本文選題：閉環(huán)供應鏈 + 回收策略��； 參考：《河北工業(yè)大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：為了推動經(jīng)濟發(fā)展向對環(huán)境危害更小、對資源利用更有效的模式邁進，越來越多的國家開始更多的關注廢舊品這類寶貴資源的再造活動，并紛紛立法將其提上日程。再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈作為一種與環(huán)境共生的系統(tǒng)，對傳統(tǒng)的正向供應鏈進行了拓展，將逆向階段的供應鏈活動也納入其中，其一經(jīng)提出便迅速成為各界普遍關注的熱點。在整個閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)的決策之中，各成員的定價決策及對供應鏈的契約協(xié)調又是其中較為重要的環(huán)節(jié)。本文在從三個方面梳理閉環(huán)供應鏈相關研究的基礎之上，基于博弈論、供應鏈契約協(xié)調理論，研究和對比了產(chǎn)品通過混合渠道銷售時閉環(huán)供應鏈各成員在集中決策和分散決策三種單渠道回收模式下的定價策略與利潤情況，并引入二部定價契約試圖解決閉環(huán)供應鏈的協(xié)調問題，進一步分析了銷售渠道間價格差彈性系數(shù)變化對閉環(huán)供應鏈的影響。在此基礎上，研究和對比了產(chǎn)品通過混合渠道銷售和回收的閉環(huán)供應鏈在集中決策和分散決策三種混合回收模式下各成員的定價決策和利潤情況，并引入收入費用共享契約探討了閉環(huán)供應鏈的協(xié)調問題，進一步考察了回收渠道間價格差彈性系數(shù)變化對閉環(huán)供應鏈的影響。主要研究成果如下： ⑴對于混合渠道銷售和單渠道回收的閉環(huán)供應鏈，分散決策時系統(tǒng)利潤均小于集中決策時的情形，制造商直接回收模式對整個閉環(huán)供應鏈是最優(yōu)的選擇，，二部定價契約可解決閉環(huán)供應鏈協(xié)調問題，銷售渠道間競爭加劇對制造商和閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)利益的提高起到積極作用，但其不是越劇烈越好。 ⑵對于混合渠道銷售和混合渠道回收的閉環(huán)供應鏈，分散決策時系統(tǒng)的效益均存在損失，可根據(jù)回收價格差彈性系數(shù)的臨界值進行回收渠道的決策，收入費用共享契約可成功彌補分散決策時系統(tǒng)的效益損失，回收渠道間競爭加劇對制造商和整個閉環(huán)供應鏈效益的提高同樣起到促進作用，但其也不是越劇烈越好。
[Abstract]:In order to promote economic development to the mode of less harm to the environment and more effective use of resources, more and more countries begin to pay more attention to the recycling of valuable resources such as waste goods and put it on the agenda by legislation. As a symbiotic system with environment, the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain extends the traditional forward supply chain and includes the reverse phase supply chain activities. In the decision-making of the whole closed-loop supply chain system, the pricing decision of each member and the contract coordination of the supply chain are the more important links. In this paper, based on three aspects of closed-loop supply chain related research, based on game theory, supply chain contract coordination theory, This paper studies and compares the pricing strategies and profits of the members of the closed-loop supply chain under the three single-channel recovery modes of centralized decision and decentralized decision when the products are sold through mixed channels. Two pricing contracts are introduced to solve the coordination problem of the closed-loop supply chain, and the influence of the change of the price difference elasticity coefficient between the sales channels on the closed-loop supply chain is analyzed. On this basis, the paper studies and compares the pricing decision and profit of each member of the closed-loop supply chain which is sold and recovered through mixed channels under the three mixed recovery modes of centralized decision and decentralized decision. The coordination problem of the closed-loop supply chain is discussed by introducing the revenue-cost sharing contract, and the influence of the variation of the price difference elasticity coefficient among the recovery channels on the closed-loop supply chain is further investigated. The main findings are as follows: 1 for the closed-loop supply chain with mixed channel sales and single-channel recovery, the system profit in decentralized decision-making is smaller than that in centralized decision, and the manufacturer direct recovery model is the best choice for the whole closed-loop supply chain. Two pricing contracts can solve the problem of closed-loop supply chain coordination. The competition between sales channels plays a positive role in improving the interests of manufacturers and closed-loop supply chain systems, but it is not the more intense the better. 2 for the closed-loop supply chain with mixed channel sales and mixed channel recovery, the benefit of the system has been lost in the decentralized decision-making, and the recovery channel decision can be made according to the critical value of the elasticity coefficient of the recovery price difference. The revenue-cost sharing contract can make up for the loss of benefit of the system in the decentralized decision. The competition between the recovery channels can promote the benefit of the manufacturer and the whole closed-loop supply chain, but it is not the more intense the better.
【學位授予單位】：河北工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F224.32

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