(shè)。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)主要對(duì)掏空組、支持組、以及掏空、支持組分別按產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)進(jìn)行分組后的國(guó)有控股與非國(guó)有控股組，支持組按是否ST分組后的ST組與非ST組，分別進(jìn)行回歸分析，并得出結(jié)論：1、存在掏空行為的上市公司資本投資與關(guān)聯(lián)方掏空程度顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，即關(guān)聯(lián)方占用上市公司資金越多，上市公司的資本投資越少。2、考慮到不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下研究結(jié)果可能存在差異，分組進(jìn)行研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：盡管二者都是負(fù)相關(guān)，但與國(guó)有控股上市公司相比，非國(guó)有控股上市公司被關(guān)聯(lián)方占用資金越多，上市公司的資本投資越少的敏感性越強(qiáng)（貝它系數(shù)越大）。3、存在支持行為的上市公司資本投資與關(guān)聯(lián)方支持程度顯著正相關(guān)，即上市公司獲得關(guān)聯(lián)方資金越大，越可能推動(dòng)增加資本投資。4、同樣考慮我國(guó)特殊的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)，分組研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：二者都是正相關(guān)，但與國(guó)有控股上市公司相比，非國(guó)有控股上市公司獲得關(guān)聯(lián)方支持越大對(duì)增加資本投資的敏感性越強(qiáng)（貝它系數(shù)越大）。5、與非ST上市公司相比，ST上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)方支持的增大推動(dòng)資本投資的增加。
[Abstract]:At present, the majority shareholder emptying the listed company is the main manifestation of the contradiction between the large shareholder and the minority shareholder. Because of the characteristics of our country, the affiliated transaction is a way for the majority shareholder to occupy the capital of the listed company. The problem that large shareholders occupy the funds of listed companies through related party transactions has been widely concerned by scholars and regulators. At the same time, the excessive scale of investment in China in recent years has also aroused widespread concern of scholars and regulators. Using the sample data of capital occupation through related party transactions from 2007 to 2010, this paper focuses on the relationship between tunneling, supporting behavior and capital investment of listed companies, and examines the controlling shareholder tunneling of listed companies. The influence of support behavior on capital investment of listed companies is studied. At the same time, the different influence of supporting behavior on capital investment is studied. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper studies the relationship between tunneling, support and capital investment of listed companies based on affiliated transactions in China. Based on the theoretical analysis of the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders, this paper analyzes the mechanism of tunneling, support and capital investment, and then puts forward the research hypotheses. The support group was divided into state-owned holding group and non-state-owned holding group according to the nature of property right, and the support group was analyzed by regression analysis according to whether St group and non-St group were divided into St group and non-St group, respectively. It is concluded that the capital investment of listed companies with tunneling behavior is negatively correlated with the degree of associated party tunneling, that is, the more capital of listed companies occupied by related parties, the more the capital of listed companies is occupied by related parties. The smaller the capital investment of listed companies is, the more different the research results may be under different property rights, and the results of the study are as follows: although both of them are negatively correlated, they are compared with the state-controlled listed companies. The more the capital is occupied by the related party, the more sensitive the capital investment of the listed company is (the bigger the Beta coefficient is. 3). The capital investment of the listed company with supporting behavior is positively correlated with the degree of related party support. That is, the larger the capital of the listed company, the more likely it is to increase the capital investment. Considering the special property right of our country, the group study found that both of them are positive correlation, but compared with the state-owned holding listed company. The greater the support of affiliated parties, the stronger the sensitivity of non-state holding listed companies to increasing capital investment (the larger the Beta coefficient is, the greater the relative party support of St listed companies is compared with the non-St listed companies, and the higher the capital investment is.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F832.51

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