本文選題：品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng) + 渠道決策��； 參考：《東華大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日趨激烈,網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道正在迅速影響著企業(yè)的渠道策略,其特有的優(yōu)勢(shì)和潛力吸引著學(xué)術(shù)界和企業(yè),越來越多的企業(yè)己經(jīng)或準(zhǔn)備進(jìn)行渠道的整合。從消費(fèi)者角度來說,渠道的多樣化意味著更多的購買選擇和成本節(jié)約,渠道結(jié)合的銷售模式能夠滿足消費(fèi)者購買產(chǎn)品時(shí)的各種需求。對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)而言,渠道的選擇是一個(gè)至關(guān)重要的經(jīng)營決策,直接關(guān)系到在同類產(chǎn)品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中勝出、企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略能否順利實(shí)現(xiàn)。鑒于此,本文應(yīng)用消費(fèi)者效用函數(shù)、Stackelberg博弈和演化博弈等,探討品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的供應(yīng)鏈渠道選擇決策以及相關(guān)參數(shù)對(duì)于決策變量的影響,以期探索出供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)的渠道模式,從而為企業(yè)渠道戰(zhàn)略提供參考依據(jù)。本文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容分為三個(gè)部分:首先,在已知單一品牌供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,利用Stackelberg博弈來研究無品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下供應(yīng)鏈的渠道選擇優(yōu)化策略,分析渠道替代率對(duì)于渠道定價(jià)、銷售量以及利潤(rùn)的影響,探索渠道改進(jìn)的帕累托區(qū)域;其次,在自有品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,探究了自有品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下供應(yīng)鏈的渠道選擇優(yōu)化策略,分析品牌相對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力對(duì)于渠道定價(jià)、銷售量以及利潤(rùn)的影響;最后,借助動(dòng)態(tài)的演化博弈理論,建立制造商是否開辟直銷渠道和零售商是否引入自有品牌的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程,通過對(duì)制造商和零售商平衡點(diǎn)的穩(wěn)定性分析,歸納得到供應(yīng)鏈渠道選擇的長(zhǎng)期演化結(jié)果。結(jié)果表明:(1)在單一品牌供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,對(duì)于制造商而言,混合雙渠模式下獲得的利潤(rùn)最高,單直銷渠道模式下的利潤(rùn)高于單傳統(tǒng)渠道模式下的利潤(rùn);但對(duì)零售商來說,單一傳統(tǒng)渠道模式優(yōu)于混合雙渠道模式。當(dāng)制造商在單傳統(tǒng)渠道模式下開辟直銷渠道時(shí),需要應(yīng)用不高于1-β_1的批發(fā)價(jià)格折扣才能使得供應(yīng)鏈得到協(xié)調(diào),達(dá)到帕累托改進(jìn)。(2)在自有品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,制造商的最佳渠道決策為混合雙渠道模式,單直銷渠道模式獲得的利潤(rùn)其次,單傳統(tǒng)渠道模式獲得的利潤(rùn)最低;對(duì)于零售商來說,單傳統(tǒng)渠道模式和混合雙渠道模式均優(yōu)于單直銷渠道模式,混合雙渠道模式與單傳統(tǒng)渠道模式的優(yōu)劣決定于品牌相對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力、品牌替代率以及渠道替代率。(3)在供應(yīng)鏈雙方均不知對(duì)方策略的情形下,供應(yīng)鏈長(zhǎng)期演化穩(wěn)定策略有兩種:當(dāng)制造商選擇引入直銷渠道,若零售商引入自有品牌所獲得利潤(rùn)低于不引入情形下的利潤(rùn),長(zhǎng)期演化結(jié)果是制造商建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道、零售商不引入自有品牌;若零售商引入自有品牌獲得利潤(rùn)高于不引入情形下的利潤(rùn)時(shí),長(zhǎng)期演化結(jié)果是制造商建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道、零售商引入自有品牌。因此,無論零售商是否引入自有品牌,制造商的最優(yōu)渠道策略是開辟直銷渠道。
[Abstract]:With the brand competition is becoming increasingly fierce, network marketing channel is rapidly affecting enterprise channel strategy, its unique advantages and potential to attract the academia and enterprises, more and more enterprises have already or ready for channel integration. From the consumer perspective, diverse channels means more choice and purchase cost saving channel according to the sales model can meet the various needs of consumers to buy products. For the enterprises in the supply chain, channel selection is one of the most important business decisions, is directly related to win in the competition of similar products, the enterprise strategy can be realized smoothly. In view of this, the application of consumer utility function, Stackelberg and the evolutionary game so, to explore the brand competition of supply chain channel selection and related parameters on the influence of the decision variables, in order to explore the optimal supply chain The channel mode, so as to provide reference basis for the enterprise channel strategy. The main content of this paper is divided into three parts: first, the known single brand supply chain system, to study the brand competition of supply chain by Stackelberg game channel selection optimization strategy, analysis the channel replacement rate for the channel sales and pricing effects profits, explore the Pareto regional channels improved; secondly, the supply chain system in its own brand competition in the supply chain optimization strategy of channel selection of its own brand competition, brand competitiveness analysis for the channel effect of relative pricing, sales volume and profit; finally, with the help of dynamic evolutionary game theory, establish whether the manufacturer opens the replication dynamic equation of the direct sales channels and retailers are introducing its own brand, the stability of the manufacturer and the retailer balance analysis, induction Long term evolution results of supply chain channel selection. The results showed that: (1) in a single brand in the supply chain, for manufacturers to obtain a mixed dual channel mode of the highest profit, single direct sales channels under the mode of profit is higher than that of single traditional channels under the mode of profit; but for retailers, the traditional single channel model is better than mixed double channel model. When the manufacturer opens the direct channel in single traditional channel mode, need to use discount wholesale price is not higher than 1- beta _1 make the supply chain coordinated, achieve Pareto improvement. (2) in a supply chain system with self brand competition, the manufacturer's best channel decision mixed double channel model secondly, to obtain single direct channel mode to obtain single profit, the traditional channel model the lowest profit; for retailers, the traditional single channel mode and mixed double channel model were better than the single direct Mixed double channel mode, channel mode and single mode determines the merits of traditional channels in relative brand competitiveness, brand replacement rate and channel replacement rate. (3) in the supply chain, both sides do not know each other in the case of supply chain strategy, long-term evolution has two stable strategy: when manufacturers choose to introduce direct sales channels, if the retailer is introduced own brand profit is lower than the case without introducing profit, long-term evolution result is manufacturers to establish direct marketing network, the retailer does not introduce its own brand; if the retailers own brand profit higher than in case of profit, long-term evolution result is manufacturers to build network of direct sales channels, retailers own brand. Therefore, no matter retailers are introducing their own brands, manufacturers is the optimal channel strategy to open up direct sales channels.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F273.2

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