本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式和盈余管理關(guān)系研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度 模式 盈余管理

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)是上市公司以本公司的股票作為激勵(lì)標(biāo)的物,通過和受激勵(lì)對(duì)象及其各方簽訂合規(guī)的協(xié)議或者合同,并在其中對(duì)于具體的實(shí)施模式、進(jìn)度、額度等進(jìn)行明確規(guī)定,把企業(yè)的運(yùn)作績效和經(jīng)營者的薪酬待遇直接掛鉤,使他們能夠以所有者的身份參與公司重要決策、分享公司利潤同時(shí)也承擔(dān)一定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),從而達(dá)到為公司長期運(yùn)營做貢獻(xiàn)的一種激勵(lì)方法。 該制度是近幾十年來在西方發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)市場中興起的一種用以激勵(lì)管理當(dāng)局的報(bào)酬制度。由于該激勵(lì)機(jī)制能夠?qū)⒐芾碚叩男匠晁脚c公司的市場價(jià)值高低有機(jī)聯(lián)系在一起,從而達(dá)到降低代理成本,實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)利益最大化的目的,因此受到了眾多西方國家的推崇。20世紀(jì)90年代以來,它已呈現(xiàn)出逐步蔓延開來的國際化趨勢。當(dāng)時(shí)我國諸如北京、上海、武漢等地的上市公司率先引領(lǐng)我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度試點(diǎn),成為新制度嘗試的的先鋒隊(duì)。但是這些企業(yè)中的大多數(shù)都屬于在國外股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度使用較為成熟的行業(yè),例如高新科技行業(yè)等。 時(shí)間飛逝,再來看現(xiàn)如今的我國,全國上下各個(gè)行業(yè)的上市公司都紛紛開始采用并逐漸擴(kuò)大股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的應(yīng)用范圍,并且出現(xiàn)過很多精彩的案例,同時(shí)該制度模式的采用上逐漸呈現(xiàn)出多元化和復(fù)合化的趨勢。對(duì)于股票期權(quán)的模式上不僅有主流的股票期權(quán)模式和限制性股票模式,虛擬股票、現(xiàn)金股票增值權(quán)等較少提及的模式也被廣泛運(yùn)用。再論行業(yè)上,不僅高新科技行業(yè)、房地產(chǎn)、食品加工制造、重工業(yè)制造加工甚至是證券金融行業(yè)也積極制定股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。同時(shí)國內(nèi)外的學(xué)者對(duì)該制度的研究也不斷深入,研究內(nèi)容從最開始的制度本身的概念、應(yīng)用狀態(tài)和會(huì)計(jì)處理等方面逐漸延伸至中國特色的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的設(shè)計(jì),市場效應(yīng)的觀測和研究等方面。 但是自美國安然事件開始,人們逐漸把股權(quán)激勵(lì)和財(cái)務(wù)造假聯(lián)系在一起,從此,股權(quán)激勵(lì)和企業(yè)盈余管理再次成為廣大學(xué)者的研究熱點(diǎn)。同時(shí),從各種學(xué)報(bào)、財(cái)經(jīng)雜志上可以看到很多的上市公司通過股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的設(shè)計(jì)進(jìn)行著不同程度的盈余管理,或者是通過穿越經(jīng)濟(jì)制度的空白點(diǎn),或者是依仗準(zhǔn)則所嚴(yán)明的政策和方法的選擇權(quán)迂回繞轉(zhuǎn)的實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤操縱。本文中探討的盈余管理指的是：很多管理層為了謀取個(gè)人利益,比方說獲得更多貸款或者證券公告上良好的業(yè)績數(shù)據(jù)反應(yīng)等而主觀操縱財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的編寫過程,從而使報(bào)表傾向于更利于管理層個(gè)人利益方向,同時(shí)也對(duì)外部使用者的決策構(gòu)成了誤導(dǎo)的行為。幾年來,公司治理問題,我國職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場不規(guī)范問題,會(huì)計(jì)政策和財(cái)經(jīng)法規(guī)的不完善問題和我國信用環(huán)境過于寬泛等問題充斥著各大財(cái)經(jīng)論壇板塊。 然而縱觀學(xué)者們所著的文章,大部分是針對(duì)整個(gè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)和盈余管理的關(guān)系、效應(yīng)、動(dòng)因、對(duì)象等的影響,對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度模式細(xì)分的角度探討的較少,或者研究結(jié)果相對(duì)現(xiàn)在來說不太具有時(shí)效性,尤其是基于我國近年的市場實(shí)際情況做出的研究更少,同時(shí)未將國有控股上市公司與非國有控股上市公司區(qū)別處理。 本文基于此,以我國上市公司為樣本,在全流通的背景下,以近年來的市場數(shù)據(jù)為標(biāo)的,對(duì)不同模式的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度以及單一模式下相關(guān)因素與盈余管理的關(guān)系進(jìn)行深入研究。本文研究的意義在于,試圖通過規(guī)范結(jié)合實(shí)證研究的方法理清股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式與盈余管理的關(guān)系,并在此基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行深入分析,以給予相關(guān)部門在股權(quán)激勵(lì)規(guī)范的制定上提出意見和建議,以更好的規(guī)范我國上市公司盈余管理,完善我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃方案,同時(shí),增強(qiáng)我國上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息的可靠性和相關(guān)性。 本文采用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合,定性研究和定量研究相結(jié)合的方法。主要內(nèi)容分為以下幾個(gè)部分,首先是緒論部分,闡明了寫作背景,提出將要研究的問題。然后從搜集到的大量文章以及著作資料中總結(jié)歸納出關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)尤其是股權(quán)激勵(lì)各模式同盈余管理的理論觀點(diǎn),其中包括國內(nèi)以及國外的研究綜述。在文獻(xiàn)綜述的基礎(chǔ)之上該章對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度及其各模式的具體涵義、特點(diǎn)、適用性和差別以及盈余管理的涵義及其理論基礎(chǔ)等進(jìn)行了說明,為實(shí)證研究部分奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。然后進(jìn)入實(shí)證研究部分。實(shí)證部分采用截面修正的瓊斯模型輔助采用統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件Eviews。實(shí)證部分具體為：查閱國泰安數(shù)據(jù)庫整理出2010年1月1日-2010年12月31日采用股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司,并統(tǒng)計(jì)分析相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),分為兩步。第一步綜合對(duì)比兩種股票期權(quán)模式的盈余管理操縱強(qiáng)度。第二步則是在前一部份的基礎(chǔ)上在單一模式下深入研究相關(guān)變量與盈余管理的關(guān)系。接下來分析實(shí)證結(jié)論且提出可行性建議。最后即是總結(jié)和展望。 框架上可以這樣理解,首先是通過背景的介紹和主題的言明提出本文接下來要研究的問題。之后進(jìn)入第二環(huán)節(jié),即是理論和實(shí)證的分析。理論是規(guī)范性的相關(guān)文字闡述,對(duì)概念和基礎(chǔ)透徹闡述。在此基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)研究論證。第三環(huán)節(jié)即是結(jié)合實(shí)證研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行問題的分析,并試著提出建設(shè)性意見,最后則是總結(jié)和展望�？傮w上走的路線是提出問題-分析問題-解決問題。 本文的創(chuàng)新在于以下幾點(diǎn)： 1.研究數(shù)據(jù)基于2010年和2009兩年,在全流通背景下,較大脫離了金融危機(jī)影響,相對(duì)于以往的文章具有一定研究時(shí)效性。 2.對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的研究更加細(xì)致深入,角度上不同于以往。對(duì)于模式劃分的盈余管理研究在國內(nèi)相對(duì)較少,且之前得出的結(jié)論不太一致,同時(shí)大部分未將國有控股上市公司與非國有控股上市公司區(qū)別處理。本文研究中比較了模式間的盈余管理強(qiáng)弱,劃分了企業(yè)性質(zhì)這一重要因素。 3.針對(duì)我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)運(yùn)用現(xiàn)狀提出了創(chuàng)新性的建議,比如：提升公司治理能力中的“潛移默化中實(shí)現(xiàn)有效管理-文化設(shè)防”、改善我國經(jīng)理人信譽(yù)中的“國際交換制度”等。 由于時(shí)間倉促本人能力有限本文也存在著很多不足的地方,總結(jié)起來有如下幾點(diǎn)： 1.實(shí)證模型的采用在我國證券市場的適用性問題值得探討。國外股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度運(yùn)用較早,關(guān)于盈余管理的研究相對(duì)我國來說成熟得多。但是在我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)中,到底哪種模型更加適用是值得進(jìn)一步考慮的。 2.數(shù)據(jù)的采集上可能存在誤差。本文的樣本數(shù)據(jù)中絕大多數(shù)來自國泰安CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫,中間有極小部分統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)來自各學(xué)報(bào)或者經(jīng)濟(jì)期刊,中間可能存在技術(shù)差錯(cuò)。但是從實(shí)證結(jié)果的顯著性和邏輯判斷上來看并沒有較大的阻礙。 3.對(duì)于小比例股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式由于樣本的比例極小且無從獲取典型案例,沒有做過多的探討,論題完整度不夠高。但是從本文所摘自的2009和2010年度的數(shù)據(jù)來看,97家上市公司中只有1家采用股票增值權(quán)模式,所以不太具有代表性,基于此沒有再就此進(jìn)行深入探討。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is a listed company with the company's stock incentive as the object, and through the inspired object and the parties signed the Compliance Agreement or contract, and in which the implementation mode, specific schedule, the amount specified, directly linked enterprise's operational performance and manager salary, so they can participate in the company's decision to the owner's identity, share the company's profits but also bear certain risks, so as to achieve a kind of incentive method to make contributions to the company's long-term operation.
This system is in recent years the rise in the western developed market economy in a way to incentive management compensation system. The incentive mechanism will be able to pay levels and the managers of the company's market value together, so as to reduce the agency cost, realize the maximization of social benefits, since therefore by many western countries respected.20 century in 90s, it has shown the trend of internationalization gradually spread. At that time our country such as Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and other places of the listed company to lead China's equity incentive system pilot, has become a new system to try the vanguard. But most of these companies are in a foreign country equity incentive system is more mature industries such as high-tech industries.
Time flies, come see nowadays in our country, under the various industries on the listed companies have begun to use the application range and gradually expand the equity incentive system, and there have been many exciting cases, while using the system mode gradually diversified and composite trend. Not only is the mainstream of stock option model and restricted stock model for stock option model on virtual cash stock, stock appreciation rights and other less mentioned models have been widely used. Not only on the industry, high-tech industry, real estate, food processing and manufacturing, heavy industry manufacturing and financial securities industry also actively develop and Research on equity incentive plan. The system of domestic and foreign scholars deeply, the beginning of the concept of the system itself from the research content, application status and gradually extended to the accounting treatment The design of the Chinese characteristic equity incentive system, the observation and research of the market effect.
But since the beginning of Enron, people gradually to the equity incentive and financial fraud together, from now on, equity incentive and corporate earnings management once again become the focus of research scholars. At the same time, from a variety of journals, magazines can be seen on the design of many listed companies through equity incentive system for earnings management in different degree. Or through the gaps in the economic system, policies and methods or rely on strict criteria of choice of circuity turn profit manipulation and earnings management. This paper discusses the means: a lot of management in order to seek personal interests, for example more loans or securities announcement on the good performance of response data the subjective manipulation of financial reporting preparation process, so that the report tends to be more conducive to the management of personal interests, but also to external users Decision making is a misleading behavior. Over the past few years, corporate governance issues, irregular market of professional managers in China, imperfect accounting policies and regulations, and over extensive credit environment in China are flooding the financial forum.
However, the scholars of the articles, mostly for the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management effect, motivation, influence object, the equity incentive system model of the segmentation results is relatively less, or now is not out sometimes effect, especially to make less research in China in recent years based on the actual situation in the market, at the same time the state-owned holding listed companies and non state-owned listed companies are treated differently.
Based on this, with the sample of Listed Companies in China, under the background of full circulation, the market data in recent years as the subject, in-depth research on the relationship between different modes of equity incentive system and single mode and correlative factors of earnings management. The significance of this study in trying to combine empirical specification method Study on the relationship of equity incentive model and earnings management, and on the basis of in-depth analysis, to give the relevant departments in the equity incentive standard put forward opinions and suggestions, in order to better regulate the earnings management of Listed Companies in China, improve China's listed company's equity incentive plan, at the same time, enhance the reliability and relevance of accounting the information of Listed Companies in China.
This paper adopts normative research and empirical research combining the method of qualitative research and quantitative research. The main contents are divided into the following parts. The first part is introduction, expounds the background, put forward to study the problem. Then a large number of articles from the collected data and summarize about equity incentive in particular is the theory of equity incentive model with earnings management, including the domestic and foreign research. The specific meaning, on the basis of literature review this chapter of the equity incentive system and the characteristics of the mode, illustrates the applicability and differences of earnings management as well as the meaning and theoretical basis, lays a theoretical foundation for the part of empirical research. And then enter the part of empirical study. The empirical part uses the modified Jones model aided by statistical software Eviews. for specific empirical part: Consult the Tai'an database to sort out the January 1, 2010 -2010 year in December 31st by the company's equity incentive, and statistical analysis of relevant data, divided into two steps. The first step of earnings management comprehensive comparison of two stock option model manipulation strength. The second step is based on the relationship between part of the single mode in depth study of the relevant variables and earnings management. Next empirical analysis conclusion and puts forward some feasible suggestions. The last is the summary and outlook.
The frame can be understood, the first is through the introduction of the background and the theme of the future put forward next to study this problem. After entering the second part, which is the theoretical and empirical analysis. The related theory is normative text elaboration, elaborated on the basic concept and thoroughly. On the basis of empirical research. The third part demonstrates the data that is according to the empirical results of the analysis of the problem, and try to put forward constructive suggestions, finally is the summary and outlook on the whole. The route is a question analysis of the problem - to solve the problem.
The innovation of this article lies in the following points:
1. the research data are based on the 2010 and 2009 years, and in the full circulation background, it is greatly divorced from the impact of the financial crisis, and has certain research timeliness relative to the previous articles.
2. the study on equity incentive system more in-depth perspective, different from the past. For the study of earnings management modes of relatively less in the domestic, and before the conclusion is not consistent, but most will not be state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies. This paper studies the difference between the earnings comparison model management division of the strength, the important factor of the nature of the business.
3., aiming at the current situation of equity incentive in China's listed companies, this paper puts forward some innovative suggestions, such as improving the corporate governance capacity, implementing "effective management culture fortification" in a subtle way, and improving the "international exchange system" in our manager's reputation.
Because of the limited time I have limited ability, there are many shortcomings in this paper, and the following points are summed up.
1. empirical models using the applicability in China's securities market is worth exploring. The earlier system of the use of foreign equity incentive, earnings management research in our country is relatively mature. But much of the market economy in our country, what kind of model is more applicable is worthy of further consideration.
May 2. data acquisition errors. This sample data in the vast majority of Chinese Tai'an from the CSMAR database, with minimal part of statistical data from the journal or the economic journal, there may be some technical errors. But from the empirical results of the significant judgment and logical point of view is not large obstacles.
3. for the small proportion of equity incentive model for the sample proportion of extremely small and unable to get the typical case, did not do too much about the topic, integrity is not high enough. But from the 2009 and 2010 annual data, 97 listed companies in 1 only by the stock appreciation rights mode, so it's not representative no, this was based on in-depth discussion.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275;F224

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 秦琴;;獨(dú)立董事與盈余信息質(zhì)量[J];東方企業(yè)文化;2011年04期

2 莫琳;;淺析公允價(jià)值的應(yīng)用對(duì)企業(yè)盈余管理的影響[J];海峽科學(xué);2011年08期

3 蔣卓君;周大偉;;我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余管理關(guān)系研究[J];時(shí)代金融;2011年18期

4 曾真;;淺析盈余管理本質(zhì)[J];現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)信息;2011年14期

5 鄭和平;;上市公司盈余管理的新方式及防范措施探討[J];商業(yè)會(huì)計(jì);2011年20期

6 祁劍清;;新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則下資產(chǎn)減值與盈余管理研究[J];中國農(nóng)業(yè)會(huì)計(jì);2011年09期

7 郭思永;;企業(yè)合并中的盈余管理問題探析[J];商業(yè)會(huì)計(jì);2011年18期

8 陳奕巧;;盈余管理研究文獻(xiàn)綜述[J];商業(yè)文化(上半月);2011年08期

9 嚴(yán)銳婷;;淺議真實(shí)盈余管理[J];商業(yè)文化(上半月);2011年08期

10 白周蕤;;我國上市公司盈余管理對(duì)策研究[J];時(shí)代金融;2011年18期

相關(guān)會(huì)議論文 前10條

1 許永聲;;盈余管理的投機(jī)與信息行為[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)審計(jì)專業(yè)委員會(huì)2010年學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2010年

2 張兆國;劉永麗;何威風(fēng);;管理者背景特征與盈余管理——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

3 趙景文;許育瑜;;兩稅合并、盈余管理與分析師預(yù)期[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

4 高利芳;;證監(jiān)會(huì)處罰對(duì)公司盈余管理的影響后果及機(jī)制研究[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

5 張帆;郭斌;;金融工具的公允價(jià)值計(jì)量對(duì)我國銀行盈余管理影響的實(shí)證研究[A];第五屆（2010）中國管理學(xué)年會(huì)——金融分會(huì)場論文集[C];2010年

6 曹國華;林川;;CEO變更、公司業(yè)績與盈余管理——基于應(yīng)計(jì)盈余與真實(shí)盈余的檢驗(yàn)[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

7 潘玲;王德武;;遼寧省上市公司盈余管理程度的實(shí)證研究[A];科技創(chuàng)新與產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展（B卷）——第七屆沈陽科學(xué)學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)暨渾南高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展論壇文集[C];2010年

8 紀(jì)信義;劉政淮;曹壽民;;公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告品質(zhì)可靠性之影響——以盈余門坎分析探討[A];首屆內(nèi)部控制專題學(xué)術(shù)研討會(huì)論文集[C];2009年

9 余怒濤;陳紅;;并購績效、盈余管理和公司治理:綜述和研究框架[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2011學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集[C];2011年

10 鄧德軍;周仁俊;;控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的制度背景與盈余管理研究——基于中國證券市場的實(shí)證研究[A];中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)2007年學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)論文集（中冊）[C];2007年

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前10條

1 范年茂;如何治理上市公司盈余管理[N];山西經(jīng)濟(jì)日報(bào);2003年

2 盧中慧;財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告之盈余管理[N];證券時(shí)報(bào);2003年

3 王棣華 東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院教授;談?wù)劰居喙芾淼闹饕愋蚚N];財(cái)會(huì)信報(bào);2011年

4 ;悄然興起de股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式[N];中國機(jī)電日報(bào);2000年

5 王素玲;上市公司盈余管理亟待治理[N];證券日報(bào);2003年

6 王文輝;誰來管管“盈余管理”[N];國際金融報(bào);2003年

7 陜西巨豐 郝善勇 高大斌;上市公司盈余管理的路還能走多久[N];金融時(shí)報(bào);2001年

8 復(fù)旦大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)系 王文輝;誰來管理“盈余管理”？[N];證券時(shí)報(bào);2003年

9 本報(bào)記者 夏晨;銀行一季報(bào)隱現(xiàn)“盈余管理” “保守派”占據(jù)上風(fēng)[N];21世紀(jì)經(jīng)濟(jì)報(bào)道;2009年

10 李姝;盈余管理是怎么“造”出來的[N];中國財(cái)經(jīng)報(bào);2001年

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前10條

1 徐焱軍;中國上市公司盈余管理季度分布特征研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

2 張子余;盈余管理若干問題研究[D];上海交通大學(xué);2012年

3 康瑞亨;臺(tái)灣上市公司轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)與盈余管理之實(shí)證研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

4 高銳;上市公司盈余管理與投資支出的關(guān)系研究——融資約束視角[D];大連理工大學(xué);2011年

5 劉穎;真實(shí)和應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理水平及其價(jià)值相關(guān)性的實(shí)證研究[D];財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所;2011年

6 劉大志;基于所有權(quán)視角的上市公司盈余管理：程度、動(dòng)機(jī)與制約因素研究[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年

7 黃文伴;管理者薪酬契約、高管變更與盈余管理關(guān)系研究[D];大連理工大學(xué);2011年

8 高潔;我國上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易與盈余管理的實(shí)證研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

9 任春艷;上市公司盈余管理與會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則制定[D];廈門大學(xué);2004年

10 雷強(qiáng);上市公司盈余管理的銀行監(jiān)督效應(yīng)研究：理論與實(shí)證[D];上海交通大學(xué);2011年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前10條

1 姜兆軍;“大小非”減持中的盈余管理研究[D];山東大學(xué);2010年

2 蘇子;公司多元化與盈余管理關(guān)系研究[D];北京交通大學(xué);2010年

3 黃威;基于上市公司董事會(huì)特征的盈余管理研究[D];河北大學(xué);2010年

4 張文京;新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則對(duì)上市公司盈余管理的影響研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2010年

5 鄭歡;薪酬契約、董事會(huì)特征與盈余管理[D];大連理工大學(xué);2010年

6 項(xiàng)晨;上市公司盈余管理及其市場反應(yīng)[D];浙江大學(xué);2011年

7 尹萌萌;財(cái)務(wù)重述與持續(xù)性盈余管理[D];北京交通大學(xué);2011年

8 張U，

本文編號(hào)：1423172