【摘要】：隨著電子商務和網(wǎng)絡技術(shù)的發(fā)展,雙渠道供應鏈成為供應鏈未來發(fā)展的一種趨勢。在網(wǎng)店與實體店并存的情形下,消費者在購買產(chǎn)品時有了更多的參照對象。因此,參照效應的存在對雙渠道供應鏈的運作有很大的影響。價格參照是引發(fā)渠道沖突的主要原因,網(wǎng)店的出現(xiàn)使原來實體店之間的競爭轉(zhuǎn)換為實體店與網(wǎng)店的競爭。消費者除了關(guān)注產(chǎn)品的價格外,現(xiàn)在也越來越重視消費體驗和消費品質(zhì)。為了最大限度的滿足消費者,在競爭中獲得優(yōu)勢,實體店和網(wǎng)店不斷提高和完善自身服務水平。在實體店服務和網(wǎng)店服務的刺激下,參照效應會產(chǎn)生新的變化。本文針對制造商開辟網(wǎng)店的雙渠道供應鏈,首先,構(gòu)建了制造商和實體店間的Stackelberg博弈模型,探討參照效應對實體店和網(wǎng)店定價策略的影響,通過分析制造商和實體店的利潤變化,嘗試建立有效契約提高雙渠道供應鏈成員的利潤水平;然后,綜合考慮實體店服務產(chǎn)生的需求正溢出效應和參照效應,構(gòu)建了影響參照價格的動態(tài)方程,研究實體店服務影響供應鏈運作結(jié)果的復雜機理;最后,將網(wǎng)店的服務納入研究范圍,探究網(wǎng)店和實體店同時利用服務開展競爭時,參照效應如何影響雙渠道供應鏈的運作。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)參照效應能夠緩解實體店和網(wǎng)店的價格競爭,有效降低消費者渠道偏好對制造商收益和實體店收益產(chǎn)生的影響,從而改善雙渠道供應鏈的運作效率。與集中決策模式相比,分散決策模式下供應鏈整體利潤水平會降低,合理設計的兩部定價契約能夠作為協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道供應鏈的有效機制。在協(xié)調(diào)契約中,參照效應同時影響制造商的批發(fā)價格和給予實體店單位產(chǎn)品的銷售補貼,作為主導方的制造商應該積極利用參照效應尋求與實體店的合作。(2)實體店服務影響供應鏈運作的機理非常復雜。一方面,消費者搭便車行為會削弱實體店提供服務的意愿;另一方面,參照效應的存在會使實體店付出更多的努力來提高自身服務水平。簡單的批發(fā)價格契約無法實現(xiàn)供應鏈整體協(xié)調(diào),分散決策模式下實體店的服務水平會顯著降低,從而導致供應鏈整體利潤水平的下降。制造商主導的服務成本分擔契約可以實現(xiàn)供應鏈的完全協(xié)調(diào),在實體店服務意愿不足的情況下,制造商能夠通過設計合理的激勵機制來實現(xiàn)“雙贏”。(3)在實體店服務和網(wǎng)店服務并存的情形下,參照效應能同時提高兩個渠道的服務水平。與集中決策模式相比,分散決策模式下實體店的服務水平會降低,但網(wǎng)店的服務水平?jīng)]有變化。雙向成本分擔契約并不能使雙渠道實現(xiàn)完全協(xié)調(diào),作為主導方的制造商去主動分擔實體店的服務成本,然后向?qū)嶓w店收取固定的費用,在實現(xiàn)供應鏈成員收益Pareto改進的同時,使供應鏈達到完全協(xié)調(diào)。參照效應的存在,可以增加制造商與實體店之間建立協(xié)調(diào)契約的可能性。在現(xiàn)實中,制造企業(yè)開辟獨立網(wǎng)店銷售產(chǎn)品的現(xiàn)象越來越普遍,本文的研究可以為企業(yè)決策提供很多借鑒。例如,參照效應的存在可以有效緩解渠道之間的價格競爭,增大制造商和實體店之間合作的可能性。作為主導方的制造企業(yè)應該利用參照效應對供應鏈競爭策略和合作契約的影響,積極尋求與下游企業(yè)開展合作,在增加雙方收益的同時改善供應鏈整體收益。
[Abstract]:With the development of e-commerce and network technology, the dual-channel supply chain has become a trend of the future development of the supply chain. In the case where the online store and the entity store coexist, the consumer has more reference objects when purchasing the product. Therefore, the existence of the reference effect has great influence on the operation of the dual-channel supply chain. The price reference is the main cause of the channel conflict, and the appearance of the online store makes the competition between the original and the solid stores converted to the competition between the solid store and the online store. In addition to paying attention to the price of the product, the consumer is now paying more attention to the consumption experience and the consumption quality. To maximize customer satisfaction, gain advantages in competition, solid stores and online stores constantly improve and improve their own service levels. The reference effect creates new changes with the stimulus of the entity store service and the online store service. In this paper, a two-channel supply chain is opened for the manufacturer. First, the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the entity store is built, the influence of the reference effect on the pricing strategy of the physical store and the online store is discussed, and the profit change of the manufacturer and the entity store is analyzed. In this paper, we try to set up an effective contract to improve the profit level of the members of the dual-channel supply chain. Then, considering the demand positive spillover effect and the reference effect of the entity store service, the dynamic equation affecting the reference price is constructed, and the complex mechanism of the operation result of the supply chain is studied. and finally, the service of the online store is included in the research range, and when the online store and the entity store are used for competition with the service, the reference effect influences the operation of the dual-channel supply chain. The results show that (1) the reference effect can reduce the price competition of the physical store and the online store, effectively reduce the influence of the consumer channel preference on the manufacturer's income and the income of the entity store, thereby improving the operation efficiency of the dual-channel supply chain. Compared with the centralized decision-making mode, the overall profit level of the supply chain in the decentralized decision-making mode can be reduced, and the two pricing contracts that are reasonably designed can serve as an effective mechanism for coordinating the dual-channel supply chain. In the coordination contract, the reference effect affects the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sales subsidy to the entity store unit product. The manufacturer of the leading party should actively use the reference effect to seek the cooperation with the entity store. (2) The mechanism of the operation of the supply chain is very complicated. On the one hand, the consumer's hitchhiking will weaken the will of the physical store to provide services; on the other hand, the presence of the reference effect will give the physical store more effort to improve its own level of service. The simple wholesale cheap contract can not realize the overall supply chain coordination, and the service level of the entity store in the decentralized decision-making mode can be significantly reduced, resulting in a decrease in the overall profit level of the supply chain. The manufacturer-led service cost-sharing contract can achieve full coordination of the supply chain, and the manufacturer can achieve the 鈥渨in-win鈥，

本文編號：2404043