本文選題：供應鏈 + 訂單農(nóng)業(yè)　； 參考：《華南理工大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文在分析訂單農(nóng)業(yè)特點的基礎上，，借鑒前景理論構(gòu)建了單一公司和單一農(nóng)戶組成的“公司+農(nóng)戶”型訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應鏈的決策模型。通過構(gòu)建存在缺貨時實施一定的懲罰、存在超額時公司分擔農(nóng)戶部分的生產(chǎn)成本以及同時實施上述兩種契約機制的決策模型，重點考察農(nóng)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)過程中的不確定性(自然隨機因素)、市場需求的不確定性(市場隨機因素)與農(nóng)戶的損失規(guī)避行為等因素對公司與農(nóng)戶決策行為及協(xié)調(diào)機制的影響，旨在為農(nóng)戶和公司提出更為穩(wěn)健、可操作的契約機制，以增強訂單的穩(wěn)健性、改善公司與農(nóng)戶的收益。 本文首先研究了供應鏈進行集中決策模式下的最優(yōu)決策行為。得到供應鏈集中決策下的最優(yōu)投入量隨著市場零售價格的增加而增加，隨著投入成本的增加而減小。 其次，本文研究了農(nóng)戶為風險中性者時“公司+農(nóng)戶”型訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應鏈的契約機制選擇問題，分析了了“成本分擔”機制、“缺貨懲罰”機制以及“成本分擔+缺貨懲罰”混合機制下農(nóng)戶及公司的最優(yōu)決策行為，同時探討了三種契約機制能否實現(xiàn)供應鏈整體協(xié)調(diào)的問題。進一步，通過數(shù)值分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，在特定條件下，成本分擔機制可以使得供應鏈整體達到協(xié)調(diào)的目的，該契約也滿足供應鏈的各方參與者的績效都得到改善，即滿足公司與農(nóng)戶的收益比沒有契約下的績效水平高的條件。 最后考慮了隨機產(chǎn)出與隨機需求條件下由具有損失規(guī)避特性農(nóng)戶與風險中性公司組成的訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應鏈的激勵機制選擇問題，將前景理論中的價值函數(shù)應用到農(nóng)戶的目標決策函數(shù)中，以分析農(nóng)戶的損失規(guī)避性對農(nóng)戶及公司的最優(yōu)決策行為的影響。同時，也分析了在農(nóng)戶具有損失規(guī)避特性的決策行為下，三種激勵機制對農(nóng)戶與公司決策的影響。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：農(nóng)戶的生產(chǎn)投入量隨著其自身損失規(guī)避度的增大而增大；相比無契約下，三種激勵機制契約均提高了農(nóng)戶的最優(yōu)投入量對公司訂單量的反應系數(shù)。進一步，通過數(shù)值分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，對于具有損失規(guī)避行為的農(nóng)戶，成本分擔機制、無機制、混合機制都可能是農(nóng)戶與公司的最優(yōu)契約機制選擇，這取決于農(nóng)戶的損失規(guī)避程度、產(chǎn)出率與市場需求的波動性。對于供應鏈整體來講，這三種契約都很難實現(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)，但在一定條件下，成本分擔機制與混合機制有其存在的合理性，使得公司、農(nóng)戶、供應鏈整體的效用都得到改善，實現(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:On the basis of analyzing the characteristics of order agriculture, this paper constructs a decision model of "company farmer" type of order agricultural supply chain composed of single company and single farmer based on prospect theory. By constructing a decision model to implement the above two contract mechanisms when there is a shortage of goods, the company shares the production cost of the farmer and the above mentioned two kinds of contract mechanism. The influences of uncertainty (natural random factors), market demand uncertainty (market random factors) and farmers' loss avoidance behavior on the decision-making behavior and coordination mechanism of agricultural products are investigated. The purpose of this paper is to put forward a more robust and operable contract mechanism for farmers and companies in order to enhance the robustness of orders and improve the income of companies and farmers. In this paper, the optimal decision-making behavior of supply chain under the mode of centralized decision-making is studied. The results show that the optimal input quantity increases with the increase of retail price and decreases with the increase of input cost. Secondly, this paper studies the choice of contract mechanism of "company farmer" type order agricultural supply chain when farmers are risk-neutral, and analyzes the mechanism of "cost sharing". The optimal decision-making behavior of farmers and companies under the mechanism of "penalty for shortage" and "penalty for shortage of cost sharing" is discussed. At the same time, whether the three kinds of contract mechanisms can realize the overall coordination of supply chain is discussed. Further, through numerical analysis, it is found that under certain conditions, the cost sharing mechanism can make the whole supply chain achieve the purpose of coordination, and the contract can also satisfy the performance of all parties involved in the supply chain improved. That is to say, satisfying the condition that the income of the company and the farmer is higher than the performance level without the contract. Finally, the incentive mechanism selection of order agricultural supply chain is considered under the condition of random output and random demand, which is composed of farmers and risk-neutral companies with loss avoidance characteristics. The value function of foreground theory is applied to the objective decision function of farmers to analyze the influence of the loss avoidance of farmers on the optimal decision-making behavior of farmers and companies. At the same time, the influence of three incentive mechanisms on the decision-making of farmers and companies is also analyzed. The results show that the production input of farmers increases with the increase of their loss avoidance degree, and the three incentive mechanism contracts increase the response coefficient of farmers' optimal input to the amount of company orders compared with those without contracts. Further, through numerical analysis, it is found that for farmers with loss aversion, cost sharing mechanism, no mechanism, mixed mechanism may be the optimal contract mechanism between farmers and companies, which depends on the loss aversion degree of farmers. Rate of output and volatility of market demand. For the supply chain as a whole, these three contracts are difficult to realize the coordination of the supply chain, but under certain conditions, the cost sharing mechanism and the mixed mechanism have their rationality, which makes the utility of the company, farmers, supply chain as a whole improved. Coordinate the supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：華南理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F326.6;F324

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