本文選題：供應(yīng)商管理庫(kù)存 + 價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼機(jī)制　； 參考：《物流技術(shù)》2016年02期

【摘要】：將供應(yīng)商管理庫(kù)存(VMI)引入軍事供應(yīng)鏈,考慮隨機(jī)需求下軍用物資的持有成本和缺貨成本,建立傳統(tǒng)、Stackelberg博弈的價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼機(jī)制(MMM)協(xié)調(diào)模型,揭示協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制中單位缺貨成本和單位補(bǔ)貼的范圍對(duì)于軍事供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的影響。
[Abstract]:The supplier management inventory (VMI) is introduced into the military supply chain. Considering the holding cost and the shortage cost of military materials under random demand, the traditional and Stackelberg game price subsidy mechanism (MMM) coordination model is established to reveal the effect of the unit shortage cost and the scope of unit subsidy on the coordination of military supply chain in the coordination mechanism.

【作者單位】： 后勤工程學(xué)院軍事物流教研室;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金軍事學(xué)項(xiàng)目(14GJ003-106)
【分類號(hào)】：E144
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本文編號(hào)：1884440