本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈 + 預(yù)測(cè)　； 參考：《中國(guó)管理科學(xué)》2013年05期

【摘要】：以報(bào)童模型為基礎(chǔ),研究了在由單一生廠商和零售商組成的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,生產(chǎn)商如何通過(guò)契約設(shè)計(jì)來(lái)影響零售商的需求預(yù)測(cè)行為,使其收益最大化的問(wèn)題。文章基于靜態(tài)博弈模型對(duì)此問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)在整合供應(yīng)鏈情境下,當(dāng)需求預(yù)測(cè)成本較小時(shí)選擇預(yù)測(cè)能夠獲得更高的期望收益;在分散式供應(yīng)鏈情境下,當(dāng)生產(chǎn)商選擇預(yù)測(cè)契約時(shí),預(yù)測(cè)成本最終由生產(chǎn)商承擔(dān),且其期望收益為預(yù)測(cè)成本的減函數(shù),而選擇無(wú)預(yù)測(cè)契約時(shí)則為預(yù)測(cè)成本的非減函數(shù);最后通過(guò)生產(chǎn)商期望收益對(duì)比,給出了最優(yōu)策略。
[Abstract]:Based on the newsboy model, this paper studies how the manufacturer influences the retailer's demand forecasting behavior and maximizes its profit through contract design in the supply chain system composed of single manufacturer and retailer. Based on the static game model, this paper analyzes this problem and finds that in the integrated supply chain situation, the expected income can be higher when the cost of demand forecasting is small, and in the decentralized supply chain. When the producer chooses the forecast contract, the forecast cost is ultimately borne by the producer, and the expected income is the reduction function of the forecast cost, while the non-reduction function of the forecast cost is chosen without the forecast contract. Finally, the expected income of the producer is compared. The optimal strategy is given.
【作者單位】： 長(zhǎng)安大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(13BJY080) 陜西省軟科學(xué)研究計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(2012KRZ10)
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F274

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本文編號(hào)：2081726