本文選題：國有控股上市公司　切入點：股權(quán)激勵　出處：《安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵制度最早起源于美國,20世紀80年代以來,世界上眾多公司紛紛采用股權(quán)激勵作為對管理者的激勵,并被認為是解決委托--代理問題的有效手段。國外的實踐證明,股權(quán)激勵極大地提高了企業(yè)的業(yè)績。我國上市公司1993年引入了股權(quán)激勵機制,但較規(guī)范的發(fā)展開始于2006年1月,中國證監(jiān)會頒布《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法(試行)》。 本文在我國股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)管理文件正式出臺、市場環(huán)境不斷完善的背景下,首先對相關(guān)理論進行闡述,并對國有控股上市公司的特殊性質(zhì)進行了分析,然后選取2007年到2010年間,滬深兩市公告股權(quán)激勵方案的國有控股上市公司為研究樣本,運用事件研究法的累計超常報酬率法(CAR)對公告股權(quán)激勵的短期市場反應(yīng)進行實證檢驗,并運用購買并持有超常報酬率法(BHAR)對實施股權(quán)激勵的長期市場反應(yīng)進行實證研究。研究結(jié)果表明,短期內(nèi)市場對公告股權(quán)激勵的國有控股上市公司具有顯著為正的市場反應(yīng),但存在股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)信息提前泄露的情況；多數(shù)國有控股上市公司實施的股權(quán)激勵從長期看是失敗的,并沒有達到預(yù)期的效果。 在此基礎(chǔ)上,文章對影響短期及長期市場反應(yīng)的因素進行回歸,研究結(jié)果表明,短期內(nèi)償債能力越強、成長性越好的公司公告股權(quán)激勵方案越能夠獲得較高的累計超常報酬率；但長期看來,公司的盈利能力、償債能力越弱、采用股票期權(quán)激勵方式的公司其激勵效果越不理想。 在實證分析的基礎(chǔ)上,文章提出了相關(guān)的建議：一,提高證券市場有效性；二,建立科學(xué)合理的績效考核體系；三,制定合理的股權(quán)激勵方案；四,提高市場投資者的素質(zhì)。
[Abstract]:The stock right incentive system originated from the 80s of the 20th century in the United States. Many companies around the world have adopted equity incentive as incentive to managers, and it is considered to be an effective means to solve the principal-agent problem. Equity incentive has greatly improved the performance of enterprises. In 1993, China's listed companies introduced equity incentive mechanism, but the more standardized development began in January 2006, China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "listed companies equity incentive management measures (trial)". Under the background of the formal publication of the relevant management documents and the continuous improvement of the market environment, this paper first expounds the relevant theories, and analyzes the special properties of the state-owned listed companies. Then, from 2007 to 2010, the state-owned holding listed companies which announced the stock incentive scheme in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are selected as the research samples, and the short-term market reaction of the announcement equity incentive is empirically tested by the cumulative extraordinary rate of return (CAR) of the event study method. An empirical study on the long-term market response to equity incentive is carried out by using the method of purchasing and holding abnormal return. The results show that the market has a significantly positive market response to the publicly held listed companies with publicly announced equity incentives in the short term. However, there is a situation where the relevant information of equity incentive is leaked in advance; the majority of state-owned listed companies have failed in the long run and failed to achieve the expected results. On this basis, the paper regresses the factors that affect the short-term and long-term market reaction. The results show that the stronger the short-term solvency, The better the growth, the higher the cumulative abnormal return rate, but in the long run, the weaker the earning ability and repayment ability of the company, the less the incentive effect of the company adopting stock option incentive mode. On the basis of empirical analysis, the paper puts forward some suggestions: first, to improve the effectiveness of the securities market; second, to establish a scientific and reasonable performance appraisal system; third, to formulate a reasonable equity incentive scheme; fourth, to improve the quality of market investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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