本文關(guān)鍵詞： 會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性 過度投資 投資不足 實(shí)際控制權(quán)人性質(zhì)　出處：《山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中的重要的原則，新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則更是將其明確定位為一項(xiàng)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量特征，近年來受到了會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)者越來越多的關(guān)注。當(dāng)前關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的研究主要集中在是否存在及影響因素上，對(duì)其經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究是少之又少。而非效率投資作為信息不對(duì)稱和委托代理情況下代理成本增高的典型表現(xiàn)形式，會(huì)侵害股東和債權(quán)人的利益，進(jìn)而影響到公司價(jià)值已經(jīng)成為公司財(cái)務(wù)領(lǐng)域的共識(shí)。本文試圖從會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性這一視角出發(fā)，考察上市公司的非效率投資行為，研究會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性和非效率投資的關(guān)系。 本文根據(jù)信息不對(duì)稱和委托代理理論，在文獻(xiàn)回顧和理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資之間關(guān)系的假設(shè)，選取2008-2010年我國(guó)滬深兩市A股制造業(yè)上市公司作為樣本，分別以累計(jì)三年負(fù)非經(jīng)營(yíng)性應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)和Richardson (2006)模型為基礎(chǔ)衡量會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性和非效率投資，運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和多元線性回歸等計(jì)量分析方法對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)，并進(jìn)一步考察了實(shí)際控制權(quán)人性質(zhì)是如何影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資行為的關(guān)系。論文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)主要是：（1）會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性明顯能抑制過度投資的發(fā)生；（2）會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性會(huì)導(dǎo)致投資不足行為，但是這種影響并不顯著；（3）實(shí)際控制權(quán)人的的性質(zhì)并未影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性抑制過度投資的行為；（4）會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性整體上具有抑制非效率投資的作用。本文為理解會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果提供了新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)，，并拓展了改善非效率投資行為的研究思路。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle in financial reporting, and the new accounting standards clearly position it as a quality characteristic of accounting information. In recent years, more and more attention has been paid by accounting scholars. At present, the research on accounting conservatism is mainly focused on the existence of accounting conservatism and its influencing factors. The research on its economic consequences is very few, but the non-efficient investment, as a typical manifestation of the increase of agency cost under asymmetric information and principal-agent situation, will infringe on the interests of shareholders and creditors. This paper attempts to investigate the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies from the perspective of accounting conservatism. The relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment is studied. Based on the information asymmetry and principal-agent theory, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of the relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment on the basis of literature review and theoretical analysis. From 2008 to 2010, China's A-share manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were selected as samples. The accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment are measured on the basis of accumulative negative non-operating accruals and Richardson 2006) models, and descriptive statistical analysis is used. The relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment is tested by statistical analysis of correlation test and multivariate linear regression. The relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment behavior is further investigated. The main findings of this paper are: (1) Accounting conservatism can obviously restrain the occurrence of overinvestment; Accounting conservatism will lead to underinvestment behavior, but this effect is not significant; (3) the nature of actual controlling person does not affect the behavior of accounting conservatism to restrain overinvestment; This paper provides new empirical evidence for understanding the economic consequences of accounting conservatism and extends the research ideas to improve the behavior of non-efficient investment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F832.51;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 徐全華;會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與公司投資決策研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2011年

2 黃良杰;國(guó)有上市公司非效率投資問題研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

3 蔣瑜峰;會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與企業(yè)非效率投資研究[D];華中科技大學(xué);2010年

本文編號(hào)：1454679