【摘要】：近幾年來,隨著我國科學技術的飛速發(fā)展以及人們經(jīng)濟生活水平的不斷提高,很多產(chǎn)品的更新?lián)Q代的速度日益提高,生命周期也越來越短,導致了資源浪費與環(huán)境問題越來越嚴重。因此,發(fā)展廢舊品的回收與再制造的閉環(huán)供應鏈運營模式刻不容緩,其不但帶來可觀經(jīng)濟的價值,而且能促進社會與環(huán)境效益的提高。但是,鑒于閉環(huán)供應鏈中的參與者彼此之間聯(lián)系緊密、復雜,各個節(jié)點企業(yè)的風險性不同,因此供應鏈的系統(tǒng)有很大脆弱性,易受各種供應鏈不確定性以及風險性地攻擊。且在回收與再制造廢舊品的閉環(huán)供應鏈中,節(jié)點企業(yè)想讓自己利益實現(xiàn)最大化,此種決策的分散性會導致整條的供應鏈的運作績效與整體利潤沒辦法達到最優(yōu),使得閉環(huán)供應鏈失調(diào)。所以,設計與研究考慮風險的閉環(huán)的供應鏈中節(jié)點的企業(yè)間協(xié)調(diào)的契約機制,對提升整個的閉環(huán)的供應鏈整體的績效有極大重要的現(xiàn)實與理論意義。本文以導師的自然科學基金項目作為選題的背景,綜合采用期望效用理論、機會約束理論和博弈論作為研究工具,主要采用了定量分析的研究方法。考慮到閉環(huán)供應鏈中各個節(jié)點的企業(yè)風險偏好,多角度分析由零售商驅(qū)動的,且由第三方回收的再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)的問題。首先分析了在研究考慮風險情況下第三方回收再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)運作問題的意義以及發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,分析了與閉環(huán)供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)有關的理論基礎,為后來的研究提供理論依據(jù)。然后,討論了在供應鏈的參與方均為風險規(guī)避型情況之下,運用均值-方差的模型量化其參與方的期望效用。經(jīng)過分別研究集中決策與分散決策情形下的第三方回收企業(yè)、零售商企業(yè)和制造商企業(yè)間的相互博弈關系,發(fā)現(xiàn)了在分散決策情形下,閉環(huán)供應鏈整體效益不能實現(xiàn)最大和最優(yōu)。最后,在考慮參與者風險和零售商驅(qū)動等多種情況影響下,建立了單一第三方回收的收益費用共享契約模型(零售商與制造商分享共同的收益,第三方回收企業(yè)與制造商企業(yè)分擔回收費用,使得供應鏈中的訂購量和回收價格也達到了最優(yōu)水平。最后,通過運用了MATLAB仿真的研究以及靈敏度分析和數(shù)值分析等方法,驗證了供應鏈的契約有效性。構建的零售商驅(qū)動的第三方回收與再制造的閉環(huán)供應鏈的契約模型不僅能使廢舊品之回收數(shù)量相應地增多,實現(xiàn)了系統(tǒng)地協(xié)調(diào),而且節(jié)約了自然和社會的資源、減少環(huán)境的污染,提高了供應鏈各參與方合作積極性與期望效用。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of science and technology and the continuous improvement of people's economic living standards, the renewal speed of many products is increasing day by day, and the life cycle is getting shorter and shorter, which leads to more and more serious problems of resource waste and environment. Therefore, it is urgent to develop the closed-loop supply chain operation mode of recycling and remanufacturing of waste products, which can not only bring considerable economic value, but also promote the improvement of social and environmental benefits. However, because the participants in the closed-loop supply chain are closely related to each other and complex, and the risks of each node enterprise are different, the supply chain system has great vulnerability and is vulnerable to various supply chain uncertainties and risks. And in the closed-loop supply chain of recycling and remanufacturing waste products, node enterprises want to maximize their own interests, the dispersion of this kind of decision will lead to the operation performance and overall profit of the whole supply chain can not be optimized, which makes the closed-loop supply chain out of balance. Therefore, it is of great practical and theoretical significance to design and study the contract mechanism of inter-enterprise coordination between nodes in the closed-loop supply chain considering risk, which is of great practical and theoretical significance to improve the overall performance of the whole closed-loop supply chain. Based on the background of the natural science fund project of the tutor, this paper adopts the expected utility theory, the opportunity constraint theory and the game theory as the research tools, and mainly adopts the quantitative analysis research method. Considering the enterprise risk preference of each node in the closed-loop supply chain, the contract coordination of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain driven by the retailers and recycled by the third party is analyzed from many angles. Firstly, the significance and development status of contract coordination operation of third party recovery and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain are analyzed, and the theoretical basis related to closed-loop supply chain coordination is analyzed, which provides a theoretical basis for subsequent research. Then, under the condition that the participants in the supply chain are risk-averse, the mean-variance model is used to quantify the expected utility of the participants. Through the study of the game relationship among the third party recovery enterprises, retailers and manufacturers in the case of centralized decision and decentralized decision, it is found that the overall benefit of the closed loop supply chain can not be maximized and optimized in the case of decentralized decision. Finally, under the influence of participant risk and retail drive, a single third party recovery revenue cost sharing contract model is established (retailers share common benefits with manufacturers, third party recovery enterprises share recovery costs with manufacturers, so that the order quantity and recovery price in the supply chain also reach the optimal level. Finally, the contract effectiveness of supply chain is verified by using the research of MATLAB simulation, sensitivity analysis and numerical analysis. The contract model of the closed-loop supply chain driven by retailers not only increases the recovery quantity of waste products and realizes systematic coordination, but also saves natural and social resources, reduces environmental pollution, and improves the cooperation enthusiasm and expected utility of the participants in the supply chain. The contract model can not only increase the recovery quantity of waste products and achieve systematic coordination, but also save natural and social resources, reduce environmental pollution, and improve the cooperation enthusiasm and expected utility of all participants in the supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：山東理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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