發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-02 20:40

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的影響研究　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 公司治理 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易

【摘要】：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是資本市場(chǎng)中一支不可忽視的力量。國(guó)內(nèi)外的相關(guān)研究表明，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者具有一定的公司治理效應(yīng)。本文研究在我國(guó)市場(chǎng)上，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的影響。這對(duì)于研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能否作為一項(xiàng)公司治理機(jī)制，參與公司監(jiān)管治理，降低關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平，，保護(hù)中小股東利益以及如何進(jìn)一步制定機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)上的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略有著重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文通過文獻(xiàn)綜述，理清了技術(shù)路線，接著對(duì)我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)狀和存在的問題進(jìn)行分析，基于公司治理理論、委托代理理論以及股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)理論的理論分析，提出本文的研究假設(shè)并構(gòu)建多元線性回歸模型。模型以上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易總額作為被解釋變量，以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者規(guī)模、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)實(shí)際控制人的股權(quán)制衡度作為解釋變量，選取2008-2010年滬、深兩市A股3005家非金融保險(xiǎn)類上市公司作為研究樣本，研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的影響。實(shí)證分析結(jié)果顯示：（1）機(jī)構(gòu)投資者規(guī)模與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者規(guī)模由機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與機(jī)構(gòu)持股家數(shù)來衡量。其中，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易在10%的水平下顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；機(jī)構(gòu)持股家數(shù)與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易在10%的的水平下顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。（2）壓力抵抗型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易在10%水平下顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；壓力敏感型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易相關(guān)性不顯著。（3）機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)實(shí)際控制人的股權(quán)制衡度與上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易在10%的水平下顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。 本文的研究結(jié)果具有以下意義：（1）研究結(jié)果表明機(jī)構(gòu)投資者具有一定的公司治理效應(yīng)，其發(fā)揮治理效應(yīng)的重要途徑之一是通過改變上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易策略，降低關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平，在維護(hù)自身利益同時(shí)客觀上保護(hù)中小股東的利益。（2）機(jī)構(gòu)投資者規(guī)模、壓力抵抗型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股、股權(quán)制衡度對(duì)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易有顯著影響，研究結(jié)果對(duì)于正確評(píng)價(jià)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在公司治理中扮演的角色以及如何進(jìn)一步制定機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在我國(guó)的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略具有一定的參考價(jià)值。（3）本文的研究結(jié)果對(duì)于降低上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易水平、如何構(gòu)建和完善公司治理機(jī)制來緩解或解決企業(yè)的代理問題保護(hù)中小股東利益具有較強(qiáng)的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:Institutional investors are an important force in the capital market. Relevant studies at home and abroad show that institutional investors have a certain corporate governance effect. The impact of institutional investors on related party transactions of listed companies. This is to study whether institutional investors can act as a corporate governance mechanism to participate in corporate governance and reduce the level of related party transactions. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to protect the interests of minority shareholders and how to further formulate the development strategy of institutional investors in China's capital market. Through literature review, this paper clarifies the technical route, and then analyzes the current situation and existing problems of related transactions between institutional investors and listed companies, based on the theory of corporate governance. Based on the theoretical analysis of principal-agent theory and equity structure theory, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis and constructs a multivariate linear regression model. The model takes the total amount of related party transactions of listed companies as the explanatory variable. Taking the size of institutional investors, heterogeneity of institutional investors and institutional investors' equity checks and balances on actual controllers as explanatory variables, we choose Shanghai from 2008 to 2010. There are 3005 non-financial insurance listed companies in Shenzhen and Shenzhen as samples. This paper studies the influence of institutional investors on affiliated transactions of listed companies. There is a significant negative correlation between the size of institutional investors and related party transactions of listed companies. The size of institutional investors is measured by the number of institutional investors holding shares and institutional holdings. There is a significant negative correlation between institutional investors' shareholding and related party transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%; There is a significant negative correlation between the number of institutional shareholding families and the affiliated transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%. 2) there is a significant negative correlation between the number of institutional investors holding shares and the affiliated transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%. There is no significant correlation between pressure-sensitive institutional investors' shareholding and related party transactions of listed companies. There is a significant negative correlation between institutional investors' equity checks and balances on actual controllers and related party transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%. The results of this paper have the following significance: 1) the results show that institutional investors have a certain corporate governance effect. One of the important ways to play the governance effect is to reduce the level of related party transactions by changing the related party trading strategy of listed companies. In safeguarding their own interests while objectively protecting the interests of minority shareholders) the size of institutional investors, pressure-resistant institutional investors holding shares, equity checks and balances have a significant impact on the related transactions of listed companies. The research results have certain reference value for correctly evaluating the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and how to further formulate the development strategy of institutional investors in China. The research results of this paper can reduce the level of related party transactions of listed companies. How to construct and improve the corporate governance mechanism to alleviate or solve the agency problem of enterprises to protect the interests of minority shareholders has a strong practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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