【摘要】：供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)已經(jīng)成為供應(yīng)鏈管理的核心和熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題,建立科學(xué)合理的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制有助于協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈中各參與者的行動(dòng),促進(jìn)其建立戰(zhàn)略性合作伙伴關(guān)系,共擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共享收益,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)最大化,提高整個(gè)系統(tǒng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。拍賣為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)上的投標(biāo)商和采購(gòu)方提供了一種簡(jiǎn)單又穩(wěn)健的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。拍賣機(jī)制在采購(gòu)市場(chǎng)上得到了有效應(yīng)用,增加了參與者的積極性,促進(jìn)了供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。本文考慮競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境下由兩個(gè)供應(yīng)商向一個(gè)零售商提供同質(zhì)的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)。同時(shí),考慮了零售商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度,并用VaR模型衡量了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與收益之間的關(guān)系。因此,本文在考慮參與者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度的情況下,對(duì)信息對(duì)稱和信息不對(duì)稱兩種情形下,基于隨機(jī)指數(shù)型需求函數(shù),通過(guò)建立非拍賣的基礎(chǔ)模型、目錄拍賣模型和二部合同拍賣模型研究分析了該供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。在信息對(duì)稱情形下和信息不對(duì)稱情形下,均有以下結(jié)論:在集中決策時(shí),零售商獲得整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈100%的利潤(rùn),盡管此時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的總利潤(rùn)最高,但供應(yīng)商沒(méi)有利潤(rùn)可得,因此供應(yīng)商沒(méi)有參與集中決策的動(dòng)力;當(dāng)分散決策時(shí),零售商和供應(yīng)商均能獲得利潤(rùn),但整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)低于集中決策下供應(yīng)鏈總利潤(rùn),因此相對(duì)于集中決策,分散決策存在效率損失。在目錄拍賣機(jī)制下,供應(yīng)鏈的總利潤(rùn)比分散決策情形下的供應(yīng)鏈總利潤(rùn)有所提高,但仍有效率損失;在二部合同拍賣機(jī)制下,在一定條件下,整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤(rùn)達(dá)到集中決策時(shí)的最大化利潤(rùn),并且實(shí)現(xiàn)了零售商和供應(yīng)商之間的收益共享以及供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:Supply chain coordination has become the core and hot issue of supply chain management. The establishment of scientific and reasonable coordination mechanism will help to coordinate the actions of all participants in the supply chain, promote their strategic partnership, share risks and share benefits. In order to maximize the profit of the whole supply chain, improve the competitiveness of the whole system. Auctions provide a simple and robust coordination mechanism for bidders and purchasers in competitive markets. The auction mechanism has been applied effectively in the purchasing market, which increases the enthusiasm of the participants and promotes the coordination of the supply chain. This paper considers a supply chain system in which two suppliers provide a retailer with a homogeneous product or service in a competitive environment. At the same time, the risk attitude of retailers is considered, and the relationship between risk and profit is measured by VaR model. Therefore, under the consideration of participants' risk attitude and information symmetry and information asymmetry, based on the stochastic exponential demand function, this paper establishes the basic model of non-auction. The inventory auction model and two contract auction models are used to analyze the coordination of the supply chain system. In the case of information symmetry and information asymmetry, the following conclusions can be drawn: in centralized decision-making, the retailer obtains 100% of the profit of the whole supply chain, although the total profit of the supply chain system is the highest at this time, the supplier has no profit to get. Therefore, the supplier has no incentive to participate in the centralized decision; when the decision is decentralized, both the retailer and the supplier can gain profits, but the profit of the whole supply chain is lower than the total profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision, so it is relative to the centralized decision. There is a loss of efficiency in decentralized decision making. Under the catalogue auction mechanism, the total profit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision, but the total profit is still lost efficiently; under the two contract auction mechanism, under certain conditions, the total profit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision. The profit of the whole supply chain reaches the maximum profit of centralized decision, and realizes the profit sharing and supply chain coordination between retailers and suppliers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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