基于回購契約的供應(yīng)鏈公平偏好類型選擇
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-24 19:12
【摘要】：越來越多的人們證明公平偏好確實(shí)是存在的,并將公平偏好引入供應(yīng)鏈中尋求供應(yīng)鏈優(yōu)化機(jī)制。于是,掀起了有關(guān)公平偏好的研究熱潮。但是,現(xiàn)實(shí)是存在多種公平偏好類型,而現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)關(guān)于公平偏好的研究大多數(shù)是在傳統(tǒng)研究之上直接假設(shè)供應(yīng)鏈成員具有某類公平偏好,并沒有探討供應(yīng)鏈成員對供應(yīng)鏈伙伴的選擇問題,所以本文研究在此基礎(chǔ)上將供應(yīng)鏈成員對供應(yīng)鏈伙伴的選擇行為引入公平偏好的研究,研究供應(yīng)鏈成員對不同公平偏好類型的供應(yīng)鏈伙伴的選擇問題。本文假設(shè)市場上存在三類不同公平偏好類型的供應(yīng)商和三類不同公平偏好類型的零售商,且各自具有選擇對方的權(quán)利。其中,三類不同公平偏好類型分別為:自利偏好類型、FS公平偏好類型、Nash公平偏好類型。本文的主要研究內(nèi)容:第一,在回購契約下,分別討論自利偏好供應(yīng)商和自利偏好零售商對供應(yīng)鏈伙伴公平偏好類型的選擇問題。研究表明:自利的供應(yīng)商在考慮自身利潤最大化的前提下會更愿意選擇自利偏好的零售商合作;自利的零售商同樣也更希望自己的合作伙伴供應(yīng)商是自利偏好的;故,自利偏好的供應(yīng)商和自利偏好的零售商彼此都更愿意選擇彼此作為供應(yīng)鏈合作伙伴,“一拍即合”成功構(gòu)建供應(yīng)鏈。第二,在回購契約下,討論FS公平偏好的供應(yīng)商和FS公平偏好的零售商對供應(yīng)鏈伙伴公平偏好類型的選擇問題。研究表明:FS公平偏好的供應(yīng)商更愿意自利偏好的零售商作為自己的合作伙伴;FS公平偏好的零售商愿意選擇自利偏好或是FS公平偏好的供應(yīng)商合作。第三,在回購契約下,討論Nash公平偏好的供應(yīng)商和Nash公平偏好的零售商對供應(yīng)鏈伙伴公平偏好類型的選擇問題。研究表明:Nash公平偏好的供應(yīng)商更傾向選擇自利偏好的零售商成為自己下游的合作伙伴;Nash公平偏好的零售商偏好選擇自利偏好的供應(yīng)商。第四,綜合以上比較結(jié)果,經(jīng)過選擇與匹配,最終得出:供應(yīng)鏈成員在考慮自身最大化利潤的前提下尋求供應(yīng)鏈伙伴,只有自利偏好的供應(yīng)商和自利偏好的零售商愿意合作構(gòu)建供應(yīng)鏈。FS公平偏好的供應(yīng)商和零售商及Nash公平偏好的供應(yīng)商和零售商,他們對對方偏好類型的最優(yōu)選擇都不能匹配成功,即,他們尋求的供應(yīng)鏈伙伴并不是最佳的。但是,Nash公平偏好類型的供應(yīng)商和Nash公平偏好類型的零售商也可以退而求其次,作為彼此的第二選擇進(jìn)行合作構(gòu)建供應(yīng)鏈;FS公平偏好類型的供應(yīng)商和FS公平偏好類型的零售商組成供應(yīng)鏈成為保底選擇。本文研究既考慮了供應(yīng)鏈成員類型的多樣性,又將公平偏好和供應(yīng)鏈成員對供應(yīng)鏈伙伴的選擇行為相結(jié)合,不僅可以豐富理論的研究,也可以指導(dǎo)實(shí)踐。因此,具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:More and more people prove the existence of fair preference and introduce fair preference into supply chain to seek supply chain optimization mechanism. As a result, there has been an upsurge in research on fairness preferences. However, the reality is that there are many types of fair preference, and most of the existing researches on fairness preference are based on the traditional research, which directly assumes that supply chain members have some kind of fair preference. The selection of supply chain partners by supply chain members is not discussed in this paper, so this paper introduces the selection behavior of supply chain members to supply chain partners into the research of fair preference. This paper studies the selection of supply chain partners with different fair preference types by supply chain members. In this paper, we assume that there are three kinds of suppliers with different types of fair preference and three types of retailers with different types of fair preference, and each has the right to choose each other. Among them, three different types of fair preference are self-interest preference type / FS fair preference type and Nash fair preference type. The main contents of this paper are as follows: first, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of self-interest preference supplier and self-interest preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type respectively. The research shows that self-profit suppliers are more willing to choose self-profit preference retailers in consideration of their own profit maximization, and self-profit retailers also prefer their partner suppliers to self-interest preference. Both self-interested suppliers and self-interested retailers are more willing to choose each other as supply chain partners. Secondly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the selection of supply chain partner fair preference type between FS fair preference supplier and FS fair preference retailer. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: FS prefers the retailer with the self-interest preference as his partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer is willing to choose the supplier with the self-interest preference or the fair preference of the FS. Thirdly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of Nash fair preference supplier and Nash fair preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: Nash is more likely to choose the retailer with self-interest preference as his downstream partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer who prefers to choose the self-interest preference. Fourth, synthesizing the above comparison results, through selection and matching, it is concluded that the supply chain members seek the supply chain partners on the premise of considering their own maximization of profits. Only suppliers with self-interest preference and retailers with self-interest preference are willing to cooperate to construct supply chain. FS fair preference suppliers and retailers and Nash fair preference suppliers and retailers. They can not match the best choice of each other's preference type, that is, the supply chain partner they seek is not the best. However, suppliers with Nash fair preference type and retailers with Nash fair preference type can also take second place. As the second choice of each other, the supply chain consists of suppliers with FS fair preference type and retailers with FS fair preference type. This paper not only considers the diversity of supply chain member types, but also combines fairness preference with supply chain members' choice of supply chain partners, which can not only enrich the theoretical research, but also guide the practice. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274
本文編號：2142363
[Abstract]:More and more people prove the existence of fair preference and introduce fair preference into supply chain to seek supply chain optimization mechanism. As a result, there has been an upsurge in research on fairness preferences. However, the reality is that there are many types of fair preference, and most of the existing researches on fairness preference are based on the traditional research, which directly assumes that supply chain members have some kind of fair preference. The selection of supply chain partners by supply chain members is not discussed in this paper, so this paper introduces the selection behavior of supply chain members to supply chain partners into the research of fair preference. This paper studies the selection of supply chain partners with different fair preference types by supply chain members. In this paper, we assume that there are three kinds of suppliers with different types of fair preference and three types of retailers with different types of fair preference, and each has the right to choose each other. Among them, three different types of fair preference are self-interest preference type / FS fair preference type and Nash fair preference type. The main contents of this paper are as follows: first, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of self-interest preference supplier and self-interest preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type respectively. The research shows that self-profit suppliers are more willing to choose self-profit preference retailers in consideration of their own profit maximization, and self-profit retailers also prefer their partner suppliers to self-interest preference. Both self-interested suppliers and self-interested retailers are more willing to choose each other as supply chain partners. Secondly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the selection of supply chain partner fair preference type between FS fair preference supplier and FS fair preference retailer. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: FS prefers the retailer with the self-interest preference as his partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer is willing to choose the supplier with the self-interest preference or the fair preference of the FS. Thirdly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of Nash fair preference supplier and Nash fair preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: Nash is more likely to choose the retailer with self-interest preference as his downstream partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer who prefers to choose the self-interest preference. Fourth, synthesizing the above comparison results, through selection and matching, it is concluded that the supply chain members seek the supply chain partners on the premise of considering their own maximization of profits. Only suppliers with self-interest preference and retailers with self-interest preference are willing to cooperate to construct supply chain. FS fair preference suppliers and retailers and Nash fair preference suppliers and retailers. They can not match the best choice of each other's preference type, that is, the supply chain partner they seek is not the best. However, suppliers with Nash fair preference type and retailers with Nash fair preference type can also take second place. As the second choice of each other, the supply chain consists of suppliers with FS fair preference type and retailers with FS fair preference type. This paper not only considers the diversity of supply chain member types, but also combines fairness preference with supply chain members' choice of supply chain partners, which can not only enrich the theoretical research, but also guide the practice. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274
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，本文編號：2142363
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