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  本文選題：供應鏈 + 聯(lián)合契約��； 參考：《北京郵電大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：云計算通過Internet將一切計算資源以服務的形式提供給用戶,而根據(jù)不同的資源類型和服務層次,可以將資源提供者劃分為IaaS、 PaaS、SaaS服務提供商。針對這一背景,本文以云計算服務提供商為主體,構建云計算服務供應鏈。以減少需求不確定性所帶來的風險和提高云計算服務供應鏈績效為目標,設計出行之有效的、并為各方主體所樂于接受的協(xié)調機制。 本文的研究主要集中在以下三個方面： (1)設計了一種聯(lián)合契約,即引入獎勵與懲罰機制的數(shù)量柔性契約,實現(xiàn)了對稱信息下二級云計算服務供應鏈的協(xié)調。該服務供應鏈由AIP(Application Infrastructrue Provider)和ASP(Application Service Provider)構成,其中ASP向AIP租賃計算能力服務,并將增值的服務提供給市場。假設在完全信息市場中,市場需求服從均勻分布且價格敏感。以LF博弈(Leader-follower Game)理論考察AIP與ASP的決策行為。通過對比集中決策、分散決策、數(shù)量柔性契約和聯(lián)合契約下,供應鏈的整體績效,說明聯(lián)合不僅能實現(xiàn)供應鏈協(xié)調,還能任意分配協(xié)調利潤。 (2)提出了一種數(shù)量折扣和收入共享的聯(lián)合契約,實現(xiàn)了不對稱信息下二級云計算服務供應鏈網(wǎng)絡的協(xié)調。該網(wǎng)絡由1個AIP、1個潛在AIP和N個ASP構成,其中AIP與潛在AIP競爭為ASP提供服務；不同的ASP面向市場提供不同類型的SaaS服務,該服務系統(tǒng)可近似抽象為M/M/1排隊系統(tǒng)。ASP面對相互獨立、價格敏感的等彈性需求。ASP擁有私有信息,即市場需求和自身最小服務期望租賃量。研究結果表明,分散決策及數(shù)量折扣契約無法實現(xiàn)供應鏈協(xié)調,而聯(lián)合契約不僅能實現(xiàn)供應鏈的績效協(xié)調,還能提供參與方的利潤。 (3)運用數(shù)量折扣與聯(lián)合契約的聯(lián)合應用,實現(xiàn)了不對稱信息下的三級云計算服務供應鏈網(wǎng)絡的協(xié)調。該網(wǎng)絡由1個AIP、1個APP(Application Platform Provider)和N個ASP構成。AIP為APP提供計算能力服務,APP為ASP提供平臺服務,ASP向市場提供增值的應用服務。ASP面對相互獨立、價格敏感的等彈性需求,且擁有私有信息。研究表明,參與各方的自利行為將導致雙邊際化效應,而聯(lián)合契約能有效的引導和激勵各方的決策行為,實現(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調。
[Abstract]:Cloud computing provides all computing resources to users in the form of services through Internet. According to different resource types and service levels, resource providers can be divided into IaaSs, PaaSnSaaS service providers.In view of this background, this paper takes cloud computing service provider as the main body, constructs cloud computing service supply chain.Aiming at reducing the risk of demand uncertainty and improving the performance of cloud computing service supply chain, an effective and acceptable coordination mechanism is designed.This paper focuses on the following three aspects:1) A joint contract is designed, that is, the quantity flexible contract with reward and punishment mechanism is introduced to realize the coordination of the two-level cloud computing service supply chain under symmetric information.The service supply chain consists of AIP(Application Infrastructrue provider and ASP(Application Service provider, where ASP rents computing power to AIP and provides value-added services to the market.Assume that in a complete information market, market demand is evenly distributed and price-sensitive.The decision behavior of AIP and ASP is investigated by using the Leader-follower game theory of LF game.By comparing the overall performance of supply chain with centralized decision, decentralized decision, quantity flexible contract and joint contract, it is shown that alliance can not only realize coordination of supply chain, but also distribute coordination profit arbitrarily.A joint contract of quantity discount and revenue sharing is proposed to coordinate the two-level cloud computing service supply chain network under asymmetric information.The network consists of an AIP, a potential AIP and N ASP, in which AIP competes with potential AIP to provide services for ASP, and different ASP provide different types of SaaS services to the market. The service system can be abstracted as M/M/1 queuing system.The price-sensitive iso-elastic demand .ASP has private information, that is, the market demand and its own minimum service expected lease amount.The results show that decentralized decision and quantity discount contract can not achieve supply chain coordination, and the joint contract can not only achieve the coordination of supply chain performance, but also provide the profits of the participants.3) the coordination of three-level cloud computing service supply chain network under asymmetric information is realized by using the combined application of quantity discount and joint contract.The network is composed of 1 AIP, 1 APP(Application Platform provider, and N ASP. AIP provides computing power service for APP. App provides platform service for ASP. ASP provides value-added application service. ASP is faced with independent, price-sensitive and other elastic demands, and has private information.The research shows that the self-interest behavior of the parties involved will lead to the double marginalization effect, and the joint contract can effectively guide and motivate the decision-making behavior of the parties and achieve the coordination of the supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：北京郵電大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：TP393.09

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本文編號：1743942