【摘要】：隨著時(shí)代的進(jìn)步與發(fā)展,“供應(yīng)鏈”一詞正逐漸進(jìn)入人們視線中,并呈愈演愈烈的趨勢(shì)。供應(yīng)鏈管理逐漸引起企業(yè)家及研究人員的重視,成為研究的一個(gè)重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域。供應(yīng)鏈并不是一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)簡(jiǎn)單單的網(wǎng)絡(luò)系統(tǒng),它涵蓋了供應(yīng)商、分銷商與零售商等眾多參與成員,各成員之間關(guān)系錯(cuò)綜雜亂。在如此復(fù)雜的條件下,如何實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào),促進(jìn)鏈上各參與者相互配合,從而提高供應(yīng)鏈總體效益成為了供應(yīng)鏈管理的一個(gè)重點(diǎn)難點(diǎn)。研究表明,供應(yīng)鏈契約對(duì)交易雙方的行為起一定的激勵(lì)和約束作用,可以很好協(xié)調(diào)各參與者。供應(yīng)鏈參與成員通過簽訂契約,可以從總體利益的角度考慮,做出最有利于整體的選擇。本文以三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)為研究對(duì)象,主要包含了上游的供應(yīng)企業(yè)、中游的分銷企業(yè)和下游的零售企業(yè)三個(gè)交易主體,假設(shè)消費(fèi)者需求具有隨機(jī)性,研究了系統(tǒng)在不同契約組合中如何達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)的問題。這里討論三個(gè)組合:收益共享與回購(gòu)契約組合;回購(gòu)與期權(quán)契約組合;收益共享與期權(quán)契約組合。首先建立風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性的契約組合模型,給出了鏈條整體的最優(yōu)訂貨量,進(jìn)而討論了包含三個(gè)交易主體的供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)的方法。然后分析了當(dāng)鏈上三個(gè)成員企業(yè)達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)時(shí),他們各自的利益分配情況。考慮到現(xiàn)實(shí)中諸多不確定因素,本文在三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈模型中引入風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素,假設(shè)下游企業(yè)是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏愛的,中游企業(yè)是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡的,構(gòu)建了三種不同組合下的契約模型,分析了此時(shí)鏈條下游零售商的收益與其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏愛之間的關(guān)系,以及鏈條中游分銷商的收益與其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡之間的關(guān)系。并進(jìn)一步分析了系統(tǒng)協(xié)調(diào)問題,給出了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好下,當(dāng)交易三方的決策能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈總體最優(yōu)時(shí)需要滿足的條件。近年來各種突發(fā)事故頻繁出現(xiàn),消費(fèi)者需求受其影響產(chǎn)生或大或小的變化,需求影響生產(chǎn)及銷售必然也會(huì)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈正常運(yùn)作造成影響。這里分別建立了不同情形下基于突發(fā)事件的上游、中游及下游三個(gè)交易方的利潤(rùn)模型。當(dāng)突發(fā)事件的發(fā)生嚴(yán)重影響了原供應(yīng)鏈訂貨量時(shí),無論增加還是減少訂貨量,必然會(huì)造成原供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)д{(diào)。但若在原基礎(chǔ)上適當(dāng)調(diào)整各相關(guān)參數(shù),便可幫助供應(yīng)鏈成功解決突發(fā)事件的影響。最后通過數(shù)值分析驗(yàn)證了相關(guān)結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:With the progress and development of the times, the word "supply chain" is gradually coming into the sight of people. Supply chain management has gradually attracted the attention of entrepreneurs and researchers, and has become a key area of research. Supply chain is not a simple network system, it covers suppliers, distributors and retailers and many other participating members. Under such complicated conditions, how to realize the coordination of supply chain and promote the cooperation of all participants in the chain, so as to improve the overall efficiency of supply chain has become a key difficulty in supply chain management. The research shows that supply chain contract plays an incentive and restraint role on the behavior of both parties, and it can coordinate the participants well. By signing contracts, supply chain participants can consider the overall interests and make the best choices. This paper takes the three-level supply chain system as the research object, mainly includes the upstream supply enterprise, the middle flow distribution enterprise and the downstream retail enterprise, assumes that the consumer demand is random. In this paper, the problem of how to achieve coordination in different contract combinations is studied. This paper discusses three combinations: the combination of income sharing and repurchase contracts; the combination of repurchase and options contracts; and the combination of income sharing and options contracts. Firstly, the risk-neutral contract combination model is established, and the optimal order quantity of the whole chain is given, and the method of coordination of supply chain with three transaction agents is discussed. Then, the paper analyzes the distribution of benefits when the three member enterprises in the chain reach the coordination state. Considering many uncertain factors in reality, this paper introduces risk factors into the three-level supply chain model, assumes that downstream enterprises are risk preference, and mid-stream enterprises are risk-averse, and constructs three kinds of contract models under different combinations. This paper analyzes the relationship between the profit of the chain downstream retailer and its risk preference, and the relationship between the profit of the retailer in the middle of the chain and its risk aversion. Furthermore, the system coordination problem is analyzed, and the conditions that need to be satisfied when the transaction tripartite decision can realize the overall optimal supply chain under risk preference are given. In recent years, a variety of unexpected accidents occur frequently, and the consumer demand is influenced by the influence of it. The influence of the demand on the production and sales will inevitably affect the normal operation of the supply chain. In this paper, the profit models of upstream, middle and downstream traders based on unexpected events are established. When the unexpected events seriously affect the order quantity of the original supply chain, whether the order quantity increases or decreases, it will inevitably lead to the original supply chain imbalance. However, if the relevant parameters are adjusted properly on the original basis, it can help the supply chain to successfully solve the impact of unexpected events. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京建筑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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