本文選題：冷鏈產(chǎn)品 + 銷售投入　； 參考：《浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,人們對冷鏈產(chǎn)品需求的不斷增加,我國冷鏈物流的發(fā)展越來越快。由于冷鏈產(chǎn)品易腐的特性,在銷售過程中為了使產(chǎn)品始終處于低溫狀態(tài)而需要投入額外的冷鏈銷售成本以保證產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量。由于投入額外的銷售成本使得原本供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)被打破,如何使供應(yīng)鏈在上述冷鏈條件下重新達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)是一個(gè)值得探討的問題。本文針對冷鏈產(chǎn)品的銷售投入影響需求情況下的供應(yīng)鏈,從由零售商承擔(dān)銷售投入成本和由供應(yīng)商承擔(dān)銷售投入成本兩個(gè)不同的角度,分別建立了回購契約模型和收益共享契約模型。首先考慮由零售商承擔(dān)冷鏈銷售投入的成本,為了使供應(yīng)鏈重新協(xié)調(diào),提出回購契約,即供應(yīng)商對零售商的剩余產(chǎn)品以某個(gè)低于批發(fā)價(jià)的價(jià)格進(jìn)行回購,幫助分擔(dān)零售商銷售投入的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。其次考慮由供應(yīng)商承擔(dān)冷鏈銷售投入的成本,為了使供應(yīng)鏈重新協(xié)調(diào),提出收益共享契約,即供應(yīng)商設(shè)立一個(gè)零售商的訂購數(shù)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn),當(dāng)零售商的訂購數(shù)量低于此標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時(shí),供應(yīng)商將對零售商進(jìn)行懲罰,單位懲罰金額由供應(yīng)商決定；當(dāng)零售商的訂購數(shù)量高于此標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時(shí),供應(yīng)商不作任何懲罰或獎勵。最后的分析和算例表明,兩個(gè)改進(jìn)后的契約模型都能使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)。但是在回購契約中,供應(yīng)鏈整體收益、零售商收益和供應(yīng)商收益均大于收益共享契約中各自的收益。本文的分析結(jié)果為冷鏈物流中的供應(yīng)商和零售商的實(shí)際操作提供一定的理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of national economy and the increasing demand for cold chain products, the development of cold chain logistics in China is getting faster and faster.Due to the perishability of cold-chain products, in order to keep the products at low temperature, extra cost of cold-chain sales is needed to ensure the quality of the products.Since the original supply chain coordination has been broken due to the extra sales cost, how to make the supply chain coordinate again under the cold chain conditions is a problem worth discussing.This paper aims at the supply chain in which the sales input of the cold-chain product affects the demand, from two different angles: the retailer bears the cost of the sales input and the supplier bears the cost of the sales input.The repurchase contract model and the income sharing contract model are established respectively.In order to recoordinate the supply chain, a repurchase contract is put forward, that is, the supplier repurchases the retailer's surplus products at a price lower than the wholesale price.Help share the risk of retail sales inputs.Secondly, considering the cost of cold-chain sales input by supplier, in order to recoordinate the supply chain, a profit-sharing contract is put forward, that is, the supplier sets up a retailer's order quantity standard, when the retailer's order quantity is below this standard,The supplier will punish the retailer, and the unit penalty will be determined by the supplier. When the retailer's order quantity is above this standard, the supplier will not make any punishment or reward.Finally, the analysis and numerical examples show that the two improved contract models can make the supply chain coordinate.However, in the repurchase contract, the overall revenue of supply chain, the retailer's income and the supplier's income are all higher than the respective income in the revenue-sharing contract.The results of this paper provide a theoretical basis for the actual operation of suppliers and retailers in cold chain logistics.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 代建生;孟衛(wèi)東;;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避下具有促銷效應(yīng)的收益共享契約[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2014年05期

，

本文編號：1751942