本文選題：電力供應(yīng)鏈 + 合作博弈��； 參考：《河北工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國電力體制改革的逐步深入與電力市場的初步形成，電力供應(yīng)鏈上的節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)將成為電力市場中真正的競爭主體，尤其是燃料企業(yè)、發(fā)電企業(yè)、電網(wǎng)企業(yè)，承擔(dān)著優(yōu)化整條供應(yīng)鏈的責(zé)任。市場運(yùn)營環(huán)境下電力供應(yīng)鏈的利益分配是指電力供應(yīng)鏈上的節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)相互溝通、協(xié)作，通過共享合約理論，同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)自身利益最大化和電力供應(yīng)鏈整體績效的最優(yōu)。論文在全面回顧一般商品供應(yīng)鏈利益分配的研究基礎(chǔ)上，借助合作博弈理論、收入共享合約理論、非線性互補(bǔ)方法，系統(tǒng)研究了考慮輸電網(wǎng)約束的電力供應(yīng)鏈利益分配問題。 在綜合分析供應(yīng)鏈管理和供應(yīng)鏈的利益分配相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上，針對三級供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)，，設(shè)計(jì)了基于共享合約供應(yīng)鏈的利益分配模型。首先選取以供應(yīng)商、生產(chǎn)商和零售商組成的三級供應(yīng)鏈為研究對象，討論了優(yōu)化的供應(yīng)鏈的渠道和雙贏條件下的收益分享問題；然后在此基礎(chǔ)之上引入預(yù)期收益增長率優(yōu)化一般的收益共享模型，強(qiáng)化了雙贏條件；最后通過數(shù)據(jù)分析得出，在強(qiáng)化的雙贏條件下縮小了收益分配因子的取值范圍，并且有一組特定的取值可以滿足整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈中的所有節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的預(yù)期收益增長率相同。 基于一般商品三級供應(yīng)鏈利益分配模型，在考慮輸電網(wǎng)約束條件下，耦合鏈上煤炭企業(yè)、發(fā)電企業(yè)、電網(wǎng)企業(yè)優(yōu)化決策問題，構(gòu)建模型，并采用非線性互補(bǔ)方法對模型求解。通過算例分析表明，收入共享合約能將電力供應(yīng)鏈的利潤按收入共享因子進(jìn)行分配，實(shí)現(xiàn)鏈上成員的個(gè)體理性決策達(dá)到供應(yīng)鏈整體績效最優(yōu)，達(dá)到電力供應(yīng)鏈的穩(wěn)定和優(yōu)化的目的，從而緩解煤電供需矛盾。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of China's power system reform and the initial formation of the electricity market, the node enterprises in the power supply chain will become the real competitors in the electricity market, especially the fuel enterprises, power generation enterprises and grid enterprises. Assume the responsibility of optimizing the whole supply chain. The distribution of power supply chain benefits in the market operation environment means that the node enterprises in the power supply chain communicate and cooperate with each other and realize the maximum of their own benefits and the optimal overall performance of the power supply chain through the theory of shared contract. On the basis of a comprehensive review of the research on the benefit distribution of general commodity supply chain, with the help of cooperative game theory, revenue sharing contract theory and nonlinear complementary method, this paper systematically studies the benefit distribution problem of power supply chain considering transmission network constraints. Based on the comprehensive analysis of supply chain management and benefit distribution theory, a model of benefit distribution based on shared contract supply chain is designed for the structure of three-level supply chain. Firstly, a three-level supply chain consisting of suppliers, producers and retailers is chosen as the research object, and the optimal supply chain channel and the revenue-sharing problem under win-win conditions are discussed. On this basis, we introduce the general revenue sharing model to optimize the expected income growth rate, and strengthen the win-win condition. Finally, through the data analysis, we can conclude that the range of the income distribution factor is reduced under the enhanced win-win condition. And there is a specific set of values can meet the entire supply chain of all node enterprises with the same expected growth rate of income. Based on the benefit distribution model of general commodity three-level supply chain, considering the constraints of transmission network, the optimization decision problem of coal enterprises, power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises in the coupling chain is established, and the model is solved by nonlinear complementary method. The example analysis shows that the revenue sharing contract can distribute the profit of the power supply chain according to the income sharing factor, and realize the individual rational decision of the members in the chain to achieve the optimal overall performance of the supply chain. To achieve the purpose of power supply chain stability and optimization, so as to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand of coal and electricity.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.61;F274

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