基于規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)和風(fēng)險規(guī)避的鏈與鏈競爭縱向合同選擇
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-16 23:46
【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的全球化和科學(xué)技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展,以及市場競爭環(huán)境的復(fù)雜多變,單個企業(yè)之間的競爭已經(jīng)逐漸演變?yōu)楣⿷?yīng)鏈間的競爭。在這種競爭環(huán)境中,企業(yè)必須與縱向合作伙伴建立緊密和諧的協(xié)同運作關(guān)系才能應(yīng)對復(fù)雜多變的市場環(huán)境,提升自身供應(yīng)鏈的競爭力,而緊密和諧的協(xié)同運作關(guān)系本質(zhì)在于績效能得到改進(jìn)�，F(xiàn)有的供應(yīng)鏈理論雖然通過采用合同改進(jìn)了整個供應(yīng)鏈的績效,但并不能確保供應(yīng)鏈成員績效均得到改進(jìn),更不能保證在鏈與鏈競爭的環(huán)境中能實現(xiàn)上下游的雙贏,特別是當(dāng)制造商的生產(chǎn)存在生產(chǎn)規(guī)模的不經(jīng)濟(jì)時、或者零售商對需求風(fēng)險進(jìn)行規(guī)避時。本文將應(yīng)用非合作博弈的理論與方法,探索制造商存在規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)或零售商對風(fēng)險進(jìn)行規(guī)避時的縱向合同同時改善制造商和零售商績效時的條件,識別合同選擇的博弈均衡特征,并分析市場競爭強(qiáng)度、制造商的生產(chǎn)規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)參數(shù)、零售商的風(fēng)險規(guī)避態(tài)度等對合同參數(shù)設(shè)計的影響,為鏈與鏈競爭中規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)企業(yè)和風(fēng)險規(guī)避型企業(yè)的縱向合同選擇提供理論依據(jù)和實踐參考價值。首先,本文將基于供應(yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行數(shù)量競爭、及其制造商的生產(chǎn)存在的規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)的環(huán)境,以分散化的批發(fā)價格合同或中心化結(jié)構(gòu)為基準(zhǔn),識別復(fù)雜合同,如數(shù)量折扣合同、縱向聯(lián)盟與利潤分享合同、兩部定價合同改善制造商和零售商績效的雙贏機(jī)制,探索縱向合同選擇的演化路徑和占優(yōu)均衡,并分析規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)、競爭強(qiáng)度對合同設(shè)計的影響。其結(jié)論表明:無論競爭對手供應(yīng)鏈采用何種合同,只要本供應(yīng)鏈采用復(fù)雜合同就可實現(xiàn)上下游績效改進(jìn)的雙贏。若以中心化結(jié)構(gòu)為基準(zhǔn),則本供應(yīng)鏈中的制造商只需設(shè)置相對較高的固定收費,即可實現(xiàn)績效的改進(jìn)。值得注意的是,若制造商的規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)性較弱或者通過技術(shù)手段消除了規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì),則當(dāng)橫向競爭相對較為激烈時,采用分散化的批發(fā)價格合同對制造商和零售商來講才最有利。其次,基于需求不確定環(huán)境和制造商對終端零售價格進(jìn)行約束的鏈與鏈價格競爭環(huán)境,分析了競爭供應(yīng)鏈分別采用批發(fā)價格合同和固定加價合同時的績效,分別從制造商和零售商績效均改進(jìn)的角度、及供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)績效改進(jìn)的角度識別了固定加價合同的占優(yōu)均衡,并分析市場波動風(fēng)險、市場規(guī)模、市場份額、競爭強(qiáng)度、零售商預(yù)測能力及固定加價比例對博弈均衡的影響。研究結(jié)論表明:當(dāng)橫向價格競爭相對較弱,零售商面臨的市場份額又較大時,兩條競爭性供應(yīng)鏈均采用縱向約束的固定加價行為是實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)績效改進(jìn)的占優(yōu)貝葉斯均衡;若此時固定加價的比例相對適中且市場需求波動風(fēng)險不是很高,或者固定加價的比例較大但市場需求波動的風(fēng)險相對適中,則固定加價能實現(xiàn)制造商和零售商雙方績效均改進(jìn)的雙贏,并形成占優(yōu)均衡和貝葉斯均衡。最后,基于需求不確定環(huán)境,構(gòu)建兩個風(fēng)險中性制造商與兩個排他性風(fēng)險規(guī)避零售商組成的鏈與鏈價格競爭模型,以批發(fā)價格合同為基準(zhǔn),分別識別了采用兩部定價合同和收益分享合同實現(xiàn)上下游績效Pareto均改進(jìn)的占優(yōu)均衡特征和局限性,分析需求風(fēng)險、價格競爭和零售商的風(fēng)險態(tài)度(風(fēng)險規(guī)避或風(fēng)險中性)對兩部定價合同或者收益分享合同參數(shù)設(shè)置的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)兩部定價合同的選擇并不直接受需求風(fēng)險的影響,但收益分享合同的選擇則受需求波動風(fēng)險和價格競爭的影響,并且當(dāng)橫向價格競爭較弱,且兩部定價合同固定收費設(shè)置適中,則兩部定價合同是實現(xiàn)上下游績效改進(jìn)的占優(yōu)均衡合同。若橫向競爭較弱或適中,且市場需求波動風(fēng)險相對較小,收益分享比例設(shè)置適當(dāng),則均提供收益分享合同是上下游雙贏的占優(yōu)均衡。本文的研究結(jié)論充分拓展了McGuireStaelin[7]等人的研究成果,彌補(bǔ)了競爭環(huán)境下的縱向合同選擇方面的不足,也為存在規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)和風(fēng)險規(guī)避的供應(yīng)鏈在實現(xiàn)鏈中上下游企業(yè)長期合作和發(fā)展的雙贏局面提供了實施的路徑和方法,具有較強(qiáng)的實踐價值和理論基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:With the globalization of the economy, the rapid development of science and technology, and the complex and changeable market competition environment, the competition among individual enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition between supply chains. In this competitive environment, enterprises must establish close harmony with the longitudinal partners in order to cope with the complex and changeable market ring. The existing supply chain theory can improve the performance of the whole supply chain, but it does not ensure that the performance of the supply chain members can be improved, and it can not be guaranteed in the chain and chain competition environment. A win-win situation between the upper and lower reaches, especially when the production of the manufacturer is uneconomical in production scale, or when the retailer evade the demand risk. This paper will apply the theory and method of non cooperative game to explore the manufacturer and retailer when the manufacturer has an uneconomical scale or a retailer's longitudinal contract to avoid the risk. The conditions of performance, identify the game equilibrium characteristics of the contract selection, and analyze the influence of market competition intensity, the manufacturer's production scale uneconomic parameters, the retailer's risk aversion attitude on the design of the contract parameters, and provide the theoretical basis for the vertical contract selection of the scale uneconomical enterprises and the risk avoidance enterprises in chain and chain competition. First, this article will be based on the quantity competition between supply chain and supply chain, and the uneconomical environment of the manufacturer's production, based on the decentralized wholesale price contract or the centralization structure, identifying the complex contracts, such as the quantity discounts contract, the vertical alliance and the profit sharing contract, and the improvement of the two pricing contracts. The win-win mechanism of manufacturer and retailer performance explores the evolutionary path and dominant equilibrium of vertical contract selection, and analyses the impact of scale uneconomy and competition intensity on contract design. The conclusion shows that, no matter what kind of contract is adopted in the supply chain of competitors, it can achieve both upstream and downstream performance improvement as long as the supply chain uses complex contracts. If the manufacturers in the supply chain have to set relatively high fixed charge to achieve performance improvement, it is worth noting that if the manufacturer's scale is not weak or the scale is uneconomical by means of technical means, when the horizontal competition is relatively fierce, it uses decentralization. The wholesale price contract is the best for the manufacturer and the retailer. Secondly, based on the chain and chain price competition environment that the demand uncertainty environment and the manufacturer constrains the terminal retail price, the performance of the competitive supply chain with the wholesale price contract and the fixed price contract, respectively, is analyzed from the performance of the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. The angle of improvement, and the performance improvement of the supply chain system, identifies the dominant equilibrium of the fixed pricing contract, and analyzes the influence of market volatility risk, market size, market share, competition intensity, retailer's forecasting ability and fixed price ratio on game equilibrium. The research results show that when the horizontal price competition is relatively weak, the retailer face is relatively weak. When the market share is large, the two competitive supply chain adopts the fixed price fixing behavior of vertical constraint is a dominant Bias equilibrium to improve the performance of the supply chain system. The risk is relatively moderate, and the fixed price increase can achieve a win-win situation of both the manufacturer and the retailer, and form a dominant equilibrium and Bias equilibrium. Finally, based on the uncertainty of the demand environment, the chain and chain price competition model of two risk neutral manufacturers and two exclusive risk averse retailers is constructed, and the wholesale price is combined with the wholesale price. On the same basis, we identify the dominant equilibrium characteristics and limitations of the improvement of both upstream and downstream performance Pareto with two pricing contracts and income sharing contracts, and analyze the impact of demand risk, price competition and risk attitude of retailers (risk avoidance or risk neutral) on the setting of two pricing contracts or income sharing contract parameters. The study found that the choice of the two pricing contracts is not directly affected by the demand risk, but the choice of the income sharing contract is influenced by the demand volatility risk and the price competition, and when the horizontal price competition is weak, and the two fixed pricing contracts are moderate, the two fixed price contract is the superior of the performance improvement of the upstream and downstream. If the horizontal competition is weak or moderate, and the risk of market demand volatility is relatively small and the proportion of income sharing is appropriate, the income sharing contract is a win-win equilibrium between the upstream and downstream. The conclusions of this paper fully expand the research results of McGuireStaelin[7] and others, and make up for the vertical contract selection under the competitive environment. It also provides a way to implement the win-win situation of long-term cooperation and development in the chain of upper and lower reaches of the chain, which has strong practical value and theoretical basis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274
，
本文編號：2128093
[Abstract]:With the globalization of the economy, the rapid development of science and technology, and the complex and changeable market competition environment, the competition among individual enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition between supply chains. In this competitive environment, enterprises must establish close harmony with the longitudinal partners in order to cope with the complex and changeable market ring. The existing supply chain theory can improve the performance of the whole supply chain, but it does not ensure that the performance of the supply chain members can be improved, and it can not be guaranteed in the chain and chain competition environment. A win-win situation between the upper and lower reaches, especially when the production of the manufacturer is uneconomical in production scale, or when the retailer evade the demand risk. This paper will apply the theory and method of non cooperative game to explore the manufacturer and retailer when the manufacturer has an uneconomical scale or a retailer's longitudinal contract to avoid the risk. The conditions of performance, identify the game equilibrium characteristics of the contract selection, and analyze the influence of market competition intensity, the manufacturer's production scale uneconomic parameters, the retailer's risk aversion attitude on the design of the contract parameters, and provide the theoretical basis for the vertical contract selection of the scale uneconomical enterprises and the risk avoidance enterprises in chain and chain competition. First, this article will be based on the quantity competition between supply chain and supply chain, and the uneconomical environment of the manufacturer's production, based on the decentralized wholesale price contract or the centralization structure, identifying the complex contracts, such as the quantity discounts contract, the vertical alliance and the profit sharing contract, and the improvement of the two pricing contracts. The win-win mechanism of manufacturer and retailer performance explores the evolutionary path and dominant equilibrium of vertical contract selection, and analyses the impact of scale uneconomy and competition intensity on contract design. The conclusion shows that, no matter what kind of contract is adopted in the supply chain of competitors, it can achieve both upstream and downstream performance improvement as long as the supply chain uses complex contracts. If the manufacturers in the supply chain have to set relatively high fixed charge to achieve performance improvement, it is worth noting that if the manufacturer's scale is not weak or the scale is uneconomical by means of technical means, when the horizontal competition is relatively fierce, it uses decentralization. The wholesale price contract is the best for the manufacturer and the retailer. Secondly, based on the chain and chain price competition environment that the demand uncertainty environment and the manufacturer constrains the terminal retail price, the performance of the competitive supply chain with the wholesale price contract and the fixed price contract, respectively, is analyzed from the performance of the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. The angle of improvement, and the performance improvement of the supply chain system, identifies the dominant equilibrium of the fixed pricing contract, and analyzes the influence of market volatility risk, market size, market share, competition intensity, retailer's forecasting ability and fixed price ratio on game equilibrium. The research results show that when the horizontal price competition is relatively weak, the retailer face is relatively weak. When the market share is large, the two competitive supply chain adopts the fixed price fixing behavior of vertical constraint is a dominant Bias equilibrium to improve the performance of the supply chain system. The risk is relatively moderate, and the fixed price increase can achieve a win-win situation of both the manufacturer and the retailer, and form a dominant equilibrium and Bias equilibrium. Finally, based on the uncertainty of the demand environment, the chain and chain price competition model of two risk neutral manufacturers and two exclusive risk averse retailers is constructed, and the wholesale price is combined with the wholesale price. On the same basis, we identify the dominant equilibrium characteristics and limitations of the improvement of both upstream and downstream performance Pareto with two pricing contracts and income sharing contracts, and analyze the impact of demand risk, price competition and risk attitude of retailers (risk avoidance or risk neutral) on the setting of two pricing contracts or income sharing contract parameters. The study found that the choice of the two pricing contracts is not directly affected by the demand risk, but the choice of the income sharing contract is influenced by the demand volatility risk and the price competition, and when the horizontal price competition is weak, and the two fixed pricing contracts are moderate, the two fixed price contract is the superior of the performance improvement of the upstream and downstream. If the horizontal competition is weak or moderate, and the risk of market demand volatility is relatively small and the proportion of income sharing is appropriate, the income sharing contract is a win-win equilibrium between the upstream and downstream. The conclusions of this paper fully expand the research results of McGuireStaelin[7] and others, and make up for the vertical contract selection under the competitive environment. It also provides a way to implement the win-win situation of long-term cooperation and development in the chain of upper and lower reaches of the chain, which has strong practical value and theoretical basis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274
，
本文編號：2128093
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