天堂国产午夜亚洲专区-少妇人妻综合久久蜜臀-国产成人户外露出视频在线-国产91传媒一区二区三区

當(dāng)前位置:主頁 > 管理論文 > 供應(yīng)鏈論文 >

基于雙重Stackelberg博弈的供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)融資決策研究

發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-06-18 01:46

  本文選題:供應(yīng)鏈金融 + 融資模式 ; 參考:《河北工程大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文


【摘要】:供應(yīng)鏈金融是以發(fā)生在供應(yīng)鏈上的商業(yè)交易為基礎(chǔ),成員企業(yè)以核心企業(yè)的資信實(shí)力和商業(yè)信用為依托的融資模式,供應(yīng)鏈金融工具的采用是一種供應(yīng)鏈金融系統(tǒng)參與主體間的博弈行為。研究供應(yīng)鏈金融系統(tǒng)參與主體對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈金融工具選擇的博弈決策過程,有助于從理論與實(shí)務(wù)兩方面分析供應(yīng)鏈的管理內(nèi)涵。 基于供應(yīng)鏈金融的研究成果和博弈論分析知識(shí),研究供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)針對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈金融工具的融資決策行為。采用規(guī)范研究方法界定系統(tǒng)變量,對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈金融的三種融資模式——預(yù)付賬款融資、動(dòng)產(chǎn)質(zhì)押融資、應(yīng)收賬款融資,分別構(gòu)建二級(jí)單周期的雙重Stackelberg博弈模型。在銀行與供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)的博弈中,設(shè)定銀行為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)整體為跟隨者;在核心企業(yè)與成員企業(yè)的博弈中,設(shè)定核心企業(yè)為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,成員企業(yè)為跟隨者。利用各參與主體的期望收益函數(shù)和博弈的均衡解分析成員企業(yè)的策略選擇,博弈分析得到如下結(jié)論:在預(yù)付賬款融資模式中,核心企業(yè)提供擔(dān)保、銀行提供貸款時(shí),,得到成員企業(yè)融資決策的影響因素是產(chǎn)品批發(fā)單價(jià)和貸款利率;在動(dòng)產(chǎn)質(zhì)押融資模式中,核心企業(yè)提供擔(dān)保、銀行提供貸款時(shí),得到成員企業(yè)融資決策的影響因素是存貨質(zhì)押率和貸款利率;在應(yīng)收賬款融資模式中,核心企業(yè)提供擔(dān)保、銀行提供貸款時(shí),得到成員企業(yè)融資決策的影響因素是核心企業(yè)交付的保證金以及貸款利率、應(yīng)收賬款總額,三種模式分別給出了參與主體選擇策略的條件,對(duì)分析供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)融資決策過程提供了依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Supply chain finance is a financing model based on the commercial transactions occurring in the supply chain, and the member enterprises rely on the credit strength and commercial credit of the core enterprises. The adoption of supply chain financial instruments is a game behavior among the participants of supply chain financial system. It is helpful to analyze the connotation of supply chain management from the aspects of theory and practice by studying the game decision-making process between the participants of supply chain financial system and the choice of supply chain financial instruments. Based on the research results of supply chain finance and the knowledge of game theory, this paper studies the financing decision-making behavior of supply chain member enterprises in view of supply chain financial instruments. The system variables are defined by the normative research method, and the double Stackelberg game model of two-stage single cycle is constructed for the three financing modes of supply chain finance, namely, prepaid account financing, chattel pledge financing and receivables financing. In the game between the bank and the supply chain enterprise, the bank is the leader, the supply chain enterprise is the follower, in the game between the core enterprise and the member enterprise, the core enterprise is the leader and the member enterprise is the follower. By using the expected income function of the participants and the equilibrium solution of the game to analyze the strategic choice of the member enterprises, the game analysis draws the following conclusions: in the prepayment financing model, when the core enterprise provides guarantee, the bank provides the loan. The factors influencing the financing decision of the member enterprises are the wholesale unit price of products and the interest rate of loans. In the financing mode of chattel pledge, the core enterprise provides the guarantee, the bank provides the loan, The influencing factors of financing decision of member enterprises are inventory pledge rate and loan interest rate. In the model of accounts receivable financing, the core enterprise provides guarantee and the bank provides loan. The factors that influence the financing decision of the member enterprises are the deposit delivered by the core enterprises, the loan interest rate, the total amount of accounts receivable, and the conditions of the choice strategy of the participants are given respectively in the three models. It provides the basis for analyzing the financing decision process of supply chain member enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:河北工程大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F274;F406.7;F426.72

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 夏泰鳳;金雪軍;;供應(yīng)鏈金融解困中小企業(yè)融資難的優(yōu)勢分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2011年06期

2 曹邦英;羅爽;;成都中小企業(yè)集群融資體系的構(gòu)建[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2006年10期

3 曹文彬;馬翠香;;基于供應(yīng)鏈金融的應(yīng)收賬款融資博弈分析[J];商業(yè)研究;2013年03期

4 張誠;;我國供應(yīng)鏈管理研究綜述[J];華東交通大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2011年03期

5 魯其輝;曾利飛;周偉華;;供應(yīng)鏈應(yīng)收賬款融資的決策分析與價(jià)值研究[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2012年05期

6 喬曉宇;;供應(yīng)鏈金融模式下成本收益的博弈分析[J];商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年22期

7 楊繼瑞;楊蓉;孟憲芮;;動(dòng)產(chǎn)質(zhì)押融資模式的若干問題探討[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家;2011年08期

8 柳斌;;美國小企業(yè)融資經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)緩解我國中小企業(yè)融資困境的啟示[J];金融經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年14期

9 魏巍;;貨幣政策轉(zhuǎn)向環(huán)境下中小企業(yè)融資問題研究[J];金融理論與教學(xué);2012年01期

10 郭戰(zhàn)琴;;基于供應(yīng)鏈金融的小微企業(yè)融資模式——以第三方龍頭物流企業(yè)為平臺(tái)[J];金融理論與實(shí)踐;2012年01期



本文編號(hào):2033449

資料下載
論文發(fā)表

本文鏈接:http://www.sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/gongyinglianguanli/2033449.html


Copyright(c)文論論文網(wǎng)All Rights Reserved | 網(wǎng)站地圖 |

版權(quán)申明:資料由用戶2e3cd***提供,本站僅收錄摘要或目錄,作者需要?jiǎng)h除請(qǐng)E-mail郵箱bigeng88@qq.com