本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈 + 合作廣告　； 參考：《蘭州大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：供應(yīng)鏈合作廣告作為一種成本分擔機制,是供應(yīng)鏈渠道協(xié)調(diào)的一個重要組成部分,它通過供應(yīng)鏈成員對廣告成本的合理分擔來實現(xiàn)對供應(yīng)鏈渠道的協(xié)調(diào)。供應(yīng)鏈合作廣告包括全國性廣告和地方性廣告,制造商為強化其品牌知名度在而做全國性廣告,零售商則通過地方性廣告向消費者提供更詳細的產(chǎn)品信息。 本文考慮了在市場需求具有價格敏感性的環(huán)境下,將單一制造商與單一零售商雙方的廣告努力水平與成本的關(guān)系,以及制造商直接給予消費者一個價格折扣這兩種情況引入合作廣告模型,建立了非線性需求函數(shù)。在此基礎(chǔ)之上,研究了四種合作廣告博弈模型,首先是經(jīng)典的制造商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者零售商為追隨者的Stackelberg博弈模型；其次是針對零售商在市場經(jīng)濟中地位的不斷提高,權(quán)利也逐漸增大這一現(xiàn)象,探討了零售商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者制造商為追隨者的Stackelberg博弈模型；第三是考慮到制造商和零售商權(quán)利對等這一關(guān)系,分析了Nash均衡下的合作廣告；第四是建立了合作博弈,制造商和零售商雙方以系統(tǒng)利潤最大化來進行合作廣告。進而對這四種合作廣告博弈模型下的合作廣告方案進行對比分析,并以制造商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的Stackelberg博弈為例,將其與合作博弈進行比較,并用帕累托改進對其進行充分的協(xié)調(diào),得出制造商和零售商平分供應(yīng)鏈額外利潤的結(jié)論。最后,通過數(shù)值分析對上述結(jié)果進行了驗證。 研究結(jié)果指出,在制造商或零售商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的Stackelberg博弈模型中,制造商與零售商所投入的廣告努力水平及獲得的利潤大于Nash均衡中的下的廣告努力水平及利潤,這說明這兩種合作廣告博弈模型是優(yōu)于Nash均衡中的合作廣告模型的。但是,與其他三種非合作博弈模型相比,充分協(xié)調(diào)后的合作博弈廣告模型是最具有優(yōu)勢的,這種情形下,制造商和零售商平分供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的額外收益,合作博弈下的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)利潤最大而且制造商和零售商所投入的廣告努力水平也最大。
[Abstract]:As a cost sharing mechanism, cooperative advertising in supply chain is an important part of supply chain channel coordination. It realizes the coordination of supply chain channel through the reasonable sharing of advertising cost among members of supply chain. Supply chain partnerships include national and local advertising, with manufacturers making nationwide ads to enhance their brand awareness, and retailers providing consumers with more detailed product information through local advertising. In this paper, we consider the relationship between the level of advertising effort and the cost of a single manufacturer and a single retailer in a price-sensitive environment. In addition, the cooperative advertising model is introduced in which the manufacturer gives consumers a price discount directly, and the nonlinear demand function is established. On this basis, four kinds of cooperative advertising game models are studied, one is the Stackelberg game model in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower, and the other is the increasing status of the retailer in the market economy. This phenomenon is gradually increased, and the Stackelberg game model in which the retailer is the leader manufacturer is discussed. Thirdly, considering the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer's right equivalence, the cooperative advertising under Nash equilibrium is analyzed. Fourth, a cooperative game is established, in which both manufacturers and retailers maximize the profit of the system to carry out cooperative advertising. Then the cooperative advertising schemes under the four cooperative advertising game models are compared and analyzed, and the Stackelberg game with manufacturer as the leader is taken as an example to compare it with the cooperative game, and to coordinate it fully with the Pareto improvement. The conclusion that manufacturers and retailers divide the extra profit of supply chain equally. Finally, the above results are verified by numerical analysis. The results show that in the Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer or retailer is the leader, the advertising effort and profit of the manufacturer and the retailer are higher than those of the Nash equilibrium. This shows that the two cooperative advertising game models are superior to the cooperative advertising model in Nash equilibrium. However, compared with the other three non-cooperative game models, the fully coordinated cooperative game advertising model is the most advantageous. In this case, manufacturers and retailers share the additional benefits of the supply chain system equally. The profit of supply chain system under cooperative game is the biggest, and the advertising effort of manufacturer and retailer is also the largest.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F713.8

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