本文選題：損失厭惡　切入點：部分延期支付　出處：《東華大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展和科學技術(shù)的進步,消費者需求的差異化越來越大,推動產(chǎn)品更新?lián)Q代加速,使得很多產(chǎn)品具備了季節(jié)性產(chǎn)品的特征:市場需求不穩(wěn)定、銷售期比生產(chǎn)提前期短、沒有售完產(chǎn)品的殘值較低。行業(yè)環(huán)境的變化、市場需求不確定和價格波動等不確定性因素會導致決策者面臨著很大風險,風險增加意味著損失的可能性會增加。一旦面臨高風險的市場時,決策者的行為往往變得謹慎,表現(xiàn)出損失厭惡的特質(zhì)。季節(jié)性產(chǎn)品市場中直接面臨這種風險的零售商,其損失厭惡的特性表現(xiàn)得更為明顯,也更需要受到供應(yīng)鏈核心企業(yè)的關(guān)注。目前,在企業(yè)實際管理和學術(shù)研究領(lǐng)域越來越重視損失厭惡對供應(yīng)鏈及各成員決策和收益的影響作用。延期支付作為一種激勵和協(xié)調(diào)手段,是指供應(yīng)鏈上游成員允許其下游成員在銷售期結(jié)束后再歸還貨款的一種商業(yè)信用,也是直接分擔風險的一種有效方式。本文在分析S玩具公司的實際運營問題的基礎(chǔ)上,重點研究延期支付對損失厭惡供應(yīng)鏈的決策和協(xié)調(diào)的影響,其中供應(yīng)商為了控制自身風險,要求損失厭惡型零售商在訂貨時立即支付部分貨款作為預(yù)付款。本文的具體內(nèi)容如下:首先基于S玩具公司的實際運營情況,分析了其時尚玩具的終端零售商的損失厭惡特性,以及這種損失厭惡對供應(yīng)鏈利益的影響。然后基于S公司存在的問題,建立了一個由單損失中性供應(yīng)商和多損失厭惡零售商構(gòu)成的供應(yīng)鏈模型,討論了零售商的損失厭惡特性和個數(shù)對供應(yīng)鏈利益、決策和協(xié)調(diào)的影響。其次,引入部分延期支付契約,對比分析了引入契約前后供應(yīng)鏈各方利益的變化,以及部分延期支付對損失中性和損失厭惡供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機制的不同;通過理論和數(shù)值分析證明了延期支付比例和批發(fā)價格聯(lián)合協(xié)調(diào)的可行性。最后,結(jié)合S玩具公司的實際情況和問題,提出可供參考的建議。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在供應(yīng)鏈中多個損失厭惡型零售商間存在納什均衡;分散決策下,存在唯一的最優(yōu)訂貨量能夠最優(yōu)化零售商的期望效用,并且最優(yōu)訂貨決策是損失厭惡的減函數(shù),是零售商數(shù)量的增函數(shù),是延期支付比例的增函數(shù);采用部分延期支付策略能增加系統(tǒng)收益;當批發(fā)價格一定時,在零售商損失厭惡或數(shù)量滿足一定條件下,部分延期支付在一定程度上能夠協(xié)調(diào)損失厭惡型供應(yīng)鏈;供應(yīng)商可以通過設(shè)計延期支付比例和批發(fā)價格組合合同來實現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)協(xié)調(diào),這種協(xié)調(diào)具有更強的柔性。最后基于這些研究結(jié)果,給S公司提出了面臨損失厭惡型零售商的參考性建議。
[Abstract]:With the development of society and economy and the progress of science and technology, the difference of consumer demand is more and more big, which accelerates the upgrading of products, and makes many products have the characteristics of seasonal products: market demand is unstable,The sales period is shorter than the production lead time and the residual value of the product is lower than that of the finished product.Due to the change of industry environment, uncertainty of market demand and price fluctuation, the decision makers will face great risks, and the increase of risk means that the possibility of loss will increase.When faced with high-risk markets, policymakers tend to behave cautiously and show a loss aversion.In the seasonal product market, the loss aversion of the retailers who directly face this kind of risk is more obvious, and it needs more attention of the core enterprises in the supply chain.At present, more and more attention has been paid to the influence of loss aversion on the decision and income of the supply chain and its members in the field of practical management and academic research.As a means of incentive and coordination, deferred payment is a commercial credit that the upstream members of the supply chain allow their downstream members to return the payment after the end of the sales period. It is also an effective way to share the risks directly.Based on the analysis of the actual operation of S Toy Company, this paper focuses on the impact of deferred payment on the decision and coordination of loss averse supply chain.A loss-averse retailer is required to pay part of the purchase price as an advance payment immediately upon ordering.The specific contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, based on the actual operation of S Toy Company, this paper analyzes the loss aversion characteristics of the end retailer of its fashion toys, and the influence of this loss aversion on the benefit of supply chain.Then a supply chain model consisting of single loss neutral supplier and multiple loss averse retailer is established based on the existing problems of S Company. The effects of retailers' loss aversion characteristics and number on the benefit, decision making and coordination of supply chain are discussed.Secondly, the partial deferred payment contract is introduced, and the change of the interests of all parties in the supply chain before and after the introduction of the contract is compared, and the difference of the coordination mechanism between the loss neutral and loss averse supply chain of partial deferred payment is analyzed.The feasibility of joint coordination of deferred payment ratio and wholesale price is proved by theoretical and numerical analysis.Finally, combined with the actual situation and problems of S toy company, some suggestions for reference are put forward.It is found that there is Nash equilibrium among multiple loss-averse retailers in the supply chain, and under decentralized decision, there is a unique optimal order quantity that can optimize the expected utility of the retailer, and the optimal ordering decision is a reduction function of loss aversion.It is the increment function of the number of retailers and the increment function of the proportion of deferred payment; the partial deferred payment strategy can increase the system income; when the wholesale price is fixed, the retailer will suffer loss aversion or the quantity can satisfy certain conditions.Partial deferred payment can coordinate loss aversion supply chain to a certain extent and suppliers can achieve system coordination by designing deferred payment ratio and wholesale price combination contract which is more flexible.Finally, based on the results of these studies, the paper gives S Company a reference recommendation for loss aversion retailers.
【學位授予單位】：東華大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F721.7

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